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Abstract
POROUS EMPIRE: FOREIGN VISITORS AND THE POST-STALIN SOVIET STATE

Alexander Hazanov
Benjamin Nathans

“Porous Empire” is a study of the relationship between Soviet institutions, Soviet society
and the millions of foreigners who visited the USSR between the mid-1950s and the mid1980s. “Porous Empire” traces how Soviet economic, propaganda, and state security
institutions, all shaped during the isolationist Stalin period, struggled to accommodate their
practices to millions of visitors with material expectations and assumed legal rights radically
unlike those of Soviet citizens. While much recent Soviet historiography focuses on the ways
in which the post-Stalin opening to the outside world led to the erosion of official Soviet
ideology, I argue that ideological attitudes inherited from the Stalin era structured
institutional responses to a growing foreign presence in Soviet life. Therefore, while Soviet
institutions had to accommodate their economic practices to the growing numbers of tourists
and other visitors inside the Soviet borders and were forced to concede the existence of
contact zones between foreigners and Soviet citizens that loosened some of the absolute
sovereignty claims of the Soviet party-statem, they remained loyal to visions of Soviet
economic independence, committed to fighting the cultural Cold War, and profoundly
suspicious of the outside world.
The gap between Soviet concessions to the era of international mobility and Soviet
attitudes to the outside world shaped the peculiar nature of globalization in its Soviet context:

even as the Soviet opening up to the world promoted Westernization and undermined
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some of the ideological foundations of Soviet power, it also generated, within the bowels
of Soviet institutions, a profound and honestly-held commitment to authoritarianism and
social discipline as an instrument of geopolitical resistance, a mental attitude that still
shapes Russian official approaches to the outside world 25 years after the fall of the
USSR.
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Introduction

In the late 1960s, the travel writers Delia and Ferdinand Kuhn joined the hallowed
tradition of Western travelers going to Muscovy/Russia/Soviet Union in order to decipher
the mysteries of the “Rude and Barbarous Kingdom.”1 In what was no doubt a major
coup by their literary agent, in the run-up to the publication of their travelogue, the Kuhns
were able to publish a summary of their findings on the pages of the New York Times
travel section.2
The Kuhns’ Times account of their travels begins with the following caveat:
“When the tourist enters the Soviet Union, the test tube of Communism, he is an alien
body not germane to the experiment.” From this perspective, the Kuhns explain the
alienating effects of travelling in the alternate universe that was the Soviet Union: the
“giant squid” of the Soviet state that engulfs the traveler, the myriad ways in which the
famed Soviet tourist monopoly, Intourist, both hinders the foreigner and shields him or
her from the vagaries of Soviet material life, and above all, the psychological costs of
“routine surveillance.” And yet, the Kuhns argue, as long as one follows Soviet law, has
the gumption to stand up to Intourist, and possesses curiosity and an open mind (and no
doubt, a copy of their travelogue), one could overcome the barriers the Soviets erected
between foreigners and unvarnished (and uncomfortable) truths about the Soviet Union.

1

Marshall Poe, Rude and Barbarous Kingdom: Russia in the Accounts of Sixteenth Century English
Voyagers (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2012).
2
Delia and Ferdinand Kuhn, “Foreign Bodies in the Communist Test Tube,” New York Times, 4/10/1970.

2

This perspective on the incommensurability of foreign bodies and the Soviet
system was shared by many Soviet officials - albeit from a radically different angle. A
1963 report on the misbehavior of one such foreign body, the American sociologist Lewis
Feuer, by the head of the Academy of Sciences Institute of Philosophy F.V.
Konstantinov, can serve as a useful case in point. During his four-month stay in the
Soviet Union, Feuer, Konstantinov complained, neglected his research topic, the
“theoretical foundations of historical materialism.” Instead, he spent his time “talking to
Soviet people on the street, in markets, in synagogues, in open meetings in educational
institutions”- all the while refusing the services of an officially assigned translator. Feuer
even enrolled his daughter in a Soviet school with the express purpose (according to
Konstantinov), of “spying on [vyvedat’] the moods of Soviet children and their parents’
opinions.” Even worse, Feuer not only shared his decidedly non-historical-materialist
perspective on Soviet society with many Soviet colleagues, but also caused a public scene
by declaring that Soviet Marxism was “at a crossroads,” that antisemitism was rife there,
and that the younger generation of Soviet people displayed a “powerful drift away from
Marxism” in a public address at the Institute. 3
Based on Feuer’s behavior, Konstantinov concluded that he and other American
exchange participants were not scientists at all, but simply “functionaries of the State
Department.” Therefore, he recommended, the Soviet Union should discontinue its

“F.V Konstantinov to TsK KPSS, 10/6/1965,” Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv noveishei istorii
[RGANI], f. 5, op. 55, d. 3, ll. 215-216.
3

3

exchange agreements with the Americans. These, he argues, served no useful purpose but
to provide a channel “for the infiltration of ideological spies, of blatant anticommunists
into our country.”4 This cri de coeur received a cold and laconic reply from the Central
Committee: Soviet officials in charge of the exchange program were well aware of
Feuer’s anti-Soviet proclivities, but could not reject his candidacy according to the terms
of the Soviet-American scientific-cultural exchange agreements.5
While their ideological predilections could not be further apart, Konstantinov, the
anonymous Central Committee official who rejected his request, and the Kuhns all
agreed on two crucial points. First, foreigners were indeed “alien bodies” quite unlike
anyone else in bloodstream of Soviet society. Second, the mighty immune system of the
Soviet state found itself rather ill-adapted to deal with the threats they posed. Seen from
the perspective of Soviet authorities, the Kuhns’ experimental metaphor was extremely
apt if, but not at all in the way the Kuhns envisioned it.Foreign visitors to the post-Stalin
Soviet Union were indeed participants in an experiment, but not quite the one the Kuhns
were thinking about: rather, the experiment involved the introduction of large numbers of
foreigners into a society organized along largely autarchic lines between the 1920s and
the 1950s, thus forcing its institutions to face a new social force they were not designed
to accommodate. Porous Empire traces the unfolding of this experiment from the initial
Soviet opening up to the world in the mid-1950s to the demise of the Soviet system in

4
5

Ibid, 217.
“Spravka na no. 20791, 7/25/1965,” RGANI, f. op. 55, d. 3, l. 218.
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1991, exploring how Soviet institutions sought to benefit from, accommodate to, and
limit the socio-cultural consequences of the ever-growing presence of “alien bodies” on
Soviet soil.
The decisions that led to the partial Soviet opening up to the world were anything
but a careful experimental process. Like so much else during the Khrushchev period, the
opening up of Soviet borders to foreign traffic was the product of a series of ad hoc
decisions that together amounted to a profound historical shift. In the late Stalin era, the
number of foreigners visiting the Soviet Union dropped to nearly zero.6 In 1956, the
country received 56,000 tourists and numerous other visitors.7 By 1963, the yearly
number of tourists amounted to 168,000 people, and other forms of travel (everything
from exchanges like Feuer’s to transit passengers going from Europe to the Far East and
vice versa) amounted to over one million.8 By the early 1970s, the Soviet Union was
receiving 4 million travelers yearly, 9 and the foreign presence on Soviet soil became
dense enough to provide a market for both phone directories aimed at resident foreigners

6

For example, according to a 1948 report by Intourist, foreign tourism in the Soviet Union was
“nonexistent” [ne imeet mesta] “Otchet inostrannogo otdela VAO Inturist za 1 kvartal 1948 g.,”
Gosudaretvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii [GARF], f. 9612, op.2, d. 142, l. 18. In the same year,
VOKS, the body in charge of hosting writers, artists and intellectuals, received only 89 guests. “Spravka o
kolichestve innostrannykh delegatsii i otdelnykh deiatelei innostrannoii kul'tury priniatykh VOKSom v
1949 godu po sravneniiu s 1948 godom,” GARF, f. 5283, op. 8, d. 332, l. 2.
7
“Ob itogakh raboty Inturista v 1956 godu i zadachakh kollektiva na 1957 god,” GARF, f. 9612, op. 2. d.
237, l. 65.
8
“Otchet ob ekskursionnom obsluzhivannie inostrannykh turistov v SSSR v 1963 godu,” GARF, f. 9612,
op. 1, d. 557, l. 2.
9
“Bulleten turisticheskoi informatsii, nomer 1, 1977,” GARF f. 9612, op. 3, d.1119, 1. 3.

5

and instruction manuals on the Moscow night scene aimed at “active bachelors.”10 Given
the global explosion of cross-border traffic in the postwar decades11 or even the numbers
of foreigners received by small East European socialist countries (Hungary, for instance,
received near 10 million tourists yearly in the 1970s),12 these were not especially
impressive figures. However, in the context of Soviet history, these numbers represented
a profound transformation, making foreigners, for the first time since the imperial period,
part of the tapestry of social life in major Soviet cities.
Despite this rapid and drastic transformation, there is no evidence that the
problem of foreigners on Soviet soil was ever discussed systematically by Soviet
authorities. The archival trails of the decisions to close the Soviet Union to foreign traffic
in the late 1940s and reopen it in the mid-1950s are both rather scant. In the immediate
postwar years, when discussing the fact that foreign tourism, the raison d’etre of their
organization, was non-existent, Intourist officials usually said little more than that they
were “not ready” to open up their system for tourists.13 According to the Soviet Ministry
of Foreign Affairs’ replies to postwar Western inquiries, foreigners could apply for
tourist visas to the Soviet Union without any difficulty. However, given that such visas
were provided only after one purchased an Intourist package, packages that were not on

10

On the phone directory, produced by Soviet journalist (and probable KGB agent) Viktor Louis, see Kevin
Kruse, Russia and the Russians: Inside the Closed Society (New York: Norton, 1984), 274-276. For the
night life manual, see Jeffrey Bocca, The Moscow Scene (New York: Stain and Day, 1974).
11
Between 1950 and 1970, global tourist flows grew tenfold, from 25 million to near quarter billion.
Elizabeth Becker, Overbooked: the Exploding Business of Travel and Tourism (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 2013), 17.
12
József Böröcz, Leisure Migration: a Sociological Study of Tourism (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1996), 73.
13
Quoted in Salmon, “Land of Future,” 139.
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sale, this was a rather weak rejoinder.14 In 1947, control over other avenues of entry to
the Soviet Union, private (i.e. family) visits and delegation travel, were transferred to,
respectively, a newly established Committee on Entrances and Departures of the Council
of Ministers and the Foreign Ministry, undoubtedly part of Stalin’s effort to tamp down
on the last shreds of wartime tolerance for contacts with the outside world.15 Another key
decision from the same year banned marriages between Soviet citizens and foreigners.16
In the atmosphere of hysteria against foreign subversion and campaigns against
“kowtowing to the West” and “cosmopolitanism,” these resolutions not only sharply
curtailed travel to the Soviet Union but also helped to create a zone of exclusion around
the few foreigners (mostly diplomats and journalists) inside Soviet borders, a zone that
few Soviet people dared enter.17

In a similar manner, while historians are confident that the reopening of the Soviet
Union to foreign traffic fit Khrushchev’s overall strategy of peaceful coexistence,
spreading the Soviet gospel to the Third World, and modernization by means of

Harry Schwartz, “Soviet Aide Says Soviet Visas are Easy to Get,” New York Times, 8/8/1951.
Polozhenie o Biuro o po v’ezdam v SSSR i vyezdam za granitsu pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR,” RGASPI,
f. 17, op. 3, d. 1065, ll. 77-78. (Accessed online via: http://www.alexanderyakovlev.org/fond/issuesdoc/69337, on 3/3/2015).
16
“Ukaz Prezidiuma VS SSSR ot 15 fevralia 1947 goda ‘O vospreschenii brakov mezhdu grazhdanam
SSSR i inostrantsami.’” Accessed online, at:
http://base.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.cgi?req=doc;base=ESU;n=20128, on 4/1/2015. For a first person
account of the impact of this decision on foreign-Soviet couples, see Eddy Gilmore, Me and My Russian
Wife (London: Foulsham, 1952).
17
For an account of life as diplomat in late Stalinist Moscow, see Richard Hilton, Military Attache in
Moscow (London: Hollis and Carter, 1949). Also see Whitman Bassow, The Moscow Correspondents:
Covering the Soviet Union from Revolution to Glasnost (New York: Morrow and Company, 1988), 119148.
14
15
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knowledge transfers from the West,18 the exact bureaucratic process by which Soviet
borders were opened to foreign travel is difficult to reconstruct. In general, the Soviet
opening seems to have consisted of two distinct phases: a gradual repeal of Stalin-era
restrictions by his erstwhile underlings and the bureaucracies they led, part of their
general policy to disarm the tense atmosphere of the dictator’s final years,19 followed by
a series of iconic events and high-level interventions that established foreign presence as
a fact of life in the late socialist USSR.
The reversal of Stalin’s policies regarding foreigners began nearly immediately
after his death. As early as June 1953, Soviet authorities allowed foreign diplomats to
travel outside Moscow, subject to prior coordination and apart from specifically
designated zones – a principle that would define Soviet regulation of foreign travel for all
categories of foreigners until 1991 (and, to a much more limited extent, even today).20 In
October of the same year, the decree banning marriages between foreigners and Soviet
citizens was abolished.21 In March 1954, the Foreign Ministry drafted a resolution calling

18

See, for example, Pia Koivunen, "The 1957 Moscow Youth Festival: Propagating a New, Peaceful Image
of the Soviet Union" in Melanie B. Ilic and Jeremy Smith (ed.) Soviet State and Society under Nikita
Khrushchev (London and New York: Routledge, 2010), 46-65. Rosa Magnusdottir, “Mission Impossible?
Selling the Soviet Socialism to Americans, 1955-1968,” in Jessica Glenow Hecht and Mark C. Donfield
(ed.) Searching for Cultural Diplomacy (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010), 51-72. On Khrushchev’s
overall strategy, see Vladislav Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to
Gorbachev (Raleigh, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 94-192.
19
Sheilla Fitzpatrick, On Stalin’s Team: The Years of Living Dangerously in Soviet Politics (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2015), 224-254.
20
“Dudorov to TsK KPSS, 1/5/1959,” GARF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 506, ll. 16-17. This letter refers to a Sovmin
Resolution from 1953 (“Postanovlenie Sovmin SSSSR, n. 1560/617SS, 20/6/1953”). This resolution has
not yet been declassified.
21
“Ukaz ot 26 Noiabria 1953 goda ob otmene ukaza Prezidiuma VS SSSR ot 15 fevralia 1947 goda “O
vospreschenii brakov mezhdu grazhdanam SSSSR i inostrantsami.” Accessed online, at:
http://base.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.cgi?req=doc;base=ESU;n=16717, on 4/1/2015
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for the resumption of foreign tourism, and by early 1955, Intourist was already selling
tour packages to Western tourists.22 In the same year, Soviet authorities drastically
loosened control over inter-socialist borders and allowed visa-free travel to residents of
Czechoslovak, Polish and Hungarian regions bordering on the Soviet Union.23
Under Khrushchev, the Soviet opening up to the world quickly evolved beyond
such mundane bureaucratic measures. The 1957 Moscow Youth Festival and the 1959
American Sokolniki exhibit were iconic moments in this regard, and still, as we shall see
below, form the focal point of the historiography of the Soviet opening up to the world.
Tourism and other forms of exchange with Eastern Europe were substantially expanded.24
Following Khrushchev’s whirlwind tours of Asia and his infatuation with the prospects of
the Soviet Union serving as the trailblazer for the developing world, Soviet universities
started receiving students from the Third World in the late 1950s, a process that
culminated in the establishment of the Patrice Lumumba Friendship of the Peoples
University in 1960.25
When it came to accepting “capitalist” foreigners, the picture was more
complicated. While Khrushchev was often enthusiastic about receiving Western visitors

“Gromyko to Molotov, 15/3/1954.” GARF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 449, ll. 3-9.
“Spravka k voprosu ob izmenenii porganichnogo rezhima na granitse so stranami narodnoi demokratii,
14/9//1955,”GARF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 466, ll. 86-89.
22
23

Rachel Appelbaum, “Friendship of the Peoples: Soviet-Czechoslovak Cultural and Social Contacts from
the Battle for Prague to the Prague Spring, 1945-1969,” PhD Dissertation, University of Chicago, 2012,
144-190.
25
For bureaucratic details of the establishment of Soviet education for Third World Students, see this
excellent document collection: T. Iu Krasovitskaia et al (ed.), Vozvratit domoi druziami SSSR: obuchenie
inostrantsev v Sovetskom Soiuze 1956-1965 (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnyi fond Demokratiia, 2013).
24
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and engaging in rhetorical swordplay with Western journalists, his attitude to the problem
of “capitalists” on Soviet soil was ambiguous. The honeymoon of the Moscow Youth
Festival, for instance, was quickly supplanted by the hysteria triggered by the Doctor
Zhivago affair – and with good reason, as far as Soviet authorities were concerned, as not
only was the novel’s manuscript smuggled abroad by departing journalists, but printed
copies of the volume were smuggled into the Soviet Union by a host of foreigners who
received them from CIA-connected publishers.26 Perhaps for this and similar reasons,
Khrushchev was distinctly unenthusiastic about American plans to, as he put it in his
memoirs, “make us open our borders, to increase the flow of people back and forth”
during negotiations of the 1958 Soviet-American exchange agreement.27 As I will
demonstrate, by the early 1960s, these concerns led to a full-fledged campaign warning
of the dangers of foreign espionage and subversion.
Yet even on this issue, the overall thrust of Khrushchev’s policy was towards
rapid expansion of Western travel to the Soviet Union, with an eye to the both the
economic and propaganda benefits it could bring. Thus, impressed by tales of the
Brussels 1958 World Exhibit and the masses of tourists it brought, he arranged for
Moscow to apply to host the 1967 iteration of the same event. Moscow’s bid won the
day, but was withdrawn when Khrushchev learned of the costs associated with the

Peter Finn and Petra Couvée, The Zhivago Affair: The CIA, the Kremlin and the Battle over a Forbidden
Book (New York: Prometheus, 2014).
27
Cited in Yale Richmond, Soviet-American Cultural Exchanges: Who Wins? (Boulder, CO and London:
Westview Press, 1968, 8.
26
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exhibit.28 Furthermore, according to his son Sergei, during his 1963 vacation in
Yugoslavia, Khrushchev became so impressed with the open Yugoslav borders and the
prosperous tourism industry they fostered that he came back to Moscow resolved to both
expand Soviet travel abroad and compete with the Yugoslavs for European tourists by
rapidly building up the Soviet hospitality industry and drastically loosening Soviet border
restrictions – plans that were allegedly foiled only by his ouster.29
Khrushchevs’ inconsistency on the desirability of a “capitalist” presence in
Soviet life highlights an important reality. According to all available archival evidence, it
seems the Soviet Union opened itself to the outside world, if not quite in a feat of
absentmindedness, then without any sustained discussion of the implications of this
dramatic shift. None of the major sources available for the study of decision-making in
the Khrushchev period, the protocols of the TsK presidium, the files of the Central
Committee apparat, and the contents of Nikita Khrushchev’s special file [osobaia
papka], contain evidence that the “foreign question” was ever discussed in a coherent
manner, or even conceived as such.30 The Central Committee never possessed a
department in charge of coordinating the activities of institutions handling foreigners
inside the Soviet Union. The only governmental body that could have served this
function, the State Commission for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries,
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established in 1958, seems to have been still-born and was folded into the Foreign
Ministry Cultural Affairs Department in 1967.31
What this omission meant was that, like so many other Khrushchevian reforms,
the opening-up of Soviet borders to mass foreign travel was not conceived by Soviet
policy-makers as a systemic transformation, but as a series of tactical moves meant to
improve both the hard currency balance and international standing of the first socialist
state. However, for institutions charged with handling, propagandizing and surveilling
foreigners, growing numbers of foreigners did indeed represent a systematic
transformation. In relatively short order, and without much guidance and coordination
from above, a plethora of organizations that were used to working with a relative handful
of ideologically sympathetic foreigners were thrown into the deep end of the pool, forced
to accommodate themselves to a new reality under which nearly anyone who wanted to
go to the U.S.S.R (and could afford an Intourist package) could do so. Porous Empire is
therefore an inquiry about institutional adaptation, enquiring how institutions crafted
during what Stephen Kotkin famously terms “the interwar conjuncture,” a global shift to
isolationism in the 1920s and 30s, functioned in the conditions of a new era defined by
ever-increasing flows of people across Soviet borders.32
Put otherwise, this dissertation is not a history of foreign travel to the late
Soviet Union, but rather a study of the interaction between Soviet institutions and
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foreigners. This institutional focus forced me into some difficult narrative and analytic
choices. First and most obviously, Porous Empire is focused much more on the reaction
of the Soviet bureaucracy to foreigners than to the foreign experience of the socialist life.
My focus on the challenges of foreign travel as seen through the eyes of Soviet
bureaucrats inevitably led me to prioritize some groups of foreigners and give short shrift
to others. Trouble-makers, chronic complainers, anti-Soviet activists and black
marketeers, sources of so many head-aches for Soviet authorities, are much more central
to the stories told here than the no doubt more numerous tourists who dutifully followed
Intourist itineraries and the lead of their guides. Eastern European visitors, who
constituted the majority of foreigners in the USSR, enter my narrative to extent they
deviated from the rituals of international socialist friendship that their presence within
Soviet borders was supposed to celebrate, by behaving in a manner Soviet officials
usually associated with “capitalist” travelers, such as expressing material or political
complaints or participating in illicit activities.33 It is my hope that whatever this approach
sacrifices in human interest it gains by highlighting the clash between the institutional
design of the Soviet state and realities of a “postwar conjuncture” in which mobility
became a defining feature of the international world order.
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Historiography
Until very recently, accounts of post-Stalin travel in the Soviet Union were outnumbered
by studies of the interwar period, in which the Soviet Union attracted prominent
intellectuals in search of utopia and workers and engineers in search of employment.
During the Cold War era, accounts of the “intellectual pilgrimage” of Western fellow
travelers to Stalin’s Soviet Union were often written in an accusatory key, demonstrating
the gullibility of leftist intellectuals and their susceptibility to Soviet propaganda.34 More
recently, Ludmila Stern, on the basis of archival materials unavailable to the previous
generation of scholars, demonstrated how the Soviet authorities used flattery and material
incentives to influence Western visitors.35
However, the vast majority of post-Cold War literature on interwar travel takes a
much more ambiguous and empathetic attitude to the problem. Kate Baldwin, for
example, sympathetically elaborates the dilemmas of African-American intellectuals who
were attracted to the Soviet Union due to its uncompromising denunciation of racism,
while also demonstrating the continuing attractions of Soviet anti-racism for radical
African-Americans well into the 1960s.36 Sergei Zhuravlev reconstructs the life histories
of foreign (mostly German) workers in Moscow’s Elektrozavod conglomerate, their

34 See, for example, Sylvia Margulies, The Pilgrimage to Russia: The Soviet Union and the Treatment of
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contribution to Soviet industrialization, and the clash between their ideals and Soviet
reality.37 Tim Tzoualiadis describes the tragedy of American workers and engineers who
had taken Soviet citizenship and were imprisoned or killed in the purges of the 1930s.38
While works, in the “fellow travelers” paradigm take the totalitarian nature of the
Soviet system for granted, using duped foreign travelers to cast it in sharp relief and more
recent literature focuses heavily on foreign experience within the totalitarian system,
Michael David-Fox’s Showcasing the Great Experiment rewrites the history of
encounters between the Soviet Union and the “intellectual pilgrims” not as a story of
Soviet perfidy and leftist gullibility but as a complex interchange, predicated on the
Soviet tendency towards self-measurement by Western yardsticks. Even as Stalin’s
USSR limited entry to small numbers of carefully managed travelers, and allowed only
small cohorts of “Stalinist Westernizers” access to foreigners, David-Fox argues that the
Soviet leadership’s conviction that arriving at socialism meant leaping over the most
advanced capitalist countries required obsessive comparison, and at least limited
engagement, with Western ideas, institutions, and technological achievements. In this
telling, the total isolation of the last Stalin years was a relative aberration, an amalgam of
a “Stalinist superiority complex” that led Soviet ideologues to imagine that they had
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already learned all they needed from the West, and a xenophobic reaction to wartime
encounters with the West and its material superiority.39
Compared to this richness of perspectives and interpretations and despite its
incomparably greater scale, foreign travel to the post-Stalin Soviet Union has received
relatively little scholarly attention. Somewhat paradoxically, before the collapse of the
USSR, this omission had much to do with the relative opening up of Soviet borders:
travel was no longer limited to a select few and became a commonplace activity for both
scholars of the Soviet Union and the general public, thus losing much of its ideological
significance and hint of scandal. Subsequently, work on contemporary foreign travel to
the Soviet Union focused on policy-related issues: the dangers of Soviet outreach to
Third World students and intellectuals and the virtues and flaws of the cultural exchanges
between East and West.40 A rare volume from this era that treats the topic as history is
Whitman Bassow’s The Moscow Correspondents. Written in the perestroika era, it
focused not on policy implications but on the experiences of foreign journalists in the
Soviet Union as a mirror to the advance and retreat of reform across Soviet history.41
While in the immediate post-Cold War era, historians’ attention was focused on
the Stalin period, in recent years, as first “the Thaw” and then the long 1970s became the
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focal point of recent Soviet historiography, literature on Western travel to the post-Stalin
Union proliferated. Crucial events in the history of travel to the Soviet Union, first and
foremost the 1957 Moscow Youth Festival, then the 1959 Sokolniki Exhibition, and
much later and to a much more limited extent, the 1980 Moscow Olympics, all found
multiple chroniclers.42 The chiefs of both American and Soviet cultural exchange projects
composed histories of cultural and academic exchanges between the Cold War foes.43
Intourist and its Komsomol counterpart Sputnik both found their institutional historians.44
Other scholars focused on specific groups, for instance, British prison reformers, Greek
leftist intellectuals, or East Europeans working on the BAM railroad.45 The experience of
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African students received much scholarly attention, focusing on questions of race and
Soviet perceptions of backwardness and progress.46
Despite the impressive scope and variety of these works, they form but a subset of
the wider literature on Soviet engagement with the outside world after Stalin. The earliest
key work in this corpus is Robert English’s Russia and the Idea of the West, a history of
the formation of Gorbachev’s cohort of Westernizing reformers under the influence of
international engagement.47 The Russian-French historian Larissa Zakharova showed
how various forms of engagement with the West, from black market jeans purchases to
international technology transfers, irrevocably altered both the shape of Soviet material
culture.48
In a similar vein, Vladislav Zubok shows how Khrushchev’s opening to the
outside world helped spark the surge of optimism and internationalism that produced “the
last Russian intelligentsia.”49 Sergei Zhuk, in his Rock and Roll in the Rocket City, shows
how even in cities closed to foreigners, the post-Stalin surge of Western culture and
consumer goods eroded fealty to official ideology and Soviet identity.50 Finally, Aleksei
Yurchak’s Everything was Forever, probably the most influential work on late Soviet
culture published to date, shows how unbridled enthusiasm for cultural materials
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imported from the “True West” became central to the identities of educated Soviet
urbanites in the 1970s and 1980s.51
As varied and illuminating as they are, the works cited above share two common
features. First, with the exception of institutional histories, all accounts of Soviet-Western
intercourse are written from the perspective of either foreigners or, more often, the
educated Soviet urbanites who partook in cross-border exchanges and Westernized
cultural consumption, while Soviet officials charged with managing these exchanges are
reduced to not much more than stumbling blocks against the surge of Westernization of
late Soviet society.
More importantly, whether because they seek to explain the sources of the Soviet
collapse or because so many historians of the late Soviet period are products of
Westernized late Soviet milieus, nearly all accounts of Soviet engagement with the
outside world take Westernization and the hollowing-out of official ideology and,
gradually, Soviet identity as a central organizing principle. Shawn Salmon, in her
excellent unpublished dissertation on the history of Intourist, narrates a story of
transformation from an ideological organization to “one of many players in the rapidly
expanding network of international tourism agencies.”52 Along with many of his subjects,
Zubok views the Thaw-era opening to the West in general, and the Moscow Festival in
particular, as a crucial turning point which produced “the first cracks” in the Soviet
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edifice, and thus set the course for subsequent dissolution of Soviet power.53 English
takes a similar line, showing how foreign travel, readings of Western literature, and
engagement with transnational networks eroded Soviet intellectuals’ fealty to MarxismLeninism. Taking a different tack, Zhuk argues that cultural consumption made
Ukrainian urbanites view New York, London, and Paris rather than Moscow as their
cultural capitols- thus shaking loose their Soviet cultural identity in a way that fostered
their embrace of European-oriented Ukrainian nationalism in the 1980s.54 Even Yurchak,
who is more skeptical of linear explanations of the Soviet collapse than most scholars,
grounds his analysis in the absolute disconnect between official ideology and social life
under late socialism.
Another strain in the literature takes a more critical view of such quick dismissals
of official ideologies and Soviet identities. Susan E. Reid, for example, famously
demonstrates that many Soviet attendees at the Sokolniki Exhibit genuinely rejected
much of what was on display as crass, impractical materialism.55 Rachel Applebaum
shows that, after 1953, Soviet propagandists were genuinely interested in forging a
transnational socialist culture all across Eastern Europe - “an Empire of friendship.”56
Kristin Roth-Ey similarly argues that Soviet media officials were committed to a vision
of high culture for the masses, which they viewed as superior to American promotion of
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mass consumerism.57 Anne Gorsuch, in her study of domestic and outgoing tourism,
describes how Soviet domestic tourism officials creatively applied official slogans like
patriotism, friendship of the peoples, and cultured consumption, to forge a distinctly
Soviet practice of tourism-as-enlightenment.58 While much of this work is focused on the
1950s and 1960s, Natalya Chernyshova shows that even under Brezhnev, many Soviet
officials were genuinely committed to the idea of cultured consumption as the highest
expression of socialist culture.59
Porous Empire builds on these insights regarding the vitality of official
institutions and seeks to apply them to the problem of foreign travel to the Soviet Union,
but does so in a darker and more pessimistic key than these relatively sunny accounts.
The perspective with which I approach the topic draws from a larger debate in the
theoretical and historical literature about the socio-political import of travel and
international exchanges. In these fields, one school of thought, popularized by New York
Times journalist Thomas Friedman’s paeans to globalization, argues that international
exchange is the handmaiden of liberalization and erosion of authoritarian regimes. Two
key historiographic works in that regard are Christopher Endy’s study of tourism as a key
component in the making of a stable, liberal, trans-Atlantic Cold War alliance between
the United States and France, and Sasha D. Pack’s masterful demonstration of how
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tourism officials formed a pro-European, liberalizing lobby in Franco’s Spain, and thus
helped ease the path to Spain’s post-Francoist, democratic path.60
Another strain of thought in travel studies takes a rather darker perspective. For
instance, the political scientist Walid Hazboon, building on the work of geographer
Gearoid O'Tuathail,61 describes how, in the authoritarian Arab states he studied, “the
processes of globalization unevenly generate deterritorialization and reterritorialization...
resulting in the heightened importance of territory, location and boundaries.”62 Put
simply, Hazboon argues that the introduction of mass travel into hitherto closed,
authoritarian societies creates new social dynamics and shakes up state control over its
citizenry. And yet, this process does not necessarily lead to the dissolution of
authoritarianism, as successful authoritarian states are quite adept at reorganizing their
institutions to meet this challenge – often using resources generated by successfully
integrating themselves into global networks of exchange.
Porous Empire applies these insights to the work of Soviet institutions that sought
to maximize benefits and minimize risks of mass travel. More specifically, it is a study of
how various Soviet institutions attempted to adapt autarchic, authoritarian and
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xenophobic ideological attitudes inherited from the Stalin period to a world in which
millions of foreigners demanded Western levels of service, claimed the right to express
their opinions freely, brought pernicious “bourgeois culture” to Soviet soil, and forged
sundry transnational networks with ideologically suspect Soviet citizens. In short, in the
same way David-Fox found profound commitment to internationalism underneath the
isolationist façade of Stalin’s time, I argue for the existence of a deep autarchicxenophobic institutional substratum that structured Soviet official responses to the global
age.

Sources

As is the case with all contemporary histories, a major challenge of writing this
dissertation was managing the enormous mass of materials pertaining to foreign travel to
the USSR. In line with my goal to write the history not of foreign travel to the Soviet
Union but of institutional responses to it, Soviet sources, archival and published, form the
lion’s share of the evidentiary base of this dissertation. Since, as noted above, there was
no single coordinating body charged with formulating policy towards foreigners in the
Soviet Union, the vast majority of the archival documents used here was produced by the
two institutions most intimately involved with visiting foreigners: Intourist and the KGB.

23

Like all Soviet institutions, Intourist was exceptionally adept at producing copious
paperwork. However, both its peculiar organizational structure and subsequent decisions
by archivists circumscribe the kind of narratives historians can reconstruct from its
records. At the heart of the Intourist collection at the State Archives of the Russian
Federation are protocols of the monthly meetings of Intourist's board of directors and the
orders and instructions issued by its central management to its local offices, hotels, and
other facilities. Until 1980, these stenograms were usually accompanied by supporting
documentation and the texts of presentations to the board; from 1980 onward, such
documents disappear from the record and by the perestroika years, the archival trail
becomes vanishingly small. Additionally, the files of Intourist’s First Department,
handling relations with the KGB and other high level institutions, are still partially
classified up to 1965, and totally absent from the archive after that year. The files of the
Moscow and Leningrad Intourist local offices, its most important sub-units, were not
preserved. The archival holdings of the Russian republican branch of Intourist, formed in
1964, are spotty, but add important perspective on the organizational rivalries that, as I
demonstrate, helped bring Intourist to an ignominious end. Supplementing these materials
are files from the party organization of the Leningrad branch of Intourist that allow us a
glimpse of the everyday life of an Intourist office.
The source problems presented by the KGB are, of course, much more
complicated. The former KGB archives archives are currently and for the foreseeable
future closed to researchers. Other sources of information, say, memoirs by veterans or
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defectors, tend to be opaque and self-serving and focus more on foreign intelligence than
the less prestigious domestic work of the KGB. Furthermore, as historian Julie Fedor
shows, these memoirs often veer into wild conspiracy theorizing about Western plots that
brought down the Soviet Union.63
However, sufficient materials exist for taking a stab at the problem of deciphering
KGB approaches to the dangers of foreign travel. KGB archives from Lithuania and
materials from Ukraine that became available in the wake of the Maidan revolution
contain many materials on day-to-day KGB operations in these border republics,
frequented by “regular” foreigners as well as large numbers of “ethnic” visitors.64 Some
published collections of KGB documents shed useful light on the problem, as does an
internal history of the KGB used as a textbook in its Higher School.65 Memoir literature,
with all its distortions, provides useful hints as to the nature of the KGB’s epistemic
community, as do official Soviet publications on the pernicious activities of foreigners on
Soviet soil - often composed by KGB officers working under thin journalistic cover.
Beyond the institutional views of the KGB and Intourist, I tapped a host of other
printed, visual, and non-Soviet archival materials. Many published Soviet materials,
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especially films, often subverted the official line on foreigners and Soviet people who
interacted with them, in ways that highlighted the difficulties Soviet institutions faced in
controlling the “foreign problem.” Memoir literature, some of it published in the
burgeoning on-line world of Runet, provides an important window onto the impact of
foreigners on Soviet life. Soviet travelogue literature is immense, and I used it to
highlight both Soviet methods of control and their impact on foreigners’ experiences of
the Soviet Union.66 Western periodicals provided a running commentary on the problems
faced by Westerners who interacted with Soviet institutions. Finally, the New York-based
Soviet Jewry Movement Archives provide a rare opportunity to analyze an organized
effort to exploit the weaknesses in the Soviet firmament created by foreign travel. As we
shall see in Chapter Five, these documents nicely complement Soviet sources by
speaking to issues on which official archives are silent.

Structure and Argument

This dissertation consists of five thematic chapters. The first four offer case studies of
how Soviet institutions vowed wich particular set of challenges wrought by mass foreign
66
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travel. The fifth chapter offers a shift in perspective, showing how foreign travel could be
used by both foreigners and dissenting Soviet citizens to challenge Soviet institutions.
My first chapter is a business history of Intourist along two major axes. First, I
examine how Intourist functioned simultaneously as an institutional player in the
industrial, producer-oriented Soviet economy and as a competitor in the global market for
tourism services, one of the key sectors of the global transformation to “post-Fordist,”
service-oriented economic order.67 Second, I argue that the tension between Intourist’s
goal of competing in a global market on the one hand, and Soviet resource and
organizational constraints on the other, forced it into a new relationship with the global
economy. Charged with obtaining hard currency to be used for imports of machinery that
would help make the Soviet Union independent of global markets, Intourist found that the
Soviet planned economy could not provide it with the resources it required to fulfill its
mission statement. Therefore, it became increasingly dependent on Western imports,
knowledge, information technology, and credits. Paradoxically, therefore, it was the
profoundly non-capitalist nature of the Soviet economy that drove Intourist towards a
growing dependence on the very same capitalist networks it was charged with aiding the
Soviet state to escape.
In the following chapter, I reconstruct the struggles of Soviet propagandists to
disseminate “the truth about the Soviet Union” to a skeptical foreign audience. These
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efforts were responses to the urgent requirements of the cultural Cold War. The great
advantage of “imperialist” propaganda was the way in which it could employ superior
material cutlure to stimulate the senses at a distance. One could watch Hollywood films,
listen to jazz and rock and roll, and taste bubble gum without ever stepping on American
shores. Soviet achievements (with the important exception of the space race) were of a
more abstract nature. Universal literacy, the advancement of formerly “backward”
nationalities, free education, housing, healthcare, and the other hallmarks of socialist
modernity could not be communicated at a distance in such experiential ways. To truly
experience Soviet socialism one had to observe it at close quarters.
The problem that Soviet propagandists faced as they struggled to craft narratives
about the superiority of the Soviet way of life was that their Western, and to a surprising
extent, their “socialist” visitors as well,68 often arrived with their own, rather skeptical
views regarding the “truth about the Soviet Union.” Because Soviet propagandists
realized that in order to perceive “the truth” about Soviet claims for the superiority of
Soviet life, foreigners’ sensitivities and materialist proclivities had to be respected, they
increasingly came to observe Soviet reality through the eyes of “imagined tourists.” Yet,
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since they remained loyal servitors of the Soviet state, this realization did not stop Soviet
propagandists from engaging in Cold War battles. Rather, arguments between foreigners
and Soviet tour guides ceased to be attempts at persuasion and became ritual
reenactments of “the unity of party and people” – reminders that the Soviet Union still
claimed absolute authority to define what truth meant within its borders.
My third chapter deals with Soviet official responses to what I term the
demimonde: a complex ecology of unsanctioned networks and interactions woven around
foreigners by black marketeers, sex workers, informal artists and other socially marginal
actors. After sketching out the contours of the demimonde, I demonstrate how policy
towards its denizens reflected the rise and fall and rise again of official efforts at
rejuvination of the Soviet project, and the intrinsic links between these reformatory urges
and coercive practices. Thus, I show that the Khrushchev years saw not only the opening
of Soviet borders, but also a sustained drive to use social mobilization to isolate and
repress Soviet citizens who engaged in unsanctioned exchanges with foreigners, as well
as a bonafide security panic that revived Stalin-era suspicions regarding the links between
cosmopolitanism and espionage. In the Brezhnev era, this assault ebbed, and the
demimonde became a de-facto recognized part of Soviet urban life. Yet, the language of
vigilance and excision directed at it by Soviet authorities survived and was reoriented
towards “renegades and dissidents.” Most strikingly, the early 1980s, a period I term “the
Andropov interlude,” witnessed a renewed campaign against the demimonde, again
attempting to cleanse the Soviet body politic of harmful elements clinging to foreigners.
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However, in an era in which every Soviet urbanite was somehow engaged with Western
cultural consumption, this attempt to name and shame black marketeers and hard
currency prostitutes as a path towards moral regeneration backfired spectacularly, as
more and more Soviet citizens found the values of the demimonde more appealing than
official morality.
The fourth and fifth chapters of this dissertation deal with a far smaller, but even
more politically charged ecology woven around foreigners: the world of Soviet nonconformists, dissidents, and nationalist activists, and the foreigners who crossed Soviet
borders in order to give them aid and succor. In Chapter Four, I reconstruct the ways in
which the KGB “read” this problem through the prism of what sociologist Andreas
Graeber termed state paranoia - the deep and abiding conviction that all unsanctioned
contacts between Soviet people and foreigners were by definition suspect. I also sketch
out the vast machinery of surveillance the KGB erected to keep tabs on these contacts. As
I demonstrate, however, the KGB failed to either fully operationalize its paranoia or
convince other Soviet institutions to take its lead and seriously restrain cross-border
flows.
In Chapter Five, I go beyond the Soviet archives in an attempt to provide an
explanation for this systematic failure. Using American and Israeli aid to Soviet Jewish
nationalist and religious activists as a case study, I show how Soviet freedom of action
was constrained by the demands of the era of mass cross-border exchanges. By nestling
themselves into the channels of exchange that increasingly linked the Soviet Union to the
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outside world, activists of the international Soviet Jewry movement could provide Soviet
Zionist activists with vast amounts of material and spiritual aid. Furthermore, the Soviet
Jewry movement could credibly threaten harm to the international channels of exchange
in case Soviet authorities moved to seriously restrict the activities of Zionist travelers or
attempted to dismantle Zionist networks on Soviet soil. Thus, they forced the Soviet
authorities to tolerate that which it could not destroy, demonstrating how mass foreign
travel allowed the existence of late Soviet lifeworlds not only outside (vnye) the bounds
of official Soviet norms,69 but in active opposition to Soviet power.
Overall, I argue, the Soviet adaptation to the ever growing flow of foreigners
across Soviet borders highlights both the extent of the challenges the post-Stalin opening
to the outside world created for Soviet institutions, and the robustness of Soviet
institutional attitudes inherited from the Stalin era. On the one hand, stunted as it was by
the structures of the planned economy and restrictions on Soviet travel abroad, the
growing Soviet integration into a global regime based on mobility of people, information,
and capital undermined the autarchic structures of the Soviet state and forced Soviet
institutions into a series of compromises that loosened some of the absolute sovereignty
claims of the Soviet Union over its citizenry. On the other hand, Soviet exposure to the
effects of international exchanges was severely limited by organizational and ideological
structures inherent to Soviet-style socialism. Stalin-era stereotypes about the irreducible
hostility of foreigners, well-based fears about the Cold War agendas of foreign visitors,
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and the practicalities of the Soviet planned economy blunted the economic possibilities
that mass tourism offered, created an adversarial relationship between hosts and guests,
and spurred a massive surveillance effort that limited unsanctioned contacts with
foreigners to marginal elements. Above all, these mental and institutional structures
maintained, among both Soviet elites and the wider Soviet population, a strong
distinction between “us” and “them,” East and West that remained intact even as the
Soviet Union grew ever-more connected into global networks dominated by “them.” I
conclude with the observation that as scholars and policy-makers ponder the combination
of cultural and economic Westernization and resurgent xenophobic and anti-Western
attitudes that defines Russian contemporary political culture, they would do well to
ponder how these phenomena may be traced back to practices and habits of thought
rooted deep in the Soviet practice of power.

.

32

Chapter 1: Serving Mister Twister, or the Political Economy of
Intourist

The eponymous protagonist of Samuil Marshak's classic Stalin-era fairytale Mister
Twister is an American billionaire on a pleasure tour of the USSR. Overcoming his initial
reluctance to visit a socialist land, Twister and his family board a prestigious, racially
segregated, ocean liner. When they disembark in Leningrad, the American party arrives
at the hotel Angleterre, a grand hotel from the tsarist period that now belongs to Intourist,
the already famous Soviet foreign tourism monopoly. There, he is shocked to discover
that colored guests are welcome in the hotel. Unable to sustain the blow to his racial
pride, Twister flees, only to learn that all his money cannot provide accommodation for
the night: Leningrad's hotels are all at full capacity due to a coming international
congress. Despondent, he is reduced to spending the night on a chair provided by a kindly
hotel concierge.70
Marshak's story is, of course, a grossly inaccurate representation of Intourist's
practices. From its earliest days, Intourist was a market operation, and earning hard
currency, not making ideological points, was its primary objective.71 However, Mister
Twister sheds light on two incongruities that would haunt Intourist down to the final days
of the Soviet state. First, it was both a commercial enterprise that operated in the context
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of a global market for luxury products, and a Soviet organization set in a socioeconomic
order where money was often not the decisive factor in economic transactions. Second,
the hard currency Intourist earned was but a means for a greater goal: the purchase of
machinery and other capital goods that would allow the Soviet Union to construct
socialism and achieve economic independence.72 Intourist, in short, was to exist within
global markets, but not be of them.
This chapter is a business history of Intourist in the postwar era, focusing on the
challenges Intourist faced as it attempted to live out this double existence. First, I will
show how Intourist, a bit player in the Soviet institutional latticework, navigated the
labyrinths of the Soviet administrative-command economy. Then, I shall address the
ways in which in which the peculiarities of the Soviet socio-economic order shaped the
managerial practices of Intourist. Finally, I will closely examine two case studies –
Intourist’s hotel construction program and its effort to integrate computer technology into
its business, demonstrating how the failures of the party-state to mobilize resources
sufficient to fulfill Intourist ambitions pushed it inexorably away from the transactional
model of trade with the West that was its raison d'etre, to ever-deepening integration
with and dependence on, global financial and technological networks.
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Figure 1.1: Mister Twister
Source: Samuil Marskhak, Mister Tvister
Before proceeding deeper into the weeds, we must tackle a fundamental, but
surprisingly difficult question: was Intourist a succesful business or a failing one? On
some measures, Intourist may indeed be seen as a success story. As Twister makes clear,
in its early days, Intourist was a boutique enterprise. In its best prewar year, it served
slightly more than 13,000 extremely well-heeled tourists.73 In the postwar years,
however, it grew into a genuine corporate behemoth: by the mid-1980s, it was receiving
more than 2.5 million foreign tourists (and large numbers of other categories of guests) in
its facilities per annum. To accommodate this mass clientele, it employed over 50,000
people, owned 107 hotels and 102 restaurants, a plethora of office buildings, foreign
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offices and other real estate, and a large fleeet of cars and buses.74 According to the
authoritative Financial Times, towards the end of the Soviet era, Intourist was the world's
largest tourist corporation.75
The transformation of Intourist from a boutique service into to a corporate giant
was also visible in its facilities and services. By the 1908s, Intourist's flagships were no
longer imperial heirlooms like the Angleterre, but capacious modernist hotels in Moscow,
Leningrad, Tallinn and the “Red Riviera” on the Black Sea shores. While some of the old
luxuries sold to Twister were still on offer, Intourist now focused on the provision of
mass-market niceties like air conditioned rooms, comfortable buses, high quality
souvenirs, tennis courts, saunas, well-stocked bars, ethnic restaurants, and even American
style video-games terminals and bowling alleys.76 If, as sociologist Louis Turner argues,
the second half of 20th century was the era of the “pleasure economy,” of “golden hordes”
of mass-market, pleasure-seeking travelers aiming to reproduce Western notions of
comfort and service wherever they went, Intourist retooled itself to accommodate their
needs.77
Still, for better or worse, the Soviet Union was not easily reduced to the kind of
homogenized, depoliticized and americanized space described by Turner. Even if tourists
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were repeatedly forewarned to lower their expectations (Fodor's Soviet Union, for
instance, delicately reminded its readers that one went to the Soviet Union to expand
one's mind, not to pleasure one's senses), the encounter between Soviet hosts and foreign
guests often ended as sadly as did Twister's tale. In the real-world Soviet Union, just as
in its fictional counterpart (albeit for very different reasons), money could not always buy
pleasure. As we shall see in Chapter Two, Intourist’s flaws - its uncomfortable hotels,
bad food, rude staff, and deficient restrooms - provided fodder for generations of
complaining tourists. These complaints were succinctly summarized by the editors of
Science magazine, who published a letter from a scientist returning from a conference in
the Soviet Union under the succinct headline “Curse of Russia is Intourist.”78
One would be well justified to consider such drastic statements as exaggerated
expressions of Cold War hostility or playing out of stereotypes about Russian
backwardness going back to the pre-Soviet period and still extant today,79 if not for a
curious fact: in their internal debates, Intourist’s leading cadres were, by and large, in full
agreement with the harshest critiques made by their foreign guests. Internal inspections,
for example, revealed that even in prestigious and newly built hotels, rooms were often
dirty, restrooms clogged, construction flaws visible everywhere, expensive imported
equipment and furniture in dire conditions, elevators more often than not broken down,
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hot water and heating not guaranteed.80 The Soviet tourism industry, fretted one official
in 1960, was unable provide service on the level of even such relatively backward
fraternal countries as Bulgaria.81 More than two decades later, another official voiced
essentially the same complaint. Intourist staff, he declaimed, “poisons the tourists' lives
[otravliaet zhizn'] with their rudeness, lack of professionalism [neakuratnost'], surliness,
tardiness and so forth.”82
Even more concerning from the point of view of Intourist’s management was the
fact that, despite heavy capital investments, it could never fulfill its promise of becoming
a major source of badly needed foreign currency. Exact figures for Intourist's earnings are
difficult to come by: reports filed to the Ministry of Finance and other state and Party
bodies about the organization’s hard-currency earnings are available in the holdings of
the secret First Department of Intourist, but only until 1965.83 Still, available numbers
paint a problematic picture. In 1964, Intourist earned about 7.9 million foreign exchange
rubles (rubles pegged to the dollar at a rate set by the Soviet state – equivalent to about 7
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million dollars in contemporary and 16 million in 2015 dollars, according to official
Soviet conversion rates). However, in the same year, it suffered a total operational loss in
rubles of 1.8 million.84 These figures underlay an important dynamic. The Soviet state
subsidized Intourist's daily domestic ruble-denominated operations it could freely issue,
so that it could earn hard currency it could not. Given the fact that Soviet exchange rates
did not reflect the purchasing power of the ruble, the economic benefit of its operations is
impossible to compute.85
Scattered figures showing up in the Intourist archives after 1965 tell a similarly
murky story. In 1989, its foreign currency proceeds grew by a factor of nearly 30, to 200
million foreign exchange rubles. In the same year, however, imports of equipment,
computers, payments to foreign firms for new construction and other hard currency
expenses stood at over 120 million. These figures, moreover, did not include the 46
million foreign exchange rubles assigned for ongoing construction projects in the Twelfth
Five-Year Plan (1986), extensive purchases of imported goods for resale to foreign
tourists, and the hundreds of millions the Soviet government paid foreign firms for hotel
construction and imports of furniture, equipment and technology for Intourist facilities
since the late 1960s - operations often not included on Intourist’s balance sheets.86
In short, given the state of our sources, it is quite impossible to ascertain how
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much foreign currency Intourist contributed to Soviet state coffers. We can however
conclude that based by the words and deeds of its principals, it fell far short of the
expectations they set for themselves. As Intourist officials freely conceded in internal
discussions from the early 1970s, their institution was chronically ailing: hard currency
proceeds were growing not because of improving efficiency of Intourist operations, but
due to the 'natural' year over year growth in foreign tourism (the income Intourist derived
per tourist remained constant or deteriorated, even as tourist flows to the Soviet Union
grew steadily).87 As a result, as the Central Committee official M.A Anisimov put it in
remarks laying bare the Soviet state’s vision of Intourist’s role in the political economy of
socialism, Intourist was failing in its one and only task: obtaining foreign currency that
could be exchanged for new factories, a condition he and the Central Committee he
represented found “shameful.”88
Despite Anisimov’s insistence on economic rationality, the language of shame
and anxiety invoked by him indicates that more was at stake than just foreign currency
proceeds. After all, throughout our period, Intourist generally met the targets set by
central planners, and whenever it fell short, it could always receive subsidies from the
state- conditions that would have left most Soviet enterprise managers overjoyed. Their
emotive response to Intourist’s failures evokes therefore a series of important questions.
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Why did Intourist officials endorse so uncritically the complaints of their guests? Why
weren’t they happy with using state subsidies to pad their balance sheets, as so many
Soviet officials did? If, as it might be argued, the story of Intourist can be told in an
optmistic key, depicting the abandonment of Stalinist autarchy in favor of global
interaction,89 why were Intourist officials so harsh on themselves? Should historians
follow their lead, or describe how, despite systemic constraints, Intourist grew into a
corporate giant and a global brand to boot?
Furthermore, the story depicted in Intourist’s archives captures its story as
perceived from the center. From this point of view, the history of Intourist consisted in
carefully navigating between the Scylla of the Soviet state and the Charybdis of
Intourist’s foreign clientele. This story is, of course, not the only one could tell. If, for
example, much of Intourist's history, as told by the documents left by its central
management, depicts it as an impoverished body struggling for its place in the sun, other
stories could be told depicting Intourist as a machine hoovering desperately needed
foreign proceeds from the republics to the center,90 or as a centralist bully ignoring the
needs of cities other than Moscow and Leningrad.91
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However, a business history of Intourist from the perspective of its management
has much to offers to scholars of the late Soviet period. Such a history offers a view of
the economic development of late socialism from the point of view of one, not
particularly important, actor, in the exceptionally complex institutional network that
constituted the Soviet party-state.92 At the same time, it was one of the few Soviet bodies
for which engagement with the outside world was not an onerous duty, but a core
activity.93 As such, the difficulties Intourist management encountered in providing the
level of service it wished to offer its guests, failures that often look like pages from a dark
comedy in both the archival record and in the pages of this dissertation, underscore a
serious reality: the perils the Soviet economy and way of life faced when they opened up
to the outside world and started to measure themselves by the Western yardstick. The
tales of woe covered in this chapter, in other words, are reflections not so much of
objective failures as of the ways the dreams of Intourist officials clashed with the realities
of the socialist system. Given the crucial importance of the imaginations and perceptions
of socialist elites to the ultimate unraveling of the socialist system,94the subjective,
discursive nature of the seemingly dry and business-like pages of Intourist's records
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makes them that much more important for understanding the encounter between the
Soviet Union and the West.
Another, less discursive reason to study the business history of Intourist relates to
what it can teach us about the nature of the modernization of the Soviet Union's famously
deficient service sector. Recent works by Dianne Koenker on Soviet domestic tourism
and Natalya Chernyshova on Soviet consumerism in the long 1970s point out that
towards the end of the Brezhnev period the Soviet services sector was rapidly
modernizing and producing what was at least a reasonable facsimile of the Western
consumer experience.95 By examining the history of a Soviet organization committed to
reproducing the experience of capitalist consumption in a socialist country as the only
way to fulfill its overall production goals, we can evaluate the possibilities, dangers, and
limitations of the nascent Soviet post-industrial transformation.
Still more important, Intourist, as noted above, was a highly peculiar institution.
On the one hand, it was clearly recognizable to a Western observer as a vertically
integrated corporation, working in a changing, logistically and technologically complex
market. As provider of goods and services, it was a commercial enterprise competing a
global capitalist market intensely focused on serving the needs of consumers. On the
other hand, to obtain the goods it marketed to its clients, it acted as a consumer in a
wholly different institutional context, in which consumers were, all too often, an
afterthought. A business history of Intourist is therefore an opportunity to explore from
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the ground up the economic transformations that growing Soviet exposure to global
markets created, as well as the strict limits imposed on such transformation by the
political economy of state socialism.

Intourist and the Soviet Economy

The most basic fact about any economic order, writes János Kornai in his seminal study
of state socialism, is that “whenever a relation subsists between two or more persons or
organizations, their activity requires coordination of some sort.”96 While, as generations
of observers and scholars agreed, the planned Soviet economy was largely a myth,
bureaucratic coordination mechanisms (administrative price setting, production quotas,
central distribution of resources and labor and, when all else failed, extra-economic
coercion) played a much larger role in the Soviet economy than they did in marketoriented economies.97 This correlation of political and economic power led, among other
things, to the creation of economic conglomerates monopolizing entire economic fields,
with Intourist assuming that role for the international tourist industry. However, even the
most powerful Soviet trust or branch ministry faced a struggle for power and resources
between itself and its economic peers and between its central managers and their local
agents. Paraphrasing Marx, one might say that the history of the Soviet economy is the
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history of such struggles. This holds especially true for Intourist, a body that on the one
hand relied on widespread cooperation from other bodies in order to house, feed,
transport and entertain its guests, and on the other hand, possessed little political power
and had therefore to negotiate its way on largely hostile terrain.
The most salient fact for the institutional history of Intourist is that, for much of
its existence, this universally recognized brand name was somewhat of a misnomer. From
its foundation in 1929 to the 1960s, Intourist was officially known as the All-Union Joint
Stock Company Intourist [vsesoiuznoe aktsionernoe obshchestvo, (VAO) Inturist] a
peculiar legal form that allowed it to deal with foreign partners on a commercial basis. 98
However, in 1964, Intourist was subsumed into a new body, the State Foreign Tourism
Administration [Upravlenie po inostrannomu turizmu pri Sovete Ministrov SSSR]. This
body was initially composed of the logistical and administrative apparat of the old
Intourist, the joint stock company itself, and newly-formed republican Foreign Tourism
Administrations.99 In 1969, the joint stock company ceased separate existence, and was
merged into the Administration, which was renamed into the Main Foreign Tourism
Administration [Glavnoe upravlenie po inostrannomu turizmu pri Komitete Ministrov
SSSR]. In 1983, the Main Administration was re-organized into the State Committee for
Foreign Tourism [Gosudarstvennyi Komitet po inostrannomu turizmu], and thus for the
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first time became a ministerial-level institution.100 Finally, between 1988 and 1990, the
State Committee was abolished, and the Joint Stock Company Intourist reappeared- only
to be subsumed in a devastating privatization struggle.101
These bureaucratic transformations are seemingly negligible enough so that
clients, contemporary observers, historians, and indeed this author all use Intourist as a
useful shorthand for the varieties of organizational forms the Soviet foreign tourism
monopoly took. However, these name changes are directly related to the most precious of
currencies in the Soviet economic realm: institutional affiliations and the power inherent
in them.
From its formation to 1965, Intourist was not an independent institution, but an
appenage of other institutions, including, briefly, the NKVD. From 1939 until 1964,
Intourist settled in as a division of the Foreign Trade Ministry. Given the Ministry's
mandate to earn foreign currency for the Soviet state, this seemed like a natural
arrangement. However, perhaps because between 1945 and 1955 Intourist did nothing
particularly meaningful, it had a difficult relationship with the Ministry, with Intourist
officials bitterly complaining about ministerial neglect.102 The pay scale was far below
those of other divisions in the Ministry, as did their prestige levels. For example, when an
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Intourist employee was moved to a position in the Protocol Department of the Ministry,
he was warned to “unlearn the ugly habits you picked up at Intourist.”103
Due to its marginal status, Intourist struggled with its role as coordinating
mechanism for the flow of foreign traffic when tourism in the Soviet Union picked up in
the late 1950s. In a memorandum he penned for Khrushchev, Vladimir Ankudinov,
Intourist’s chief, drew up a long list of institutions with which Intourist had to cooperate.
The Ministries of Civilian Fleet, Civil Aviation, and Railroads were in charge of
transporting tourists. The Ministry of Trade supplied Intourist facilities with food and
other consumer goods and the Ministry of Culture was in charge of providing them with
entertainment. The KGB and MVD policed tourist traffic, and republican organizations
and ministries, local Soviets and party organizations had to attend to their care in their
areas of jurisdiction.104 None of these organizations, Ankudinov implied, viewed tourism
as a pressing concern, and a mere division of the Foreign Trade Ministry did not have
enough bureaucratic heft to force them to do so. Therefore, he concluded, a Foreign
Tourism Administration with the right to impose its will on other state institutions in its
field of competence was required.105 This memorandum was initially rejected by the state
authorities in a way that demonstrated Intourist’s marginal status: Anastas Mikoyan, then
the First Deputy Chair of the Soviet of Ministers, responded to a previous appeal on the
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topic with a terse and vaguely threatening note: “so, you want a committee?!” (chto,
komitet zakhoteli?).106
Despite this snub from above, Ankudnov's plan was realized in 1964.
Unfortunately, I was not able to find documents shedding light on the lobbying that led to
this policy reversal. But he reasons for Intourist’s sudden ascent are easy enough to
guess. The early 1960s saw a sharp upswing in Soviet imports of Western technology that
had to be paid for in hard currency. Especially before oil and gas became major Soviet
exports, tourism was one of the most appealing options for improving the Soviet balance
of payments. We’ve already seen that Khrushchev toyed with the idea of making the
Soviet Union into a tourist Mecca. Even before his Yugoslav trip described in the
Introduction, he personally initiated the construction of a hotel for wealthy foreigners not
far from his favorite vacation haunt in the Crimea.107 Even after his ouster, his more
sober successors viewed tourism development as a priority item, and accordingly
approved a massive expansion plan for Intourist.108
And yet, as both Intourist clients and managers knew, neither money nor
institutional independence was a panacea for Intourist’s ailments. Here again,
institutional arrangements were key. According to the charter of the new Administration,
it bore total responsibility for the planning, development, financing, marketing, and
administration of foreign tourism. The charter also established two other bodies: a
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Council for Foreign Tourism [Sovet po turizmu], a coordinating body that brought
together Intourist and the other all-Union institutions involved in foreign tourism, and
republican-level Foreign Tourism Administrations, tasked with conveying Intourist’s
wishes to republican and local institutions.109
However, this institutional design was not enough to overcome Intourist's
significant weaknesses as a player on the Soviet institutional field, weaknesses that were
furthermore exacerbated by flaws in its new institutional scheme. Most fundamentally, in
an economy in which producers had significant advantages over consumers, Intourist was
at a significant disadvantage as a consumer that produced no tangible material goods and
could not sell or barter its goods to other Soviet organizations.110 To overcome this
handicap, it needed administrative power – which it sorely lacked. Perhaps because the
the political nature of Intourist’s work with foreigners, was the politically-oriented
Foreign Cadres Department, 111 and not one of the powerful departments that oversaw
various sectors of the Soviet economy that served as Intourist’s curator at the Central
Department.112 Neither of Intourist’s chiefs between the 1950s and the 1980s, Ankudinov
and his 1968 replacement, Sergei Nikitin, was a member of the Central Committee or any
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other important party-state institution.113 The Foreign Tourism Council was more or less
politely ignored by Intourist’s partners, rarely met, and did not improve inter-institutional
coordination to any significant extent.114
Coordination within Intourist also far from given. While republican tourism
administrations coordinated relationships between Intourist departments and republican
institutions, the center maintained managerial and financial authority over all Intourist
facilities.115 This arrangement meant that, by and large, Intourist facilities were outside
the logistical chains and networks of exchange that defined economic life in their
localities.
In short, whatever particular form it took, Intourist’s existence was defined by a
struggle to impose its will on partners which had little desire to work with it. This
struggle extended to nearly all interactions Intourist had with Soviet institutions, from its
failure to obtain reliable train and airline schedules from the relevant organizations,
through the defeats it faced as it fought for office space,116 and up to the herculean efforts
it had to exert in order to obtain branded briefcases for its guides.117 Nowhere was this
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reality more pronounced than in the great difficulties Intourist faced when feeding and
housing its clientele.

Intourist and the Deficit Economy

In the postwar period, Twister’s homelesness episode could easily be read by a
despairing Intourist official as an ascerbic comment about the fundamental clash between
the capitalist offerings Intourist sold, and the socialist institutional arrangements it had to
navigate in order to provide its clientele the services they purchased. Already by the early
1960s, tourism to the Soviet Union far surpassed its prewar level. Intourist's hotel base,
however, remained more or less constant until 1965. As a result, over 85% of the hotel
space used by Intourist belonged to other organizations, most often city soviets. In
Moscow in 1962 for example, Intourist required 6,400 rooms in hotels owned by the city
to accommodate its needs.118 This number of rooms reserved for Intourist was determined
administratively, with a set quota of rooms assigned to Intourist at the beginning of each
tourist season, and adjusted on the basis of both foreign and domestic demand (in theory)
and inter-institutional haggling (in practice) throughout the year.
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For two major reasons, this situation created a variety of conflicts between
Intourist and its hosts. First, hotel room deficits were a significant problem in all Soviet
cities.119 This situation was even worse in Moscow, by far the most prominent tourist
center of the Soviet Union, where Intourist clients had to compete for hotel rooms with
out-of-town Soviet officials and foreigners visiting the Soviet Union on official business,
putting both Intourist and city officials in difficult situations.120 Second, in the 1960s, all
foreign currency proceeds from foreign tourism were collected by Intourist and
transferred to the central state budget, meaning that local authorities had little or no
incentive in hosting foreigners. That situation was ameliorated somewhat after 1969,
when the Soviet government allowed Intourist to forward up to 10% of its proceeds to
republican administrations to be spent purchasing imported equipment for hotels owned
by local soviets. However, this incentive was insufficient to fundamentally transform
relations between local soviets and Intourist. In 1986, for instance, the RSFSR received
10 million foreign exchange rubles, a sum not nearly sufficient for its needs in equipment
and construction funds.121 Given this lack of financial inducements, as far as local Soviets
were concerned, their administrative needs far outweighed Intourist’s commercial
considerations.
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As a result of these realities, relations between Intourist and local soviets were
extremely acrimonious. Fights broke out over the ownership of major hotels, including
Leningrad’s reknowned tsarist-era Evropeiskaia and Astoriia.122 Local authorities made
concerted efforts to boot foreign tourists from their hotels during major events.123 The
most determined fights took place over Intourist room quotas. Arguing that the needs of
Soviet economic, administrative and scientific bodies (the main client base of Soviet
hotels) should not be outweighed by the demands of foreign tourism, local authorities
furiously tried to reduce Intourist’s quotas. Since relations between the local soviets and
Intourist were not based on legal contracts, but on administrative decisions, the only
recourse the latter had was to appeal to Party and state authorities. However, even when
Intourist managed to obtain positive administrative outcomes, success in obtaining
needed hotel space was far from guaranteed.
For example, in Leningrad in 1958, the Leningrad local soviet (Lenispolkom)
waged a valiant delaying battle against Intourist. After an initial quota of 700 rooms was
assigned to Intourist, with the personal involvement of Frol Kozlov, the Vice Chairman
of the all-Union Council of Ministers, the Lenispolkom refused to execute the decision.
After further negotiations involving senior party officials, the Leningraders relented, and
promised to supply the rooms. However, when the local Intourist department tried to
make orders [zaiavki] for the rooms it was promised, it was refused. In a meeting
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between Ankudinov and the chairman of the Administrative Department of Lenispolkom,
the latter promised yet again to provide 700 rooms. However, in a subsequent meeting of
the Leningrad party committee, the Leningrad official again reneged on his promise and
even “indicated that in the future Intourist will receive no rooms at all.”124
While this was an extreme case, the basic contours of the room deficit problem
remained constant until the end of the Soviet era. In 1976, as détente brought more and
more foreigners to Soviet soil, the Moscow soviet unilaterally reduced Intourist's quota in
its hotels from 5,800 to 4,000, announcing the cuts in March, after Intourist had already
signed most of its contracts with its Western partners. Unable to come to an agreement,
as both sides had fewer rooms in their possession than their minimal plans for the year
required, they had no choice but to appeal to the Soviet government to mediate.125 A few
years earlier in Kyiv, Intourist was joined in the battle for hotel rooms by the republican
KGB, which argued that the local Soviet was sabotaging surveillance efforts by
confiscating hotel rooms from Intourist.126 In the absence of material incentives, only
“administrative resources” could help Intourist get its way.
As was the case so often in the Soviet Union, food supplies were another serious
flashpoint. Here Intourist faced problems of both production and institutional
coordination. Complaints about deficits of meat, milk products, vegetables, and
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especially delicatessen were a staple of Intourist correspondence. Strikingly, the situation
in this regard was becoming worse, not better as the decades went by: by the early 1980s,
Finnish tourists were complaining about shortages of the most basic of Soviet staples,
potatoes.127
While these deficits surely had something to do with the chronic problems Soviet
agriculture faced, this was surely not the entire story: after all, production difficulties did
not impact the operations of the famous “closed” food shops catering to Soviet elites. The
problem was again with relatively low priority other institutions assigned to production
for Intourist, which required items of a quality few Soviet consumers could dream of. For
instance, breakfast items favored by foreign tourists, for instance small packages of jam
and butter, were not manufactured by Soviet industry, to Intourist’s great shagrin.128 Even
when Soviet industry produced desireable items, Intourist often remained outside the
supply chains that connected them to the markets. Soviet industry produced ample
amounts of delicatessen items (caviar, sturgeon, and so forth) for export. Intourist
restaurants, by contrast, suffered endemic shortages of such products. The reason for this
situation was simple: the Ministries of Trade and Foreign Trade refused to categorize
Intourist restaurants as export-oriented institutions, even though they catered to
foreigners and earned hard currency, as sending produce to Intourist would have reduced
their own foreign currency earnings, since Intourist paid other Soviet organizations in
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domestic rubles.129 On the local level, the fact that Intourist facilities were outside
republican chains of supply meant that trade organizations kept them at very low priority,
a condition that led to serious disruptions even in such high priority locations as Sochi.130
Supplying tourists with souvenirs and high-end products was another problem
Intourist lacked the resources and administrative heft to resolve.131 A series of
investigations conducted into lagging sales of such items in the mid-1960s found that
production lines were obsolete, knowledge of market conditions was missing, and
manufacturers showed little interest in working for the tourist market, since such work
required a high level of investment, with hard currency returns going to Intourist, not to
the manufacturers. Furthermore, since mass-produced souvenirs were considered luxury,
and therefore low priority products [produkty ne pervoi nadobnosti], the Ministry of
Trade set their prices at levels above what tourists were willing to pay.132And even when
prices were right, Soviet souvenirs failed to sell, because manufacturers lacked the
capacity to package them in anything but simple cardboard.133
Yet again, the problem was rooted in incentives: as long as Intourist made
foreign-currency demoninated profits and paid manufacturers in domestic rubles, the
latter had no particular desire to work for the demanding foreign market. The Soviet
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government, concerned with the lost opportunities to earn hard currency that these
conditions created, recognized this reality, and decreed in 1964 that up to 50% of all
proceeds from hard currency sales of souvenirs were to be reinvested in imports of,
among other items, machinery for souvenir producing factories.134 Yet, even this
measure, which after all diverted desperately needed hard currency towards the
production of low priority items, was not enough to overcome the problem. In 1968, the
Russian Foreign Tourism Administration complained, the Soviet Union could provide
less than half of tourist demand for furs, gold, amber, and other luxury items - as the
Ministry of Trade refused to classify deliveries to Intourist hotels and their Berezka stores
as counting towards’ manufacturers export quotas.135 Four years later, Nikitin complained
to the Soviet Prime Minister Kosygin, things had not improved at all - and the Soviet
Union was losing as much as 25 million foreign currency rubles per annum in funds that
foreigners reconverted from rubles to their currencies, after they failed to spend them on
Soviet products- more than twice the sum the Soviet Union made from souvenir sales.136
Even more strikingly, even when the bureacratic mechanisms of the Soviet state
assigned top priority for production for foreigners, their mode of operations could prove
to be counter-productive. Amber was, according to Krupin’s 1968 estimates, the top
deficit item in Berezka stores, with as much of 90% of demand for it going unmet.137
According to an investigation into the matter by the State Control Committee, these
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deficits were rooted in the vast performance gap between the Soviet Union’s two amber
processing facilities: Kar'er in Kaliningrad, and Daile in Klaipėda (Lithuania).138 The
former was a massive enterprise, operating under the auspices Rosiuvelirtorg, the
institution that, among other things, ran the Berezkas. As such, it was the sole supplier of
Intourist's clientele, and a major beneficiary of the 1964 decisions on the development of
the souvenir industry, receiving large amounts of West Germant machinery in the
preceding 3 years. The latter belonged to the Lithuanian Union of Artists, sold nothing to
foreigners and owned no imported machinery. Despite these advantages, State Control
found that Kar’er produced low-quality and unfashionable product, and took years to put
to its designs to market. Meanwhile, Daile produced fashionable products, with its
product cycle taking months, not years.
This curious condition, State Control inspectors discovered, came exactly because
of the priority status Kar’er enjoyed. In order to launch a new product line, it had to
receive approval from Rosiuvelirtorg. Rosiuvelirtorg, in turn, required the State Planning
Committee to set production quotas and hard currency prices for each new product line- a
process that could require up to two years, meaning that Kar’er product was out of
fashion by the time it hit stores. At the same time, Daile, due to its marginal institutional
affiliation, could set its own prices and immediately market its products through local
Lithuanian stores. Thus, the products that were sold in Intourist hotels and Berezkas were
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below global standards, while Daile's superior product reached almost no foreign
customers. While no Intourist official would ever put it this way, no less than Twister, the
story of Daile and Kar’er served to illustrate the radical disjuncture between Soviet
institutional arrangements, and the rules of the global market in which Intourist operated.

Managing Intourist

So far, this chapter has focused on the ways in which Intourist navigated the complex and
often dysfunctional Soviet economic coordination mechanisms. However, like any large
organization, it was not a unitary body acting as a transmission belt to the wishes of its
principals, but a complex bureaucracy in which a variety of agents acted to promote their
interests which sometimes did and sometimes did not coincide with the interests of the
organization itself (as defined by its principals.) These organizational dynamics,
moreover, played out in a large, diffuse organization that was shaped both by the unique
institutional context of the Soviet system and the emerging global context of a service
economy anchored by ever increasing information flows. In the following pages, I will
examine at some length two institutional dynamics to which these realities gave rise:
tensions between Intourist's principals and their agents, and the informal practices that the
latter turned to in order to both accomplish their tasks and promote their material
interests.
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From 1964, when Intourist underwent its first major postwar reorganization, to the
perestroika years, when it underwent first an attempt at commercial reform and then a
rapid implosion, Intourist took many institutional forms, but its basic organizational
principles remained the same.139 It was divided into a central, Moscow-based and
functionally organized apparat, and geographically organized sub-units. At the top of its
pyramid stood its First Chairman, Deputy Chairman, and its board (kollegiia), consisting
of the heads of various central departments and divisions.
Given the rapidly evolving size and complexity of Intourist's operations, its
structure was in constant flux, and accounting for its many permutations is both
impractical and unnecessary. Crudely speaking, however, one could functionally divide it
into three component parts: propagandistic, economic and logistical. Intourist's
propaganda work lies outside the scope of this chapter. Economic sub-units included the
Commercial Division, the body that designed and marketed tour packages, the Financial
[valiutnoe-finansovoe] Division in charge of formulating plans and price policies, and
smaller sub-units charged with accounting and oversight. Finally, Intourist's logistical
section included a variety of bodies in charge of overseeing the organization’s sprawling
possessions, managing logistics and supplies, and ensuring the smooth flow of
information.
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Outside the central apparat, Intourist’s organizational structure was defined by
institutional duality. As mentioned above, Intourist facilities were subject to an awkward
system of dual subordination. Financially and organizationally, its facilities were under
the direct control of the central apparat. At the same time, the republican Administrations
were in charge of both overseeing their daily activities and facilitating their relationships
with republican organizations, without which the work of local managers became
difficult, if not impossible.
The expansive mechanism described above functioned in a similar manner to that
of all other Soviet economic institutions. Intourist's main plan indicators, namely the
desired number of tourists per year, profit goals, and hard currency objectives, were set
by the State Planning Committee, but could be negotiated down or ratcheted up in a
dynamic manner.140 Intourist profits were returned to central and republican authorities.
Where necessary, the state provided Intourist with subsidies. Within the organization, the
central apparat set plans and allocated resources for localities – but these were also
subject to negotiation. Such negotiations were, however, only one aspect of a series of
endemic conflicts that pitted republican administrations against the center, peripheral
organizations against the central apparat, and, indeed, different central apparat divisions
against each other.
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Quite understandably, the awkward conditions of the republican Administration
were cause for sharp arguments between them and the central apparat. This was
especially the case for the Russian Foreign Tourism Administration, which forcefully
argued that given the fact that the vast majority of tourist traffic in the Soviet Union was
in Russian cities, it should have a much stronger voice in Intourist's affairs.141 Shawn
Salmon argues that such arguments were part of a process in which Intourist was
gradually shaking off its pan-Soviet identity and focusing its business on selling Russia to
the world.142 However, the underlying theme of the debate between Russian and allUnion Intourist officials was administrative. The Russian Administration (as well as
many other republican Administrations) was interested in asserting more control over
Intourist facilities for two reasons. First, as described above, in the absence of any assets
with which to manage and barter, republican Administrations had little standing vis-à-vis
both the center and other republican bodies and thus could not fulfill their role as
advocates for the development of foreign tourism in their republics. The second cause of
conflict was money. The Administrations were republican institutions, and as such, they
chafed under the rules of a system that pumped back 90% or more of the proceeds of
what should have been their domains into the all-Union budget. Instead, they argued, the
lion's share of Intourist's proceeds should be the property of the republican
Administrations, so that the republican authorities could directly benefit from an industry
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that after all “sold” their histories and cultures. While this issue did play a crucial role in
Intourist’s eventual breakup along republican lines, it was rooted less in nationalist
aspirations than in a very Soviet struggle over administrative resources.143
Similar tensions characterized inter-departmental relations inside the central
apparat. Here, problems revolved less around policy-related issues than the politics of
plan fulfillment. The plans for Intourist's commercial division, for example, set maximum
numbers of tourists it could commit to receiving – numbers that took account of
Intourist’s chronic resource shortages, but not the foreign currency goals set by the state.
As exceeding plans was deemed less damaging than failing to hit planned targets, the
sub-units of the division tended to sign contracts to receive more tourists than the quotas
they were allotted.144 Since hotel rooms, restaurant spots, airline quotas and other
resources were also rationed and, as we have seen, mobilizing outside resources was an
often impossible task, this practice helped to stretch Intourist's already more than limited
resources beyond the breaking point.
In an even more glaring example, competition between the Soviet Tourism
Division, charged with sending Soviet tourists abroad, and the People's Democracies
Department of the Commercial Division, in charge of receiving East European tourists,
directly undermined Intourist's financial goals. Tourism to Eastern Europe was handled
on the basis of a barter-based system of clearing agreements that presumed roughly
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equivalent incoming and outgoing bilateral tourist flows. In other words, if the number
of, say, Soviet tourists in Poland exceeded the number of Polish tourists in the Soviet
Union, Intourist had to compensate its Polish counterparty. In negotiating with the Polish
side, however, the two Intourist sub units failed to coordinate their activities, the former
pushing to maximize the number of tourists it wished to send abroad, and the other
minimizing the number of tourists it was willing to receive, thus both causing economic
damages and endangering relations with Intourist's Polish partners.145
While conflicts at the center could and did affect Intourist's bottom line, much of
its everyday existence was defined by friction between its central apparat and agents on
the periphery. On some level, such tensions were an inevitable result of the gap between
Moscow, Leningrad and the rest of the Soviet Union. For instance, when a Council of
Ministers official referred to the non-Moscow facilities of Intourist’s network as the
'provinces' in a 1960 meeting of Intourist’s cadres from the localities, his words caused a
wave of indignation in the crowd.146
Such psychological factors however were not the main driver of the problematic
relationships between center and periphery. Rather, they were the result of the profound
tension between the centralized nature of Intourist, the far-flung nature of its network,
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and the constraints that technology and the incentive structure of the Soviet system put on
the center's ability to both control and provide aid and resources for the periphery.
The conflicts and complaints this reality created were myriad. Hotel managers in
Moscow, one witty Intourist official complained, practiced spikhotekhnika (the art and
science of shoving problems on someone else), directing tourists to address the central
apparat with their problems and difficulties.147 The Commercial Division, the periphery
complained, did not have proper information about conditions on the ground, and sold
tourists promises the local departments could not fulfill.148 The Commercial Department
complained that hotel managers preferred to host tourists sponsored by other
organizations (for example, businessmen working with industrial ministries) at the
expense of tourist groups sent by the Commercial Division, as the former paid higher
prices for rooms. Hotel managers complained that they had few incentives to sell theater
tickets and guided tours for hard currency, as such income was assigned to the
Commercial Department’s hard currency quota.149 The central apparat berated localities
for distorting their reports, hiding damning facts, and failing to provide the center with
accurate information about tourist movements, while the localities retorted that they were
swamped with paperwork and complex instructions (a point that Intourist management
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not only conceded, but often bemoaned).150 According to the localities, food, equipment
and machinery shortages in Intourist facilities were due to faulty work of the central
logistical departments.151 According to central logistical departments, they were the result
of the localities' proclivity to hoarding, incompetence, and collusion with local authorities
to make Intourist, not the latter, bear the brunt of supplying local facilities with deficit
items.152
Intourist's leadership was anything but oblivious to the frictions described above.
The policy response it devised to the problems that plagued its bureaucratic mechanisms
reflected the tension between the centralization embedded in Intourist’s structure and the
center's lack of sufficient administrative capacity to control its far-flung network.
Intourist, for example, was an enthusiastic participant in the Kosygin reforms (19651969), which thought to delegate some decision-making authority to individual
enterprises (in this case, hotels), and introduce “material incentives” (i.e profits) as a
measure of managerial success.153 This reform, however, failed to impact Intourist
operations, due to resistance from both localities and the central apparat. Hotel managers
were concerned that the news system would make it harder for them to obtain resources
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from Intourist’s logistical departments,154 while the central apparat was concerned, as we
had seen, that “material incentives” would lead hotel managers to prioritize obtaining
guests via other organizations over fulfilling the directives of Intourist’s commercial
departments.
After the Kosygin reforms failed to make a mark on Intourist, attempts at reform
focused on centralization as path to better resource management. In the 1970s, Intourist
started reorganizing its local departments, which until then exerted little control over
Intourist hotels and restaurants, into more cohesive bodies, entitled hotel trusts
[ob'edineniia]. The goal of this reform was twofold. First, the trusts were to take over
many of the organizational and logistical functions of individual hotel managers, thus, in
theory at least, obtaining savings by reducing manpower and reducing resource hoarding.
Second, the trust manager was to become an administrative link between the Central
apparat and local managers, and thus allow the former to better control the latter.155
Another attempt at centralizing reform was taken in the early 1980s. During this period
an experiment that allowed the Ukrainian and Armenian republican Administrations more
control over Intourist facilities within their borders was rolled back.156 Moreover, the
central apparat attempted to remake the republican Administrations into subordinate
institutions, taking them out of the control of republican-level governments. This attack
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was however rapidly rebuffed.157 This defeat as well as the entire pattern of resistance to
control from above described in this section was a reminder of the extent to which
realities on the ground gave local actors far more power than the formal structures of
authority allowed them. Neither centrifugal nor centripetal forces could do much to
change a status quo with which neither side was particularly satisfied.

A look from Below

So far, we have examined the history of Intourist from the perspectives of its clients and
top management. This is a story of deficits of material goods, of institutional power, of
even basic competence, in which local cadres appear as impediments to better business
practices at best, and as a gaggle of inept, perhaps malevolent, incompetents at worst.
Viewed from a local perspective, the story looks markedly different, in a way that
highlights the extent to which the Soviet Union was indeed the workers’ state - but in a
very different sense than that which its founders intended.
To better understand how the Intourist system operated from the ground up, we
must start by looking at its linchpins: the managers of Intourist hotels, restaurants and
local departments. How did the balance sheets of their assets and liabilities look? At first
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glance, their position was not particularly envious. Local managers were to supply
services at a level higher than any other Soviet institution, while locked out of the local
supply chains and administrative networks. However, they were also in control of what
was, for most Soviet people, the stuff of which consumer dreams were made: material
items fit for consumption by foreigners. Armed with these assets, as well as with
whatever administrative resources they could muster, Intourist's managers engaged in a
complex system of informal exchanges that aimed to both promote their organizational
goals, and their personal interests.
The most immediate goal of Intourist's local managers was rather straightforward:
obtaining scarce material resources. One obvious method of doing so involved informal
channels. Like many other economic functionaries, Intourist leaders widely used the
services of tolkachi, black market and informal barter experts, to obtain food for their
restaurants and scarce items for their hotels, paying them in both money and material
objects they received from the state (for example, black caviar and other specialty
items).158 Others exchanged favors with local institutions, by, for instance, writing off as
unuseable out-of the-box imported supplies and selling them for symbolic prices to other
institutions.159 Imported equipment and high quality foodstuffs was a key to this sort of
barter trade, and local managers did indeed flood the central logistical apparatus with
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request for imported materials even when, central officials complained, Soviet materiel
was available.160 In one such case, the Intourist hotel in Dushanbe requested the center to
provide it with $200,000 of imported products for its hard currency bar, even though it
already had half a million dollars' worth of such items on hand. These facts, an auditor
dryly noted, were especially surprising as the hard currency bar of the Dushanbe Intourist
hotel was closed for business.161 From the point of view of the center such practices were
incompetence at best, and corruption at worst. From the point of view of local managers,
however, they were necessary preconditions for navigating the deficit system - and if they
provided opportunities to skim off the top, so much the better.
Another crucial arena in which Intourist managers had to exercise their creativity
was in the retention of their labor force. In this respect, Intourist had several serious
disadvantages. First and foremost, as its cadres department complained repeatedly, the
wages it could offer were lower than those in equivalent organizations.162 With few
exceptions, it could also rarely offer its employees housing, childcare, and other welfare
provisions that many other bigger and more powerful institutions could provide. In these
circumstances, informal methods came to the fore. One common method to retain
workers, the vast majority of whom were women straining under “dual burden” of both
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working and caring for their families, was providing them with deficit food items pilfered
from the warehouses of Intourist restaurants, or using the writing-off method described
aboveto provide bonuses for employees. Thus during several months in 1983, in Moscow
alone, nearly one million’s rubles worth of consumer goods, and 20 tons of delicatessen,
were provided to employees for kopecks on the (dollar equivalent) ruble. During the
same time period, the Moscow hotel trust paid its employees a sum total of 90,000 rubles
in illegal bonuses every day.163
So far, the practices described here were, even if strictly speaking illegal, aimed at
promoting Intourist's organizational aims. However, Intourist managers were no angels.
With paychecks that, in line with the egalitarian ideology of the Soviet state, were
sometimes lower than those of waiters who worked in their restaurants, and yet
controlling extremely valuable resources, Intourist managers were constantly tempted to
supplement their salaries. Quite often, the illegal practices they engaged in derived from
the informal practices they employed in Intourist's service. For example, the manager of
the famous Hotel Intourist in Moscow, desperate to obtain proper uniforms for his staff,
negotiated directly a deal with a West-German textile firm in violation of Intourist
protocols that limited such deals to the proper authorities in the central apparat. Was the
fact that he also obtained a number of high-quality suits for himself in the deal an act of
corruption, or a simple bonus for a job well-done?164 In a similar manner, a State Control
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investigation in the early 1970s found that the manager of an Intourist hotel in Sochi
hosted hundreds of Soviet citizens on his premises. Many of these guests were Georgian
black marketeers, who presumably paid for the privilege of ostenstatiously staying in a
hotel for foreigners.165 However, many others were referred to the hotel either by local
bodies that held (or could take away) resources that the hotel needed (a woodworking
factory, the Sochi concrete works, a military recruiting office, a municipal bus park), or
other organizations that provided deficit items to the hotel (the Russian republican trade
Rossbakaleia provided the hotel with 1.3 tons of black pepper, for instance). Such
transactions were, technically speaking, illegal, but nevertheless crucial for managerial
success in the late Soviet economy.166 Other misdeeds, however, were less ambiguous.
In Moscow's car park, for example, the wives of senior Intourist officials used luxury
vehicles for their own purposes while their husbands could purchase barely used vehicles
at deep discounts.167
The work-lives of Intourist employees were also defined by the same interplay
between low wages and a wide field of opportunities to enhance them by illegal means.
Intourist's archives groan with tales of the myriad ways in which employees benefitted
from easy access to its store of material goods. Restaurant workers, for example, diluted
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patrons' drinks, replaced expensive drinks with cheaper ones, served portions smaller
than the norms, or simply took off with stolen deficit food items.168 In Leningrad in the
early 1960s, one bohemian taxi driver writes in his memoirs, high-class Intourist cars
were used as private, illegal, taxis so often that the wealthy guests of the Evropeiskaia
hotel who paid in advance for a chauffeured car had to use his decrepit cab as a
replacement vehicle.169 Warehouses were a gold mine where plates, cups, silverware, bed
sheets and many other items were ripe for the taking. Such practices were often covered
up by accountants and facility managers, who unfailingly covered up for the graft.170
Whether this widespread phenomenon was the result of collusion, criminal conspiracy,
attempts to maintain the good name of one's enterprise, or indeed a welfare ethic that
viewed access to pilfered goods as part of the benefits packages attendant on working in
Intourist, is impossible to determine. It can be said with near certainty that, like the rest of
the Soviet economy, work life in Intourist was based on what James Millar terms the
“little deal”: an implicit arrangement in which workers and the Soviet state traded low
wages for job security, and graft as a safe proposition to supplement one’s income.171 The
implications of this arrangement are profound: while the global tourism industry is
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renowned for its exploitative work practices, in Intourist, workers, not management, held
the upper hand in labor relations - while the balance of payments of the Soviet state, let
alone the wants and needs of foreign clients, were often an afterthought.
Foreigners were nevertheless the linchpin of another systematic perk of working
for Intourist: hard currency payoffs. Waiters, for example, could get hard currency tips,
and barmen allowed sex workers and black marketeers entrance to their bars for a hard
currency feee.172 As we shall see in Chapter Three, such extracurricular activities were
crucial for the survival of the complex world that “a-social elements” wove around
foreigners. For our purposes, it suffices to know that according to oral history interviews
conducted by Crimean historian Alexei Popov, such business opportunities constituted up
to 70% of the income of an Intourist employee.173
These operations could, of course, only exist with the connivance on Intourist
senior cadres. Even before the Andropov-era assault on corruption exposed the
widespread nature of such schemes, the head of Leningrad's powerful hotel trust, Sergei
Sorokin, was arrested for extorting over 90,000 rubles from Intourist staff in bribes.174
Memoir literature suggests that this was probably a vast under-estimation of the fortune
he amassed.175 This arrest did not deter other culprits- and under Andropov, large
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numbers of Intourist workers and their superiors were arrested, imprisoned, or removed
for bribery and coverup of foreign currency speculation.176

Intourist and Global Economic Networks

Bribery, corruption, theft, graft, barter: albeit usually denominated in rubles, not dollars,
these activities were the inevitable (and, at times, salutory) effects of the social
arrangements of the Little Deal and all were rooted in the peculiar rules of the Soviet
political economy. Yet, another corruption case from the early 1980s was profoundly
different, in a way that highlights the slow transformation of Intourist’s business practices
and the states of minds of its senior employees in the twilight of the Soviet era. The case
involved one E.V. Fillipov, the manager of Intourist-Reisen, Intourist’s wholly owned
West-Berlin subsidiary. Fillipov concocted a complex scheme in which he obtained a 2.5
million DM credit line from a West German Soviet-owned bank, which he used to
purchase consumer goods he smuggled to the GDR, thus obtaining money to pay back
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the loans he took. In parallel, he founded a West German firm which directly competed
with Intourist-Reisen. 177
Fillipov’s innovative shift from Soviet-style graft to Western-style credit
manipulation reflects an important underlying reality of Intourist’s history in the late
socialist era. So far in this chapter, the image we drew is that of a relatively static
institution, struggling in 1985 against the same set of systemic constraints it fought in
1955. However, Intourist’s everyday operations took place in the context of a global
economic revolution: the explosion of the international travel and leisure industry, which,
between 1960 and 1970 alone, grew tenfold (from 25 million international tourists’ trips
taken in 1960 to 250 million in 1970).178 These incoming hordes of tourists had to be fed,
housed and moved around, tasks that required significant capital investment and
technological innovation. In direct competition with competitors at the cutting edge of the
global travel revolution. More than any Soviet institution besides the defense sector,
Intourist therefore felt the pressures of competitive modernization. To conclude this
chapter, I will survey two crucial elements of Intourist’s modernization program: hotel
construction and information technology development, demonstrating how the stable, yet
inefficient equilibrium Intourist developed with the rest of the Soviet economy was
insufficient to mobilize the resources required to keep up with the rest of the world.
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As discussed above, the single most pressing issue on the agenda of Intourist
officials as they strove to build a viable foreign tourism industry was the quantity and
quality of the hotels they owned. On that front, the conditions they faced when tourism to
the Soviet Union was renewed in the 1950s were grim. Not only was the number of
hotels and rooms inadequate for new needs, Intourist inventory bore the scars of war and
chronic under-investment. As a result of these difficulties, even in the late 1960s, the time
tourists could spend in Moscow and Leningrad was limited to 3 nights, foreigners were
sent to sub-par hotels, and, in a twist straight out of the pages of Twister, it was not
uncommon for guests to sleep in hotel hallways.179
Intourist’s 1964/5 reform also included an ambitious construction program aimed
to adress these difficulties. If in the early 1960s, Intourist possessed around 30 hotels and
other tourist facilities, the hotel construction program authorized in 1965 called for the
construction of 59 hotels, 50 motels and 9 camping sites by 1968, bringing the total size
of Intourist's network to about 150 facilities and 52,000 rooms.180 Ten years later,
however, only 34 facilities with 18,000 rooms were completed.181 While in themselves,
these numbers represented significant improvement, they not only fell short of the 1965
planned targets, but failed to adress the endemic room shortages which plagued Intourist
to the end of the Soviet era (in the 1980s, Intourist still limited tourists to 3 day-long stays
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in Moscow- and housed thousands of them on-board improvised river-boat hotels).182
Worse stil, while original plans called for hotels to be built by Soviet organizations and
thus incur all expenses in rubles and profits in foreign currency, starting in the 1970s,
construction of Intourist hotels was increasingly monopolized by foreign contractors –
making them far less beneficial to the Soviet balance of payments than originally
planned.
To understand the the gaps between the promises and the realities of the Intourist
construction program, we must turn, as always, to the coordination mechanisms of the
Soviet economy. As always, local authorities had little incentive to part with their assets
(in this case, real estate) to favor Intourist. Haggling over hotel locations put the
construction program off track even in the first months after its launch.183 Six year later,
construction was still meeting serious difficulties as “the choice of locations for hotels is
not done on a scientific basis and does not take the interests of foreign tourism into
consideration as a result of... localist tedencies [mestnicheskikh nastroenii].”184
A similar problem haunted relations between Intourist and its contractors. The
crucial fact in this regard was that unlike more powerful Soviet organizations, Intourist
had no independent construction capacity.185 Instead, construction projects were assigned
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administratively to a hodge-podge of organizations, usually the construction trusts of
large cities, and for smaller locations, the construction units of branch ministries. One
such contractor, for example, was the Ministry of Medium Machine Building, the
institution in charge of the Soviet nuclear industry.186 These organizations were often
unwilling or unable to fulfill their assignments. Almost uniformly, they lobbied to reduce
their construction plans sharply, even after years of construction delays. If plans were not
reduced, contractors refused to supply the work-force and machinery that Intourist
construction sites required. Employing such tactics, Intourist contractors fulfilled only
30-50 percent of their initial plan targets in 1970, a fairly typical year in that regard.187
As was the case with its interactions with other institutional partners, Intourist had
little recourse but to turn to higher authorities. Here again, the record was mixed. Even
when Intourist managed to obtain governmental instructions for contractors to focus on
Intourist projects, the latter could find ways to resist such impositions. In Sochi, for
example, the local construction agency argued that it could not fulfill its assignments due
to a deficit of construction machinery.188 Other contractors complained they could not
make progress as Intourist failed to provide them with the construction materials.189 If all
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else failed, they could just ignore previous promises at will, knowning Intourist had no
clout over them.190
Other construction problems were the results of planning and architectural
difficulties. While hotel planning was a topic often discussed by Soviet architects,191 the
scale of Intourist’s program and their lack of institutional knowledge of global standards
of hotel construction overwhelmed their efforts. Looking to save costs, many architects
used hotels for Soviet citizens as their base model. As such hotels were deemed unfit for
Intourist’s client base, planning had to be redone at higher standards, causing significant
delays and cost overruns.192 Other architects erred in the opposite direction, designing
luxurious facilities that had to be readjusted to reduce costs.193 When consruction began,
it was more often than not delayed by discovering that plans called for materials Soviet
industry did not produce or that Soviet equipment was unable to work with imported
materials.194 All this meant that, by the time hotels were launched, they were often
already outdated and in need of serious restructuring. By 1975, Intourist estimated,
financial damages caused by delays of hotel construction stood at 100 million foreign
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exchange rubles (in 1964, as described above, Intourist’s yearly proceeds were about 8
million foreign exchange rubles), with more damages accruing into the 1980s.195
In an earlier era, this systemic failure might have been construed as a result of
sabotage, with dire consequences for both Intourist and its contractors. In a more
civilized age of Soviet power, the policy response was altogether different. While I was
not able to locate any document testifying to a conscious decision to turn away from the
Soviet construction industry, foreign contractors became a growing presence on the
Soviet scene. Between 1969 and 1972, Finnish construction crews working under the
terms of Russo-Finnish foreign trade clearance agreement constructed Tallinn's Viru
hotel.196 In the early 1970s, foreign firms were hired to quickly complete construction of
long delayed facilities. By the mid-1970s, French, Swedish, Yugoslav and Finnish firms
held 400 million foreign exchange rubles' worth of contracts for the construction of new
hotels in Moscow, Leningrad, Sochi and Yalta.197
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Figure 1.2 Hotel Viru, Talinn
Source: thetallinncollector.com

While foreign contractors were by no means exempt from the difficulties of
mobilizing labor, materiel, and inter-institutional cooperation that so plagued Soviet
contractors,198 by and large, their superior experience and technological skill sufficed to
create a major jump forward in Soviet hotel inventory.199 However, the prevalence of
foreign contractors created an ideological conundrum: the growing market in Soviet hotel
construction created foreign interest in even more involvement in the Soviet hotel
construction. By the late 1970s, major hotel chains were fielding offers to fund, construct
and jointly manage Intourist hotels if these could be run under their corporate brands and
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joint-Soviet American management. Up until the perestroika years, Intourist forcefully
rejected such offers, brokering instead deals that limited foreign participation in Intourist
hotels to the construction phase. Credits were agreed upon “only on conditions extremely
favorable to us” - making sure that construction was funded by foreign credits, and that
foreigners neither managed nor owned stakes in Intourist hotels.200 This nod to the
dreams of economic independence embedded into Intourist's foundation could not
however elide two crucial facts: Intourist's straddling of the Western service economy
and the Soviet economic system was an inherently unstable proposition, and continued
modernization required increasingly leaning on the capitalist world. Nowhere was this
dilemma felt more acutely than in the unfolding of another major Intourist initiative, its
entrance into the information age.
While many many of the difficulties with which Intourist’s management struggled
were products of the Soviet political economy, they also reflect dilemmas faced by all
major modern bureaucratic institutions: how could any large organization gather, handle
and disseminate the massive amounts of information required to fulfill organizational
tasks and maintain control over the operations of its agents?201 Like all Soviet
bureaucracies, Intourist was intimately familiar with problems caused by faulty
accounting practices, abundant paperwork, and the tendency of lower-level bureaucrats to
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avoid disclosure to their superiors. How did it handle the challenges of the information
age?
While the technological and organizational problems involved in handling the
myriad pieces of information required to efficiently (and profitably) move travelers
around the world were shared by all major participants in the emerging mass travel
industry,202 in Intourist’s case, they were exacerbated by the unique challenges posed by
its institutional structure. This was especially the case for two of most pressing
informational challenges Intourist’s logistical experts faced: processing information
regarding tourist traffic, and managing its hotel room inventory.
The basic document that defined the movement of a given tourist (or, more often,
a tour group) during their Soviet tour was called the notification [izveshchenie]. A
notification was created when a sub-unit of the Commercial Division received a request
[zaiavka] from a foreign tour operator and contained all pertinent information about the
package. The notification was then circulated to various logistical departments that
handled reservations for room, board and transportation. If the reservation was approved,
the notification was sent to the localities that were slated to receive a given tour group. If
and when itinerary changed, the localities had to inform both the Commercial Division

202

Pauline J. Sheldon, Tourism Information Technology (New York: CAB International, 1997, 1-15, James
L. McKenney, Business Evolution through Information Technology, ( Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1995), 97-140,

84

and other localities on the itinerary. For each change, an amended version of the
notification had to be reissued.203

Figure 1.3: Intourist Information Scheme, c.1975.
Source: GARF, f. 9612
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The complex bureaucratic process described above was suited to Intourist’s days
as a boutique enterprise. By the 1960s, however, the massive increase in tourism to the
USSR overwhelmed the Intourist’s information processing mechanisms. Some of the
problems in this regard were organizational. The dispatch group of the Service Division,
the body in charge of handling the planning and regulation of tourist flaws, was staffed
by transient labor who struggled with the complexities of their assignments.204 Handling
the notifications taxed the modest capacities of local Intourist offices, especially since
they often had to rely on the not-so-reliable Soviet postal servie to conduct their
business.205 More importantly, Intourist experienced a serious technology lag. Telephones
and fax machines were sorely lacking, as were copying machines (access to which was
limited anyway due to security considerations).206 Due to the shortage of typewriters,
into the 1970s many notifications were still handwritten.207 As a result of these
conditions, one official estimated that in 1965 about 75% of all notifications arriving to
and from Moscow, the hub of the Intourist system, arrived with errors and significant
delays.208 This informational breakdown stranded tourists in airports and hotel lobbies,
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befuddled Intourist employees charged with handling arriving and departing tourists, and
often drove senior Intourist officials to a state of despair.209
The structure of Intourist’s hotel inventory further exacarbated its logistical
problem. As discussed above, a significant share of its hotel quotas were obtained from
often recalcitrant partners. The latter assigned Intourist a room quota based on an
estimate of demand Intourist had to submit 40 days before the start of the calendar month
in which rooms were required (for instance, orders for September had to be filed on July
20th). These estimates were based on preliminary orders submitted by Intourist's foreign
partners, who, being aware of Soviet hotel room shortages, often inflated their demands.
In these circumstances, avoiding a paradoxical condition in which many of the rooms
assigned to Intourist stood empty while tourists were turned away due to room deficits,
was only possible if rooms could rapidly be reassigned to respond to new reservations. 210
However, even if the local city authorities who owned the hotel rooms in question
cooperated in this task (which they preferred not to, as they could simply commandeer
vacant rooms for their purposes), the technological capacity necessary for this turnaround
was simply not available for Intourist’s officials. Large Western corporations used
business machines for such relatively straightforward information processing tasks for
decades, and computers were beginning to transform the science of inventory
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management starting in the late 1950s.211 However, in Moscow in 1967 the Intourist team
in charge of managing the city’s room quota was still using abacuses as its main
computational device.212
Distressed by this logjam, Intourist's management embarked on a major
modernization drive. Unlike the hotel construction program, while developing a Soviet
software was briefly considered,213 Intourist quickly decided on a foreign solution. In
1973, it signed an 11 million dollar deal with IBM for a mainframe based reservationmanagement system.214 Why this significant foreign currency outlay? First, Intourist
officials and their academic advisers found that Soviet industry could not compete with
the superior performance of IBM's products.215 Equally importantly, they reasoned,
Intourist could enjoy the privileges of backwardness. In a 1972 memorandum describing
the history of IPARS [International Passenger Airline Reservation System], a proprietary
reservation management system that IBM developed for American Airlines and was
refitting for tourism industry uses, one Intourist official noted that the system took 11
years and vast amounts of money to develop, but was now on sale for a relatively
manageable sum. By purchasing IPARS as an off-the shelf package, he surmised,
Intourist could in essence outsource technology development costs, leapfrog from the pen
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and ink era to the digital age in one fell swoop - and do so on the cheap.216 Finally,
proponents of the deal argued, since Soviet industry could produce IBM-compatible
peripheral equipment, hard currency spending on the project would be limited to the
initial purchase.217 The IBM deal was conceived, in other words, as a one-off transaction,
not as long term technological relationship.
Unfortunately, the Intourist computerization project revealed the perils and
unforeseen consequences of relying on Western technology. While original plans called
for finishing the project in 1976, the American government took almost 2 years to decide
whether to provide IBM with an export license for its equipment and software. In
November 1975 the US Department of Commerce denied the export license, on the
grounds that the hardware sold to Intourist could be repurposed by the Soviets for
military uses. After a series of complex negotiations, IBM was finally authorized to sell
Intourist a less powerful version of its hardware in 1976.218 This delay forced a major
reworking of the project: the launch of the reservation and inventory management
modules was delayed until 1979, and the launch of other sub-systems, for example a
billing system for Intourist's foreign partners, was punted into the mid-1980s.219
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Beyond this setback, the computerization project ran into the difficulties inherent
in the implementation of all large-scale projects in the Soviet Union. Intourist’s newly
established Main Computational Center [GVTs], was beset by a series of difficulties. The
Moscow city authorities refused to provide it with a proper facility to house its computer
room, while Intourist's own cadres department failed to pressure universities to put
Intourist on the list of enterprises to which computer science graduates were sent for
mandatory work assignment (raspredelenie).220 Intourist's office buildings proved
difficult to network, while the long-distance network hardware linking southern resort
cities to the Intourist’s mainframe required more bandwidth than Soviet
telecommunications authorities could provide. Even more frustratingly, Soviet industry
failed to provide enough peripheral equipment, forcing continued imports of IBM
terminals, printers, storage devices, and communication equipment.221 Furthermore, as
Intourist's informational needs kept growing while the launch date of the IBM system
was being pushed back, GVTs was forced to launch a massive program of business
technology purchases (accounting machines, printers, copying machines, typewriters and
other similar devices).222 Such purchases and the efforts GVTs took in installing and
training staff in the new technology could alleviate some of the most pressing problems
Intourist's back-office employees faced but could not resolve the structural crisis of
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Intourist’s informational infrastracture. Such unforeseen expenditures, furthermore,
further encumbered Intourist’s hard currency balance of payments.
Unfortunately, after 1980, Intourist's archival holding are much thinner than for
the preceding three decades, and therefore reveal relatively little about the subsequent
history of the computerization project. A centralized reservation system was indeed
launched in the early 1980s. In 1983, however, the system was not yet connected even to
the Moscow hotel trust, let alone the periphery, and therefore could not be used for realtime inventory management and control of tourist traffic, the purposes for which it was
designed.223 Only in 1988 could Intourist finally retire paper-based notifications. Even
then, the new digital system did not extend to all cities in its network.224 The first
integrated database of all Intourist hotels, tours, and itineraries was launched, on an
experimental basis, in 1989,225 at a time when its new list of information technology
purchases already included personal computers, the device that was rapidly displacing the
kind of centralized, mainframe-based systems Intourist spent nearly two decades
developing.226 At that point, however, computer technology was already far from the
most important item on Intourist’s agenda, as both it and the socialist system that shaped
its unique political economy, were rapidly dissolving.
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Conclusion

Like the Soviet system itself, Intourist entered the 1980s in a state of seeming stability
that obscured serious transformations that were slowly, almost imperceptibly, eroding its
foundations. Like the rest of the Soviet economy, Intourist was an underperforming
institution, but not by a degree that indicated that it could not preserve its business model
for the foreseeable future. The number of tourists it received grew steadily. More and
more hotels were constructed every year. If supplying them with proper services, decent
hotel rooms, souvenirs, and, indeed, food and drink was a difficult proposition, things
were probably not much worse than they were in 1955 of 1965 - not a given the growth in
the numbers of foreigners the Soviet Union received. Intourist’s financial conditions was
murky, but not murkier than before; on paper at least, it seems to have kept turning a
profit for the Soviet state. Bureaucratic reshuffling, modernization efforts, anticorruption drives came and went, leaving Intourist and its staff seemingly unchanged,
year after year, decade after decade.
And yet, step by step, almost imperceptibly, a new reality was taking shape
behind this facade of stability. Built by foreign contractors, stocked with foreign furniture
and décor, networked by foreign computers, Intourist hotels in the twilight of the Soviet
era showed the vast limitations of Intourist business model: participation in global
markets, without fostering dependence on the capitalist system. From Mister Twister’s
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fantasy of the market yielding to the superior morals of the socialist system, to the
“money for factories” dreams of party officials, the function of Intourist seemed so
simple: to sell Soviet-made luxury for hard currency, currency that would allow the
Soviet Union to construct an economy unconstrained by dependence on capitalists.
However, manufacturing mass-market luxury for the “golden hordes” to which Intourist
catered proved impossible under the constraints of the Soviet economy, with its
bureaucratic social coordination system, problematic manufacturing base, and lagging
information technology system. To meet the demands of both foreign tourists and the
standards its managers set for themselves, Intourist officials were forced to retreat from a
purely transactional view of engagement with the outside world, under which even
Soviet organizations operating in the international trade sector considered the “purpose of
trade […] to use imports to help meet internal goals...[and] the role of exports merely to
cover the resulting deficits in the balance of payments,”227 and came to accept growing
dependence on global chains of finance, supply and technology. The story of Intourist
under late socialism was therefore a tale of an almost imperceptible Soviet surrender to
the forces of international capital, or for the poetically inclined, of Mister Twister’s
revenge.
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Chapter 2: Truth? Which Truth? Contesting the Tourist Gaze in the
Soviet Union

In 1960, Eugene Lyons, a former “intellectual pilgrim,” and now a known figure on the
anti-Communist Right, was invited to provide testimony to the Senate’s Subcommittee on
Internal Security on a topic near and dear to his heart: the gullibility of American visitors
to the Soviet Union.228 The report attending his testimony, appropriately entitled
“Beware! Tourists Reporting from Russia,” concluded that the new cohort of post-Stalin
travellers were nearly as open to Soviet seductions as their 1930s predecessors.229 This
new generation of “Columbuses” travelling to the “Soviet Atlantis” he argued, were
nothing but “innocent transmission belts for Soviet propaganda.”230
The reasons for the susceptibility of travelers to Soviet propaganda were twofold.
First, the visitors’ conceit that they could comprehend a complex social system through a
short, state- arranged visit was nothing but folly.231 More importantly, naiveté and, often,
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“soft spots” for the Soviet project made them prone to accepting the lies, omissions, and
the Potemkin vistas offered to them by the Soviet regime at face value. Given the vast
literature about the Soviet Union available in the West, seeing the Soviet Union firsthand
obscured rather than revealed, the true nature of the system, Lyons concluded.
Lyons’ fears about Western susceptibility to Soviet Potemkinism were profoundly
misplaced. Even a cursory examination of their reports from beyond the Iron Curtain
reveals that even if many of them were friendly to Soviet people, very few, if any,
mainstream Western travelers in the postwar era returned overall impressed with Soviet
system or its achievements. Yet, nagging doubts about the truth of what one could see
there and the power of Soviet propaganda to warp it were a permanent feature of Cold
War discourses about travel to the Soviet Union. In the late 1950s, for instance, a
somewhat mysterious non-profit operated a tourist information center in New York,
providing prospective travelers to the Soviet Union with briefings and literature so that
“they won’t become easy marks for Soviet propaganda.”232 More than 10 years later, the
New York Times was still offering its readers tips on “getting to know Russia by avoiding
the guided tour.”233
Such efforts, many critics of Soviet power believed, were woefully insufficient to
withstand the allure of Soviet propaganda. The dissident Andrei Sakharov argued that
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“foreign tourists who come here will go around the country in comfortable buses,
prevented by simple measures from making contact with regular Soviet people.”234 While
giving some credence to Western diplomats and journalists, Sakharov’s fellow dissident
Solzhenitsyn found that the impressions of short-term visitors were of no significance in
deciphering the Soviet Union, as “due to the skillful efforts of Intourist” their impressions
were “altogether superficial.”235 The myth of the Soviet propaganda machine’s successful
befuddlement of “fellow travelers” even survived the Cold War. During the Presidential
campaign of 1992, for example, Bill Clinton’s exchange student trip to the Soviet Union
in 1970 briefly became a campaign issue, with several Republican Congressmen alluding
that he might have been recruited as a Soviet agent of influence,236 with similar
accusations popping during the 2013 New York mayoral election, and the 2016
presidential race.237
Such exaggerated views of the allure of the Soviet Union aside, concerns about
travelers’ access to unvarnished Soviet reality contain a hidden assumption worth
unpacking. The notion that Russian, and later Soviet authorities, shamelessly manipulated
travelers’ perceptions of Russian reality was a staple of travel writing on Muscovy/Russia

234

Interview with the Observer Review, 8/6/1975, read into the Congressional Record by Rep. Donald
Fraser (121 Congressional Record, 22899).
235
“Misconceptions about Russia are a Threat to America” Foreign Affairs 58, no. (1980), 799. On
dissidents’ perceptions of Westerners see: Barbara Walker, “Moscow Human Rights Defenders Look West:
Attitudes toward U.S. Journalists in the 1960s and 1970s,” Kritika 9, no.4 (2008), 905-927.
236
“Clinton Toured Moscow at War’s Peak,” Washington Times, 10/5/1992, read into Congressional
Record by Rep. Duncan Hunter (138 Cong. Rec. E 3201.
237
“Bill DeBlasio visited Communist USSR in College,” New York Post, 11/3/2013, accessed online at:
http://nypost.com/2013/11/03/de-blasio-visited-communist-ussr-in-college/ on 3/1/2016. “Bernie Sanders’
Soviet Honeymoon,” National Review Online, 6/24/2015, accessed online 3/1/2016.

96

since the early modern period.238 However, the burgeoning literature on travel and tourist
studies takes as more or less given that all forms of travel, foreign and domestic, are an
essentially constructed enterprise. Thus, sociologists John Uhry and Jonas Larsen use the
French theory-inspired term “tourist gaze” to describe the social interaction of visitors
and hosts that creates the act of observing foreign locations. The tourist gaze, they write,
is “constructed in relationship to its opposite, to non-tourist forms of social experience
and consciousness,” and consists of observing outside reality “through frames and styles,
circulating images of this and other places,” that condition the tourist to see their
surroundings as “interesting, good or beautiful.”239 Simply put, tourists observe little that
is not culturally encoded beforehand as the kind of thing tourists should observe. From
this perspective, what made /Soviet perspectives unique is not that Russian authorities
sought to manipulate foreign perceptions and block travellers’ access to unvarnished
truths about the Soviet Union. Rather, if in Uhry and Rasmussen’s formulation, the
tourist gaze is an essentially collaborative enterprise, Soviet authorities and their visitors
were often in disagreement about what was “interesting, good and beautiful” about Soviet
reality.
In this chapter, I reconstruct Soviet efforts to win this battle of perceptions,
construct an image of Soviet reality its propagandists could “sell” to foreign audiences,
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and find ways to block counter-narrative imported by foreign travellers to disrupt Soviet
images. To do so, I explore the world of Soviet “warriors on the ideological front:”
propagandists, tour guides and other employees of Intourist, Sputnik and other
organizations charged with propagandizing foreign visitors.240 Building on recent works
of scholars like Michael David-Fox, Kristine Roth-Ey and Anne Applebaum, I argue that
Soviet propaganda in the Cold War era was not an ossified relic, but rather an expression
of deep ideological commitment to a vision of the Soviet Union as viable alternative to
Western modernity.241
Before proceeding, we should adress an important objection: despite Lyons’
concerns over their persuasive powers, foreigners’ Soviet handlers often appear in
Western accounts of the late Soviet period either as somewhat ridiculous conveyors of
Soviet propaganda, authoritarian robots, or voices of the Soviet “person on the street”
forced to convey lines they don’t believe in.242 Should their voices and narratives be
taken seriously? My answer is a resounding yes. Even if we accept that by the 1970s,
few if any Soviet ideological workers took the Marxist-Leninist claims they espoused
literally, there are still reasons to consider carefully the narratives they offered to
foreigners. First, their foreign encounters were part and parcel of the cultural Cold War, a
For uses of this term to describe Intourist guides, see “Stenogramma…” GARF f. 9612, op. 2, d. 286, l.
192; “Otchet ob ekskursionnom obsluzhivannie inostrannykh turistov v SSSR v 1963 godu “GARF, f.
9612, op.1, d. 557, l. 87. See also Igor Orlov “Boitsy ideologicheskogo fronta: podgotovka gidovperevodchikov v SSSR,” in Irina Glushchenko, Vitalii Kernnyi (ed.), Vremia vpered! Kulturnaaia politika
v SSSSR (Moscow: VShE, 2013), 81-95.
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context in which Soviet patriotism in the face of ideological aggression was still a
powerful stimulus. Second, while the narratives offered to foreigners may not have
seemed particularly convincing, they still conveyed a set of values that exerted power on
the Soviet imagination: multi-nationalism, war memory and pursuit of peace, universal
welfare and infatuation with high culture.243
Finally, on the most basic level, the elaboration of stories fit for foreign
consumption was an activity to which the Soviet Union devoted significant attention.
Soviet tour guides, for example, were trained and professionalized to a degree rarely
achieved by their Western counterparts, where this profession is usually the domain of
transient labor.244 This implies that the stories they told, the images they conveyed, the
efforts they made to convince visitors who could be convinced and to silence those who
could not - that all of this mattered for the conduct of the cultural Cold War and for the
maintenance of the stability of the Soviet discursive universe. The gap between the
bumbling and burdensome image of the Soviet official handler in Western accounts and
the massive Soviet efforts at the construction of a coherent narrative of Soviet modernity
invites several key questions. What did Soviet authorities try to achieve in constructing
the images they offered to foreign consumers? What arguments did they offer regarding
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the superiority or at least the sustainability of the Soviet way of life? How did patriotism
and cynicism interact in the professional identities of Soviet propagandists for foreigners?
How did they handle challenges to the narratives they offered? In short, what do the
stories the Soviet Union told about itself tell us about the nature of “real existing
socialism”?

On the Ideological Front

Aleksei Legasov, a representative of the International Department of the Central
Committee, was the keynote speaker at a January 1961 meeting of the leading cadres of
Intourist. The Communist Party, he reminded the audience, viewed the employees of the
Soviet tourism industry as fighters on a crucial sector of the “ideological front.” Foreign
tourism was an important “channel of our influence on… international public opinion
[obshchestvennost’].” The effects of travel to the Soviet Union on visiting foreigners
could help “refute vicious propaganda unleashed by foreign countries.” A crucial
indication of Soviet success in this field was the fact that “the ruling circles of capitalist
countries including the USA are making efforts to neutralize impressions [created by]
tourist travel to the Soviet Union. They are brainwashing people [obrabatyvaiut
liudei]…the State Department is creating work groups on tourism, gives tourists
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assignments, creates briefing documents [pamiatki] for tourists”- all in order to
counteract Soviet and promote Western propaganda.245
With its combination of optimism and (well-grounded) suspicion, Legasov’s
address was a fitting expression of the state of mind of Soviet propaganda officials in the
late 1950s. As a number of scholars demonstrate, Soviet officials in the late Stalin and
early Khrushchev eras were painfully aware of the failings of the Soviet foreign
propaganda apparatus. In the form it took under late Stalinism, Soviet propaganda aimed
at the West was dry, boring, didactic, and ignorant of postwar conditions in the West.246
Whereas during the prewar years Soviet propagandists could rely on the impact of the
Great Depression and the rise of fascism to find friendly audiences, during the postwar
boom, they could appeal only to the thin sliver of Western public opinion that was
ideologically sympathetic to the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the old, text-based methods
of Soviet propaganda proved no match for the appeals of American popular and
consumer culture, spreading with the help of new communications technology,
innovative advertisement techniques – and massive state backing.247 In this context, the
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opening of the Soviet borders to mass foreign travel seemed like a golden opportunity to
show, not tell, the “truth about the Soviet Union” to increasingly skeptical foreigners.
The potential of Soviet travel to improve foreign perceptions of Soviet reality
seemed so powerful to Soviet officials that they (not without reason) both publicly and
privately charged that Western governments were waging a concerted campaign to
forestall travel to the USSR. A 1958 Intourist report on conditions in international tourist
organizations noted with pride that Americans were planning a major push to negate what
the latter perceived as “the great advances made by the socialist bloc” in advancing
tourism to the Eastern block.248 In West Germany, Intourist chief Ankudinov angrily
reported in late 1960, “the press, instructed [po ukazke] of the ruling circles of the FRG,
conducts a campaign against travel to the Soviet Union,” by terrifying them with
accounts of KGB surveillance. This campaign he alleged, brought only 14,000 West
German tourists to the Soviet Union, instead of the 20,000 Intourist planned to receive.249
Beyond such statements, which more than anything else mirrored Soviet attitudes
to media management to a different cultural context, Soviet tourism officials had a
somewhat solid case regarding Western approaches to Eastern Block travel. For instance,
Soviet media relished reports on State Department refusals to issue foreign passports to

The Cold War and the United States Information Agency, 1945-1989 (New York and Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2008).
248
“O razvitii inostrannogo turizma v SSSR (predvaritelnyi otchet za 10 mesiatsov 1958 g.),”GARF F.
9612, op. 2, d. 247, ll. 83-85.
249
“Doklad Predsedatelia Pravlenia. VAO Inturist , V.N Ankudinova ‘Ob itogakh turistkogo sezona za
1960 god’ na soveshchanii VGK SM SSR po kul’turnym sviaziam s zarubezhnymi stranami,” GARF, f.
9612, op. 2, d. 273, l. 62. In fact, as I show in Chapter 3, the real culprit was a hysterical Soviet campaign
against espionage, conducted after the U-2 shootdown in summer of 1960.

102

suspected Communist sympathizers, arguing that this refusal showed “who really is
constructing an Iron Curtain.”250 In West Germany, state employees still had to sign
affidavits acknowledging travel to “Communist dominated countries” as late as the mid1980s.251 In Italy, Soviet officials and their Italian Communist partners complained,
authorities aimed to sabotage travel to socialist countries by denying Communistaffiliated tour firms foreign currency quotas and dragging their feet on issuing passports
for would-be proletarian tourists.252 In dictatorial Latin American countries, returning
travelers from the Soviet Union could expect harassment, arrests, and torture.253
And still, flattered as they might have been by alleged attempts to stop travel to
the Soviet Union, Soviet officials knew Western attempts to use travel for their own
purposes represented a far greater threat. Many foreign tourists, Soviet officials fretted,
were either innocents captured by the coordinated Cold War campaign to darken Soviet
reality or were “open or hidden enemies of Communism.”254 Foreign governments, media
tycoons, travel book publishers, and “ideological centers of anti-Soviet propaganda” all
colluded to turn tourists into willing or unwilling vectors of ideological infection. Thus, a
1963 Intourist report complained that “...the American propaganda machinery aims to use
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foreign tourism [kanaly inostrannogo turizma] to spread bourgeois ideology and alien
mores [chuzdykh nam nravov]…to achieve these aims, they recommend that tourists
create as many contacts as possible with Soviet people, to study their psychology, their
attitudes towards the foreign and domestic policies of the CPSU.”255 Acting under this
malign influence, a significant minority of tourists from the West was “gathering
sensitive information, engaging in currency speculation, distributing anti-Soviet
literature… and participating in other hostile activities.”256
Despite the hyperbolic nature of these complaints, they were undoubtebly
grounded in fact, as we’ve seen above and will still amply demonstrate. Here therefore
was the cultural Cold War in all its complexity. Soviet officials, skilled in the art of
organizing tourist groups, foreign and domestic, to see what they wanted them to see,257
could not but imagine their foes acting in a similar manner, while the latter - motivated
by a similar mixture of fears and ambitions, obliged – and thus confirmed Soviet fears.
Thus travel to the Soviet Union became a battleground on which Soviet
propagandists had to deploy both offensive and defensive strategies. On the one hand,
Soviet officials aimed to “propagate truthful information about the life of the Soviet
people,”258 in order to “penetrate the web of lies and disinformation about the Soviet
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Union woven by the owners of Big Media [bolshoi pressy]”,259 and thus confirmed at
least some of Lyons’ fears. On the other hand, they had to find ways to minimize harm
caused by visiting “enemies” and their impact on both locals and their less ideologically
committed travel-mates. While neither side would have thought about this in these terms,
what was at stake were competing ways to gaze at Soviet reality: will foreign visitors
perceive the benefits of the Soviet way of life, or will they serve as witnesses, validators,
and, worst of all, disseminators, of “bourgeois ideology” and its claims of Soviet
oppression and backwardness?

The Truth about the Soviet Union

In 1960, Intourist released a short pamphlet aiming to provide its guides with an itinerary
for showcasing “the capital of the world’s first socialist state of the toilers” [stolitsa
pervogo v mire sotsialisticheskogo gosudarstva trudiashchikhsia] to its foreign guests.260
Starting on Sverdlov Square (today, Theater Square), the city tour looped through
Moscow’s historic center, then veered off beyond the Garden Ring to showcase new
construction along Lenin prospect, passed by the architectural marvel of the Moscow
University skyscraper, and then returned downtown to conclude at Red Square. Along the
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route, guests were to absorb vistas of the past, present, and future of the socialist
metropolis.
At the first point of the tour, the Bolshoi Theatre, guides provided detailed
explanations of the flourishing of theatre culture in the Soviet Union, pointing out
especially that the Soviet Union was home of the world’s first children’s theatre, still
unrivalled in any capitalist country. Observing the Palace of Unions, visitors were
reminded of the love the Soviet people bore for Lenin. Standing on Manezh Square and
enjoying the view it provided of the Moscow University’s skyscraper, they were told both
of the great patrimony of imperial-era Russian science it represented, and of the great
efforts Soviet power took to overcome illiteracy. On Gor’kii Street, they were shown the
granite facades of new buildings made of materials the Germans had planned to use for a
monument to their conquest of Moscow, while pointing out how much wider this
boulevard was compared to its tsarist predecessor. In front of the Moscow Soviet
building, guides provided information on housing construction and Moscow’s emerging
transport, heating, electricity and gas networks.261
The mingling of past, present, and future did not subside when the tour moved
away from historical Moscow. On the recently finished the Garden Ring road weaving
around the historical heart of Moscow, tourists were told about the ongoing construction
of the Moscow Ring Road, encircling the outlying parts of the town constructed in Soviet
times (perhaps in an attempt to dispel the impression made by the frequent traffic jams).
261
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During the ride down to the Academy of Sciences, visitors were told both about rapid
scientific progress in the Soviet era and reminded that the road on which they were
travelling had been used by Polish and French invaders as they beat hasty retreats from
Moscow. The views of Moscow’s new South-West District visible along the Lenin
Prospekt provided an opportunity to discuss both the massive scope and the welfarist
nature of Khrushchev’s housing program: its self-contained mikro-raiony, featuring
“buildings equipped with stores, cinemas, clubs, restaurants,” parks and green zones, and
gleaming new kindergartens and experimental boarding schools “for the education of
children who will live under Communism.”262
The tour reached its climax at Red Square. There, visitors were told about the
Square as the launching point of “popular rebellions against the boyars and tsars,” as well
as about the heroic feats of Russia’s princes, nobles and tsars: Dimitry Donskoi’s victory
over the Tatars, Minin and Pozharskii’s expulsion of the Poles from Moscow, and
Kutuzov’s triumph over Napoleon. Following this encomium to tsarist heroes (and subtle
reminder that the Cold War was not the first clash between Russia/USSR and the West),
they were treated to a list of revolutionary heroes interred in the Kremlin wall. After a
brief introduction to the mausoleum, still housing both Stalin and Lenin, guides were to
recall the famous November 7th 1941 parade that demonstrated Soviet willingness to fight
to the bitter end, and the Victory Parade of June 24, 1945. Then, visitors were requested
to look above, at the building of All-Union Council of Ministers, and to the other side of
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the Square, where GUM, the USSR’s flagship department store, worked to fulfill
Muscovites’ consumer needs. Connecting past, present and future, the everyday and the
heroic, the nationalist and the socialist, tours concluded with a paean to Moscow, a city
that was “living its ninth century, but is eternally young, growing, developing, renewing
itself. Moscow is a city with a glorious past, grandiose present and even more
magnificent future.”263
The Moscow city tour, the first socialist society’s love song to itself at a moment
when its dreams seemed, for some at least, within reach,264 encompassed an important
transition in the way visions of socialist modernity were transmitted to outsiders.
Michael David-Fox demonstrates that during the interwar period, sightseeing programs
for foreigners focused heavily on exceptional objects: ultra-modern factories, model
farms, schools and social welfare institutions that served as harbingers of the socialist
future.265 In the immediate postwar years, perhaps due to the general turn of Soviet
culture to the celebration of the Russian past, programs for the few visitor groups that
entered the Soviet Union balanced such showcases with a heavy diet of museums and
classical culture.266
While the structured, stage-managed programs balancing showcases and classical
culture never disappeared, and were now the main fair offered to myriad “friendship”
263
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delegations from Eastern Europe,267 the sharp post-Stalin increase in the numbers of
foreigners entering the Soviet Union required a significant change of tactics. First, given
the rapid rise in the numbers of visitors the USSR received, the capacities of the
showcases (ob’ekty pokaza) were exceeded, while the interest of the average visitor in the
achievements of, say, collective farmers waned (if it had, indeed, ever existed in the first
place). Second, given that travellers to the Soviet Union from the United States and, to
lesser extent, Western Europe, tended to be well-educated and often viewed trips there as
political endeavors, visitors could be quite skeptical of the official Soviet line.268
Propagandists at the Moscow House of Friendship, for instance, were bombarded with
questions ranging from social insurance to the finer points of Marxist theory, revealing
very high level of preparation among their “clients”.269 While this sort of familiarity with
the Soviet Union was surely an exception rather than general rule, complaints about
skeptical or even hostile tourists were ubiquitous among Soviet “warriors on the
ideological front” (see below).
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The rhetorical responses Soviet propagandists fashioned in response to these
challenges were conditioned by the profound ideological transformation that the Soviet
system underwent in the late 1950s. On the most basic level, the narrative offered to
foreign visitors was evidence of a profound temporal shift. Visages of socialism were no
longer limited to future visions. Rather, socialism was a living, breathing reality.
Itineraries were now structured not so much to demonstrate abstract Soviet achievements
or heroic labor but rather social objects of everyday life (kul’turno-bytovye obekty):
housing projects, schools, clubs, kindergartens, hospitals, and clinics.270 Tour guides were
instructed to put special emphasis on such objects even when taking tourists on tours of
factories and collective farms. Welfare, not production, was the new calling card of
Soviet socialism.
Recitation of statistics, the Soviet Union’s favorite form of self-measurement, was
another tactic that brought home socialism’s record of achievement. In what they termed
the “comparative method” [sravnitelnyi metod] statistical information about the USSR
was presented not in isolation but in contrast with data on contemporary capitalist powers
and tsarist Russia. The former comparison was usually presented in terms of welfare: the
Soviet Union, visitors were told, produced more engineers, doctors, kindergartens, and
university students than the United States, while providing social benefits (free schooling
and healthcare, universal employment and retirement benefits) that West Europeans and
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Americans could only dream of.271 Comparisons with tsarist Russia were made in terms
of productivity: the former “backward annex of the global capitalist economy” now shot
to a position of global leadership in the production of tractors, electricity, machinery, coal
and steel.272 The superiority of the socialist system, these figures aimed to demonstrate,
was not a matter of theory or prediction; rather, it was embedded in its capacity to
combine productivity, fairness and welfare in the here and now.
Soviet propagandists took a similar attitude towards discussion of national issues.
Here again, the past and present, rather than future, were used to defuse questions about
Soviet colonialism, Russification, suppression of national movements, the “Jewish
Question” and other thorny problems that might be raised by inquisitive visitors. For
instance, when planning itineraries to Uzbekistan, a showcase of the multiethnic nature of
Soviet modernity,273 modernization and benevolence were the key items on Intourist’s
agenda. Itineraries emphasized the miraculous development of a backward corner of a
backward empire into an industrial, cultural, and educational powerhouse. Here again,
socialism was described not as a future promise, but as concrete reality: one (Slavic)
Intourist official proposed to use indigenous, female, university-educated Intourist guides
with “their unveiled beautiful faces… smiling eyes [and] self-confident manner,” as
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living proof of Soviet achievements in modernizing Central Asia and refutation of the
slanderous notion that the Soviet Union was a colonial power there.274
Similar themes on the national question were played out on the politically fraught
terrain of the Soviet Union’s western borderlands.275 As in the center, statistics and the
“comparative method” were the main weapon of Soviet propagandists. Tourists visiting
L’viv, for example, were fed figures comparing the meagre educational levels,
urbanization rates, and industrial production indices of the backward, agriculturally
oriented province of “szlachta-dominated [panskaia]” Poland to the industrial
development figures of the modern day L’viv oblast’.276 In the Baltic republics, visitors
were given litanies on the numbers of books, plays, newspapers and periodicals in
Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian designed to prove that claims of russification were
nothing but slander. Above all, Soviet propagandists argued, Soviet-style modernization
and the preservation of national cultures were not antithetical, but served to reinforce
each other. Thus, Intourist itineraries for Tallinn emphasized that the reconstruction and
upkeep of the Old City, the main tourist attraction in the republic, was part and parcel of
the Soviet concern for the preservation of Estonian culture. Veering off from the Old City
to Mustamäe, Tallinn’s first mass housing district, the same itinerary emphasized that the
new housing program was motivated by the same ethics of welfare and care that
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motivated Soviet preservation efforts in the Old City.277 Over and over again, socialist
modernity was represented not as a future promise, but as a mature, dividend-bearing
model of social organization.
If socialist modernity was the main ingredient in the self-image Soviet
propagandists drew for their guests, the peaceful nature of Soviet society was a powerful
secondary motiff. As Finnish historian Pia Koivunen describes, desire to counter Western
images of the Soviet Union as a militaristic, aggressive state was a key motivation in the
Soviet decision to open itself to foreign travel in the 1950s.278 Throughout the post-Stalin
period, disseminating messages about the “peace-loving foreign policy” of the Soviet
state and contrasting it with images of Western brutality remained a key goal of Soviet
itinerary planners. For instance, images of the Vietnam War were so common in Soviet
propaganda aimed at foreigners that they drew complaints from Intourist’s American
business partners concerned that they were creating discomfort among their clients.279
In this context, the Second World War grew ever more prominent in Soviet
representations to foreign visitors. War memorials, Tombs of the Unknown Soldier and
narratives about Soviet sacrifice, heroism and commitment to peace became central
ingredients of visitors’ itineraries. As was the case with propaganda aimed at the Soviet
public (in which, as Nina Tumarkin demonstrates, the War took an ever more central
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position as the promises of the Khrushchev era faded),280 the growing obsession with the
war served both to express Soviet self-perceptions and explain away Soviet flaws.
Damages caused by the war were, for example, an easy retort to Western boasts about
material superiority (and, at times, could serve as rebuke to foreigners complaining about
trifles like tourist amenities). Even more important, such narratives reminded visitors that
the Soviet Union was a hero-martyr nation, and this heroic martyrdom served to reiterate
the extent to which the pursuit of peace was at the very heart of its identity. After all, as
one training document for guides preparing for the 50th anniversary of the formation of
the Soviet Union put it, “if we say that the Soviet people carried the entire burden of the
war on its shoulders,” how could visitors fail to understand that “the Soviet people wants
peace and is unified behind the Soviet government”?281

Image and Reality

In short, in theory at least, the “interesting, good or beautiful” things Soviet propagandists
expected their charges to gaze at featured moderate consumerism bound by reasonable
limits, housing for all, modern cities, emancipated women, friendly faces, and peaceloving foreign policy: all the benefits of contemporary capitalism, but none of its flaws.
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Like all imagery presented to tourists, the particular vision of reality had essential
elements of truth (the Soviet leadership did indeed seek to avoid nuclear war at nearly all
costs, and welfare socialism was indeed at the center of the post-Stalin Soviet social
contract).282 Yet, bridging the gap between what Soviet propagandists thought foreigners
should see, and their guests’ actual perceptions of their surroundings (perceptions that
were moreover mediated by preconceived images of the Soviet Union) required
herculean labor.
From the point of view of the constructivist literature on travel, the gap between
Soviet reality and narratives Soviet propagandists offered to their visitors was in itself
nothing unusal. And yet, one cannot avoid the conclusion that the Soviet case possesed
some uniqure features. First, as discussed above, images of the Soviet Union held by
hosts and visitors were instruments of ideological war, designed to be incommensurate
with each other. On the most basic level, whereas in many other cases when foreigners
visit a poorer location, exoticism, backwardness, and poverty serve as essential
components of the “othering” effect of foreign travel offered for tourist consumption,283
Soviet propagandists aimed to represent the Soviet Union as a society that beat back
backwardness, and where the most exotic locations were transformed by modernity into
“normal” spaces.
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No less importantly, constructivist views of the tourist experience, developed to
their logical conclusion, imply that there was nothing especially peculiar about Soviet
practices of ideologically arranged hospitability. Travelers, especially travelers taking
part in modern, mass, commercialized forms of foreign travel to relatively poor locations,
never experience foreign life as it is, but rather exist in carefully constructed bubbles of
privilege that both protect them from most of the material effects of relative (or absolute)
impoverishment, and produce attractive slices of foreign, exotic life for their enjoyment.
In the Soviet case, due to a combination of high-flying ideological statements by hosts,
visitors’ skepticism, and, above all, the Soviet economy’s failure to produce bubbles of
privilege rising to the level of upper-middle class Western existence (or, sometimes, even
middle class East European existence) , made generating the totalizing effects of tourism
an especially hard assignment. What made the Soviet organization of hospitality unique
was not that it wrapped foreign visitors in a web of deceit, but that it failed to produce a
coherent enough image of Soviet reality to support its rhetorical claims.
As described in Chapter One, the most fundamental problem Soviet propagandists
faced when attempting to arrange a satisfying imagery of the Soviet experience was the
failure of Intourist and attendant industries to provide for a tourist experience meeting the
standards Soviet authorities set for themselves. And indeed, Intourist archives groan with
internal complaints about shoddy construction, bad maintenance, insufficient food, faulty
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bathrooms, and an immeasurable host of other problems of the Soviet hospitality
industry. 284
And if these were the opinions of Intourist officials, foreigners often had a field
day reporting with barely hidden glee the many ways in which they were let down by
Intourist. One rather typical description of an Intourist hotel in the Georgian Republic,
for instance, found it: “a distorted reflection of Intourist description: shabby bathroom,
broken window, doors that didn’t close, and dirty interior.”285 The comic travel writer
Irene Campen devoted much of her account of travelling by car throughout the Soviet
Union (memorably entitled Are You Carrying Gold or Living Relatives?) to sketches of
various Intourist officials who, trapped in the informational chaos described to Chapter
One, struggled to comprehend where she came from and where was she going next.286
Poor Soviet restrooms, and especially the endemic lack of toilet paper therein, served for
one libertarian writer as a vivid reminder of the evils of price controls.287 Stan Rose, a
Kansas-City columnist, opened his Memo from Russia in a similar key, remembering
“stinking public toilets that befoul the air from Moscow to the faraway Pacific.”288 Soviet
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restaurants with their long wait times, kitchens that lacked most items listed on the menu
and featured haughty staffs, were “designed to teach you that, just because you have the
greenbacks, it doesn’t mean you call all the shots” wrote Max Polonsky and Russell
Taylor, the authors of a satirical travel guide to the Soviet Union.289 And of course,
Intourist’s flaws were but a metaphor for the faults of the USSR itself. As one British
reporter put it: “when I started a three-year stint as… Moscow correspondent, I stayed at
the grim Intourist hotel on Gorky Street. It incorporated the worst aspects of Soviet
society: incompetence, surveillance, bad standards, incivility and suspicion.”290
Soviet officials fully grasped the metonymic link such accounts established
between the Soviet hospitality industry and the Soviet system. As I.G. Bolshakov, a
functionary from the State Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries,
explained to a group of Intourist officials: “the political effect of tourism depends, above
all, on material factors… How will the tourist be received? How will he be fed? How will
he be served [budet obsluzhivatsia]?” Here, he continued, lay Soviet weakness: if a
“tourist receives a bad room... Has to wait hours for his meal... Has to stand in line to
receive this or that piece of paper [tu ili inuiu spravku]... He will leave the country in a
bad mood.” And since such rooms, delays, and lines were indeed what awaited visitors,
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“foreigners say that the Soviet Union supposedly launched Sputnik into space [govoriat
chto mol zapustil v kosmos sputnik], but they can’t organize good service. Hostile
foreigners are gloating [zloradstvuiut].”291
Bolshakov’s channeling of Western tourists’ complaints captures the near
obsessive zeal with which Soviet officials treated foreigners’ perceptions of the USSR.
The files of Moscow’s Hotel Administration, a body that played host to the majority of
visitors to the Soviet capital in the 1950s and 1960s, contains numerous translated
newspaper clippings of highly uncomplimentary Western travel writing about the Soviet
Union. 292 The Central Committee’s Propaganda Department commissioned a translation
of an American sociological study about the impact of travel to the Soviet Union on
American opinions,293 while Sputnik briefly considered disguising sociology students as
guides in order to better understand, and influence, how its guest perceived their
environments.294 Most strikingly perhaps, tourism officials were almost gleeful to recount
negative comments from foreigners, as these often reinforced their own perceptions of
organizational weakness. For instance, one trip report cited, with no negative comment, a
West German tourist complaining that “you don’t know how to squeeze money out of us
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[kaki iz nas den’gi vykolachivat],295 and another took to heart a comment from a
Yugoslav tourist that “you don’t care whether we spend money here or not.”296
No doubt, Soviet officials could credit some private complaints to the problematic
mentality of Western tourists (“these gentlemen,” one incensed official observed “are
abusing our patience” [zlouboterbliaut polozheniem]),297 while public complaints could
be seen as attempts at slander. For instance, articles in the Western press doubting the
capacity of the Soviet tourist industry to accommodate tourist influx were deemed by
Soviet officialdom to be part of a campaign to sabotage the 1980 Olympics, orchestrated
by Western “imperialists.”298 And yet, the zeal with which such comments were
collected, indicates something more fundamental was afoot than cataloguing slander.
Soviet propagandists knew exactly what foreigners should observe and what they ought
to ignore as surface phenomena obfuscating deeper truths. However, they also knew that
for foreigners not trained in in Soviet art of separating the observed aspects of reality
from its deeper ideological meaning,299 it was immediate sensual perceptions that
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counted. Therefore, to organize a proper presentation of the truth about the USSR, Soviet
officials had to learn to perceive the Soviet Union from a foreign perspective.
Unfortunately for the efforts of Soviet propagandists, there was no bridging the
gap between narratives of socialist modernity and sensory perceptions of foreigners. The
power of Soviet narratives could not, for example, overcome the shock that olfactory
exposure to Soviet reality could produce. Soviet restrooms were such an endemic and
embarrassing problem that on the eve of the Moscow Olympics they were personally
denounced by no lesser authority than than Aleksey Kosygin, the Chairman of the Soviet
of Ministers.300 In another high-level meeting involving olfactory matters, in 1970, the
Foreign Relations Committee of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet debated the problem of
unpleasant smells emanating from dishes in restaurants serving foreign tourists, noting
that the problem was that foreigners could not tolerate smells Soviet people learned to
live with.301 Unceasing complaints from Intourist regarding Soviet the terrible quality (or
absence) of microphones on tourist buses it was provided by Soviet industry meant that
things were not much better when it got to hearing.302
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Figure 2.1: Intourist Tour Bus (Scaled Model)
Source: http://sprzedajemy.pl/

Manufacturing appealing visual snapshots of Soviet reality also proved largely
beyond the grasp of Soviet tourism organizers. At times, they struggled with making
tourists see Soviet reality in the most literal sense of the word. In 1967, one French group
complained that winter travel in Intourist's buses was equivalent to a trip to a dark frozen
cavern. Another group christened such buses “hearses,” as they were cold, dark, and
allowed one to see little of the outside world through their frozen, besmirched
windows.303
While these were extreme cases, such occurrences represented real and persistent
problems: the resource constraints and coordination efforts that so hampered efforts to
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feed and house tourists also hindered the production of visual paraphernalia of the tourist
trade: albums, postcards, posters, brochures, souvenirs, maps and guidebooks. Intourist
official spent decades complaining about deficits of high quality paper necessary to
produce everything from coffee-table books to humble suitcase labels,304 while staff
uniforms even in such key locations as the Sheremet’evo and Vnukovo’s airports were
made of “bad fabric and fraying after less than one year of use” – and therefore gave the
wrong impression to foreign visitors.305
As their title implies, showcase objects - factories, top collective farms, and
increasingly, schools and kindergartens, were key components in the scenery Soviet
propagandists wished to arrange. However, here too their capacity to organize a coherent
image was impaired. The managers of such objects generally disliked this duty.
Exasperated by demands on his time and resources, one such manager declared that he
was “sick” of Intourist demands [vy nam nadoeli].306 Security concerns also posed
difficulties. In 1963, one Komsomol official complained that due to secrecy rules,
Sputnik could only take visitors to obsolete factories.307 The state of these factories, even
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sympathetic visitors could not help but point out, undermined Soviet claims about its
industrial achievements.308
Similar problems of priority and coordination plagued attempts to provide visitors
with showcases in one field where the Soviet Union did excel: high culture.309 Here,
Soviet tourism organizers were stumped by two problems. First, the Soviet Ministry of
Culture often failed to provide them with sufficient quota of tickets to address foreign
demand, arguing that Soviet citizens deserved a priority over foreigners. In the summer
months, moreover, the height of the tourist season, the most prestigious troupes and
performers were often abroad, as the Ministry of Culture preferred foreign tours (for
which it was paid in foreign money) to local shows (from which Intourist benefitted).310
These difficulties were all rooted in one fundamental reality: the institutional
power of Soviet tourism organizers was nowhere sufficient enough to arrange an
idealized image of Soviet life for their clients. This conundrum expressed itself most
powerfully in their inability to control the physical spaces in which foreigners moved.
Outside the historical hearts of Moscow and Leningrad and other select locations (such as
the Golden Ring towns of Vladimir and Suzdal’, where major reconstruction was carried
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out in the 1960s), the aesthetic qualities of Soviet life failed to fit the standards they set
for foreign consumption.
The former problem was, by and large, a product of some of the basic features of
the Soviet economic model: rapid industrial development that left little room for
historical preservation. As Shawn Salmon demonstrates, tourism officials,
preservationists and Russian nationalists successfully lobbied the Soviet government to
fund Vladimir and Suzdal’s reconstruction in part by arguing that these historical towns
would draw significant numbers of foreign visitors, who would then spend dollars
there.311 This was, however, a rare success. Documents from the perestroika era indicate
that little was done for preservationists and tourist officials thereafter. For instance,
Intourist, activists and local officials argued that despite its commercial potential, the Old
City of Novgorod failed to attract foreign tourists, as it was in a state of near ruin due to
frequent floods of liquid industrial wastes.312
Similar conditions obtained in other historical sites. For example, on the eve of
the Moscow Olympics, the State Control Commission found that the Borodino
battlefield, a possible draw for foreign Tolstoy buffs, 313 was in a state of total disrepair.
Battlefield museums, chapels and nearby historical monasteries were all in a neglected
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state, and funds for their restoration were scarce. Even worse, neighboring factories and
collective farms used the battlefield as dumping grounds for their waste and refused to
take measures necessary to reverse the damage they caused. As result of these findings,
Borodino was removed from the list of “Olympic” objects.
While balancing industrial development and historical preservation was hardly a
uniquely Soviet challenge, Soviet tourism organizers faced another dilemma: the glaring
contradiction between Soviet claims of alternative modernity and the evidence provided
by Soviet human and physical landscapes. Intourist officials were, for example, stymied
by the prevalence of begging: both cripples on cathedral squares and “chewing gum
knights,” children pleading foreigners for gum and other souvenirs, served as embodied
counter-arguments for claims about the superiority of the Soviet way of life. 314
Rural landscapes posed an even harsher challenge to Soviet claims of alternatice
modernity. All across the Soviet Union, model collective farms located at some distance
from cities had to be removed from showcase object lists, as “by the time they get to
these kolkhozy, tourists will see 20 lying in ruins [v razvalinakh].315 An inspection of the
Moscow-Vladimir-Suzdal highway in 1970, six years after they became a key ingredient
of tourist itineraries, revealed “old, decrepit, boarded up houses… old barracks…a club
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with a broken door, missing windows… decrepit sheds and silos” scattered along the
tourist route.316
Even entry points to the Soviet Union could not be reshaped to fit forms Soviet
tourism organizers considered appropriate. Another pre-Olympic investigation by State
Control, this time of the Soviet-Finnish border town of Vyborg, an important hub on the
Helsinki-Leningrad tourist route, found that tourist facilities in the town had “dirty walls
and ceilings, peeling paint on walls and ceilings…water and sewage networks requiring
urgent repairs.”317 This finding was especially interesting, as tourist organizers were
complaining about conditions in Vyborg since the late 1960s, focusing on the
embarrassment caused to the Soviet Union by the condition of its old town.318 Looking at
Soviet reality from the perspective of imagined Western tourists, Soviet propagandists
could not but find the views on offer rather disappointing.

Golden Links of the Chain of Friendship: Soviet Tour Guides
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The reality described above had clear implications: in the Soviet case, seeing did not
mean believing. Since Soviet propagandists could not surround their charges with
coherent images of their vision of Soviet modernity, they had to train them in the art of
Soviet observation. This entailed filtering out the unessential elements of Soviet reality to
get at its underlying truths, and stopping visitors from innocently (or maliciously)
mistaking chaffs for wheat. For that reason, as was the case with Soviet travelers both
home and abroad, tour guides (gidy-perevodchiki) took a key role in elaborating
ideologically appropriate perceptions.
Here too, Soviet tourism organizers faced substantial difficulties, succinctly
captured by French chansonnier Gilbert Bécaud. In his 1960s hit Nathalie, Bécaud
sketches a fantasy of romance between the first-person narrator and his tour guide, the
eponymous Nathalie. The first stanza of the song is set on Red Square, where Nathalie
“spoke in somber phrases//of the October Revolution,” while the narrator daydreams that
“after Lenin’s tomb, we will go to Café Pushkin //to drink hot chocolate.” After the visit
to the Mausoleum, Nathalie takes him to a party at a student dorm room. Later they are
left alone, and “there was no longer any question of somber phrases// or of the October
Revolution.” At the end of his visit the narrator is left to dream that “one day in Paris// I
will be her guide.”319
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Figure 2.2: Gilbert Becaud and “Nathalie”
Source: youtube.com
The duality of Bécaud’s Nathalie as both symbol of the distance the Cold War
created between East and West and the means by which it could be overcome, agreed in
some ways with the vision of Soviet propagandists of the role Intourist guides should
play. In others, it realized some of their deepest fears. On the one hand, as one official put
it, citing Kant’s paean to the translator, Intourist guides were “a golden link in the chain
of friendship:”320 a smiling (and, visitors observed over and over again, physically
attractive)321 bridge between the Soviet Union and its guests. On the other, the same
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official continued, the very qualities that made the guides good ambassadors (youth,
higher education, gender), also were a glaring weakness: “they must wage an ideological
struggle in person [odin na odin] with bourgeois ideology… They are [usually] young
recent graduates… lacking life experience and knowledge of capitalist reality… They
require much educational and political work [nuzhdaiutsia bolshoi politiko-vospitatelnoi
raboty].”322 Here was a double bind: tour guides had to be friendly and open enough to
serve as efficient propagandists, and yet were expected to maintain enough distance to
avoid propagandizaton by bearers of “bourgeois ideology.” In a world riven by fierce
ideological struggle, Soviet tour guides played twin parts: both as subjects charged with
propagating Soviet self-portraits and as objects over whose minds and bodies both
ideologies struggled.
Who were these “golden links”? With the important exception of guides who
worked in the Intourist system since before the war,323 in the early years of mass foreign
travel, they were recent, overwhelmingly female, graduates of pedagogical, literature and
foreign language faculties. Intourist officials sometimes demanded tour guide classes to
be included in university language curricula, and the inclusion of Intourist in the list of
institutions receiving graduate quotas (raspredelenie). In reality, Intourist had to compete
for graduates with other, often more prestigious, institutions.324 Sputnik, the other major
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employer of tour guides, employed university students recommended for service by their
faculties and Communist Youth League cells. Until the 1970s, the seasonal nature of
foreign tourism necessitated that a significant proportion of Intourist’s guides were
temporarily hired (and undertrained) students and recent graduates.325 However,
throughout our period, Intourist’s management, for reasons having to do with both the
lackluster professional performance and putative political unreliability of temporary
cadres, strove to make employment as tour guide into a professional career (for example,
in Moscow, it provided winter employment by establishing a Translation Bureau which
marketed its services to other institutions.)326 While statistics are sketchy, the neardisappearance of complaints about temporary guides indicates that by the mid-1970s,
Intourist maintained a stable corps of career tour guides.
Given the key role of these “warriors on the ideological front” played in the
cultural Cold War, Soviet tour guides faced an intensive training regimen. Starting in
1965, this included three months of initial training, followed by a period of supervision,
and, in theory at least, continuous professional development.327 This ongoing training
included, among other things, weekly meetings in which tourists’ questions, the
international situation, difficult encounters with hostile tourists, and ways to “rebufft”
[davat’ otpor] bourgeois ideology were discussed. Guides were expected to engage in
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country studies [stranovedenie], read and discuss foreign language publications, and
attend political education sessions and lectures by experts and propagandists. In the offseason, they were supposed to produce a major essay [referat] either outlining a city tour
or summarizing information on a topic of pertinence to the “ideological struggle,” and
before the start of the season, to conduct a supervised model run of their tour.328
The contents of the guides’ training were an expression of the priority Soviet
tourism organizers put on ideological warfare. While Intourist training courses devoted
time to language, presentation skills, history, and culture,329 post-employment training
was relentlessly focused on political issues. During the training season in 1958, for
example, guides had to learn about the development of the Soviet chemical industry,
events in the Middle East, and Soviet-Chinese relations.330 A 1962 list of recommended
literature for Intourist guides included a plethora of Marxist classics, interpretations of
the Party platform, works on economics, welfare, foreign affairs and stranovedenie, but
little on culture, art, or history.331
To think that all or even most guides talk this ideological training literally would
strain belief. First, given the ubiquitous breakdowns of the Soviet service industry, much
of their actual work-time was devoted to various ‘organizational’ issues. The seasonal
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nature of the industry (intensive work in the summer, which earned guides extensive time
off in the winter), meant that guides had little time to hone their ideological skills when
they needed them most.332 Others had no time for such affairs, as they were doing
“business” – finding ways to benefit from access to foreigners and their material goods.
In 1959, one senior guide was caught defrauding Intourist by inflating the number of
tourists in the groups he led, and pocketing the funds and products meant for feeding the
phantom tourists.333
More importantly, tour guides and (sometimes) itinerary planners employed a full
ranges of techniques that followed the forms, but hollowed out the content, of
“ideological struggle.” For instance, despite admonitions to focus their efforts on displays
of the Soviet way of life, many guides instead preferred to showcase churches, palaces
and other venerable objects [starina].334 Other guides took a “formal” approach to their
work, reciting dry facts and figures and newspaper extracts instead of integrating new
materials in their texts, which meant visitors had to listen to the same text over and over
again in different cities.335 As was usually the case in the Soviet system, middle
management colluded with subordinates, allowing them to rewrite their referaty instead
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of producing original work, and cared little about the quality of model tours.336 Whether
these realities represented a subtle rebellion against official phraseology, or an example
of late Soviet attitudes towards work, the odds are that much of what guides were taught
during their training was confined to their classrooms.
Finally, Intourist guides, a young professional group that enjoyed privileged
access to foreigners, were not exempt from the general trend of Soviet urbanites’
fascination with the West. Tour guides, one official complained as early as 1956: “dress
in foreign styles, wear outwordly [svrekhestestvennye] hairstyles and hang all sorts of
weird decorations that even savages wouldn’t put on themselves.”337 Despite bans and
admonitions, guides exchanged addresses and phone numbers with their charges, and
maintained connections with “their” tourists when they left the country.338As visitors
noticed with relish,339 and Soviet officials with anger, 340 guides were no less infatuated
with Western consumer goods that the most enthusiastic black marketeers. They
therefore regularly asked for and received gifts: cosmetics, clothing, and other consumer
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goods (and, sometimes, small sums of money) from their charges. 341 In light of these
predilections, Intourist regulations barred guides and other employees from “starting
personal correspondence with foreigners, exchanging gifts... Inviting them home,
fulfilling personal requests... purchasing gifts and other items for them, exchanging
money… and introducing them to third persons.”342 It seems reasonable to take this
inventory as a good approximation of actual practices among Intourist guides.343
Worse still from the point of view of tourism organizers, Becaud’s Nathalie was
not a pure fantasy. As one Georgian Intourist official complained, mixing ideological
fervor with traditional paternalism, some guides were prone to inappropriate behavior
with their charges, instead of “behaving like a proper Soviet person and a modest,
virtuous girl.”344 In other words, whether tempted by the material objects foreigners could
offer, the excitement of a new experience, or a bona fide search for love, guides, charged
with policing the border between socialism and capitalism, were sometimes seduced by
the latter, in the most literal sense of the word. Sometimes, such liaisons led to
“treason”- marriage and subsequent emigration. While this problem was discussed in
Intourist circles from the late 1950s on,345 perhaps the most telling episode of this sort
occurred in the early 1970s, in Leningrad, where three guides who had all recently
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married West European tourists were revealed to have made a pact to get hired by
Intourist for exactly this purpose.346 Such acts revealed a basic contradiction between the
words guides were delivering and Soviet reality as foreigners perceived it. If Soviet
modernity was indeed superior to the Western way of life, how could this eagerness to
leave it behind be explained? If, as a KGB general invited to give a talk to Intourist brass
about vigilance [bditel’nost’] complained, a 25-year-old Intourist guide married a 57year-old obese American,347 how could one explain this but by reference to love of
money and material things, and how could such materialism be squared with the different
sort of Marxist-Leninist materialism featuring in the lectures Intourist guides were
delivering?
Such questions indicated how thin the line was between the personal and political
in such close proximity to foreigners. Some ideological problems skirted the line between
the political and the material: guides who took books from foreigners or borrowed and
never returned Western reading materials from Intourist reference libraries might have
been reading them themselves, or unofficially circulating them among friends on on the
book black market.348 Others expressed personal opinions that were, in the context of
“ideological struggle,” very political indeed: one male guide, possibly in a better position
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to defend his amorous adventures than his female colleagues, boldly argued that no one
had the right to ban him from loving whomever he wanted.349
Especially in the Khrushchev era, with its political zig-zaging and growing
engagement with the West, grumblings of dissent among guides went further than this. In
one extreme case, Boris Shragin, an art historian moonlighting as tour guide and not
hiding his unorthodox opinions from foreigners, found the questions about when “had his
eyes opened” regarding the official party line bizarre, as he never had a shred of faith in
it.350 Others took more ambiguous positions, but voiced them openly to their superiors. In
Leningrad, younger guides expressed doubts regarding the usefulness and necessity of the
“ideological work” they were required to perform.351 At a 1963 conference organized by
Sputnik, rank and file guides issued a series of challenges to a functionary of the
Komsomol Central Committee giving a keynote address, asking about contradictory
Soviet policy regarding Stalin’s memory, the Sino-Soviet split, and other thorny issues.
One guide went so far as to ask whether, given that Stalin, Mao and Enver Hoxha had all
been denounced as dictators, foreigners might conclude that there was something about
socialism that inevitably led to dictatorship.352
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These realities lead to an inevitable question. Were Soviet tour-guides, to cite
Anna Krylova’s celebrated term, concealed “liberal subjects” forced to play in an ugly
comedy? Post-Soviet memoirs and interviews indicate that some guides conceived of
themselves in these terms, at least retrospectively.353 Management complaints about the
failure of Intourist guides to police their “treasonous” colleagues indicate that their
commitment to discipline by the kollektiv was lacking.354 Most important, fear and selfinterest helped keep guides on the straight and narrow. On the former side of the ledger
lay the complicated relationship many guides had with the KGB (see Chapter 4). On the
latter lay the simple fact that satisfactory performance allowed one access to foreigners,
their material goods, and above all: the prospect of foreign travel as escorts to Soviet
tourists going abroad.355 As former Intourist guide Marina Kenderovskaia recalls, when
she, a recent graduate of a linguistics faculty, was sent to work in Intourist, “all my
teachers were shaking their heads and telling me how sad it all was, while I was thinking
that the world was opening up to me... and that extraordinary travels awaited.”356 Such
opportunities were surely worth the costs of ideological struggle.
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Yet, some indications exist that conformism and dual consciousness are not the
only terms that apply to the experience of Soviet guides. Kenderovskaia’s memoirs
clearly indicate that she was motivated not only by material factors, but also genuine
affection for her charges, pride in Russian and Soviet history, and plain old
professionalism.357Archival evidence points to genuine outrage and shock at any
expressions of disrespect for the Soviet sacrifice in the War (or failure by German visitors
to properly reflect on it).358 The behavior of “chewing gum knights” and black marketeers
who swarmed foreigners evoked shame and frustration for some tour guides.359 In one of
the few extant contemporary texts by an Intourist guide, a 1969 open letter to
Literaturnaia Gazeta by Intourist guide Viktoriia Vershkova-Sdobnova, the author
declared that her life goal was “to meet new people, from all corners of the world… I
would like them to be inspired [voskhishchalis] by my Motherland, the heroism of our
people, to believe in our future... [I would like] to show them the best in our lives, in our
people.”360 The protagonist of Kira Mikhailovskaia’s 1964 novel, The Intourist
Translator [Perevodchitsa iz Inturista], a young Leningrad guide, expresses strikingly
similar emotions.361
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Finally, it was not impossible, and perhaps even probable, that tour guides could
combine dislike for official rhetoric with a sense of Soviet patriotism and honest desire to
defend their country from foreign aspersions.362 For instance, an anonymous poem from
the 1970s, a supposed March 8 tribute from the men of Intourist to its female guides,
entitled The Ballad of the Intourist Soldier [Ballada o soldatke iz Inturista], contains the
following lines:
The war is over - but you are still in the thick of battle
For the hearts and minds of mankind
For future generations
And the triumph of our ideals.
No guns are pointed at you now
But still - the enemy is nearby
And when duty calls you become
A soldier guarding our Intourist frontiers.
You know all about the Five Year Plan
And all about that temple too
You're smart and witty
But can sock the face that annoys you.363

What was the meaning of these pugnacious couplets? Did they indicate pride in the
patriotic work Intourist guides conducted, or perhaps corporate pride, or annoyance at
visitors eager to torment Intourist guides with ideological disputations? Was it perhaps
an elaborate late Soviet joke? Some combination of both? Ultimately, the answer is
unknown and probably unknowable. As Aleksei Yurchak memorably argued, a simple
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distinction between truth and lies is insufficient to crack the cultural code of the late
Soviet period. Rather, Soviet life, and especially the life of Soviet ideological institutions,
was a series of performative acts, in which the enactment of rituals and speech acts
established one’s standing as a Soviet citizen, and enabled the pursuit of both public and
private projects. In this sense, it did not matter whether guides believed in what they said
or not. Rather, in order to maintain their positions and the benefits, psychic and material,
they conferred, they had to enact a role - that of a vigilant “warrior on the ideological
front” manning the increasingly porous borders between the capitalist and socialist
worlds. And to enact that role in the face of interlocutors who, inhabited the cultural trope
of truth-tellers behind the Iron Curtain, guides had to perform the scripts written for them
to the best of their ability. Let us now see how this performance unfolded.

Demonstrating the Soviet Way of Life

In theory, it was all very simple. Foreign visitors, brought to the Soviet Union by their
curiosity about the socialist way of life, are organized in a group. These groups are led by
a guide who, armed with her itinerary, extensive knowledge and ideological vigilance,
explains the ways in which socialism forms the scenes that unfold around them. Wellintentioned questions are given extensive answers, and ill-intentioned ones are resolutely
challenged. Along the way, tourists meet Soviet people and encounter demonstrations of
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friendship (if the visitors are socialists) or polite disagreements (if they are capitalists). At
the end of the visit, socialist guests bring home the spirit of friendship, while capitalist
visitors, although perhaps not converted to Marxism-Leninism, relinquish the stereotypes
they held about the Soviet state and society, and accept Soviet civilization as an
equivalent, if not superior, model to their own.
The problem with this story was that very little in it unfolded as planned. A very
large proportion of Intourist clients came to the Soviet Union individually, and were
escorted by guides only if they wanted (and were willing to pay for) the services
provided.364 Even for group tourists, the authority of the collective did not mean what it
meant in usual Soviet practice. Not only were hierarchical relations between ideological
authority and the collective non-existent, but as one visitor recalls: “when a tourist bus
opened its doors, [tourists] disappeared in all directions and…it was a very unpleasant
task for the Intourist guide to pull out all the fleas back into the flea box.”365
In short, nothing but the tour guide’s capacity to impose discipline, and the fear of
being a stranger in a land where preciously few spoke foreign languages, stopped
foreigners from either scattering to the winds or challenging the authority of their guides.
What happened to visitors who left their transient collectives, and the impact their
adventures had on Soviet society, will be discussed in subsequent chapters. What follows
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below addresses to a more limited question: how, given the circumstances of their work,
did Soviet tour guides go about maintaining control and message discipline? How did
they establish authority when Soviet narratives were delivered to audiences not bound to
Soviet-style discursive discipline?
As far as many visitors were concerned, the clash between tourists and guides was
indeed a power struggle between a totalitarian state, represented by Intourist guides, and
voices of the free world: themselves. Travelers and journalists gleefully reported on the
authoritarianism and dishonesty exhibited by Intourist guides. A journalist from the
Miami Herald recalled, for instance, that “when we reached Leningrad, we were told that
there would be no dinner. The Intourist guide, with no apology, remarked, "It will do you
good.366 Ronald Hidgley, author of the 1977 Russian Mind, found Intourist guides among
the Soviet Union’s best practitioners of vranyo – the uniquely Russian (according to
Hingley) practice of telling lies and then becoming convinced by one’s own
fabrications.367 Similarly, based on his total distrust of anything he was told by his
Intourist minders, the science fiction writer Robert Heinlein surmised that the Soviets
were so adept in the art of lying that they were misleading the West to think Moscow had
5 million people, when its real population was about 700,000.368 Such tales made an
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obvious implication: if the Soviet Union was could not treat foreigners with dignity, how
much worse did Soviet people have it?
Furthermore, unlike Soviet people, foreign “liberal subjects” could challenge
Soviet power on the public square - and did so with relish. Their most common tool was
to “disrupt the guide’s work... [by] asking provocative questions, and sometimes giving
commentaries distorting Soviet reality.”369 Thus, Irving Levine, the author of one of the
first wide-circulation travel guides to the Soviet Union, found in the course of a trip to
Zagorsk that many a Western visitor was “more enthusiastic about having bested his
guide in an ideological argument than about the sights of that old monastery
settlement.”370 Over twenty years later, a Wall Street Journal reporter gleefully described
how he forced his Intourist guide to bend himself into a pretzel, trying to answer why the
Soviet Union did not allow the distribution of Western newspapers.371 Such challenges
could grow heated indeed: one erstwhile traveler recalls that when he became enraged
with the whitewashed version of the history of the swimming pool that had taken the
place of the Cathedral of Christ the Savior presented by his guide, he “grabbed the
microphone from her and explained it myself.”372
How did Soviet tourist organizers respond to this challenge? In the mid-1950s,
they couched the problem in crudely Marxist terms, as Soviet officials tried to impute a
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connection between the class backgrounds of foreign visitors and their opinions of the
Soviet Union.373 However, this analysis was quickly abandoned. Instead, foreign visitors
were conceptually divided into three groups. First, there was a minority of visitors who
were “genuinely curious,” knowledgeable about, and perhaps sympathetic towards the
Soviet system. Open opponents of the Soviet system constituted another group of visitors.
Finally, the vast majority of visitors were “philistines” [obyvateli,] who, while often
curious and well-intentioned, were also profoundly ignorant of Soviet reality. Their
ignorance was exploited by the Western media which, as Soviet officials viewed it,
pounded into them [vbili v golovy] that the Soviet Union was both a police state and
“utterly devoid of any comfort.”374 This assumption of ignorance implied an important
silver lining: darkness, as any Soviet propagandist knew, could always be penetrated by
light. Therefore, what Soviet tour guides required was a strategy to isolate and discredit
hostile visitors so that they could enlighten their ignorant peers.
In line with their collectivist conception of foreign travel, Soviet tourism
organizers saw the key to their problems in the existence of alternative, anti-Soviet
sources of authority providing “distorted” images of the Soviet Union and strategies to
distribute them to both hostile and unwitting travelers. As we have seen above, the
ultimate culprits in this regard, as far as Soviet propagandists were concerned, were
Western media, governments and “ideological centers” working in unison to slander the
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USSR. Therefore, Soviet officials attempted to identify and neutralize such local agents
of influence. For instance, all socialist tourist groups and many ‘capitalist’ ones were
escorted by a representative of the Intourist or Sputnik foreign partner firm that organized
the group in question. Many of the partner firms from the West, especially firms working
with various NGOs, were suspected of sending group leaders who worked to subvert the
authority of the Soviet guides.375 Western embassies were another alternative source of
authority. They, Soviet officials believed, briefed tourists and delegation members, gave
them literature to spread among Soviet people and recommended visits to places outside
tourist itineraries: “pawn shops, beer bars, train stations, saunas.”376
Finally, in some groups, charismatic or well-educated tourists threatened to seize
the initiative from their tour guides. In one Italian group in 1963, for example, a Jesuit
professor of philosophy (Luciano Josephi) who was also an expert on “Marx, Engels…
harpooning whales and Italian cuisine” and a “brilliant story-teller” became the unofficial
leader of the group. From the position of authority he gained, he quietly scored points
against the tour guide (tikhoi sapoi… zabival goly v nashi vorota] by asking
uncomfortable questions, and pointing out disconcerting sights that tourists had no
business gazing at (for example, elderly women doing heavy manual labor).377
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What could tour guides do in the face of such challenges to their authority? Some,
seeking to report that their ideological struggle was a success, sought accommodation
with their charges (or simply quietly ignored their extra-curricular activities). Polish
tourists, for example, cut informal deals with their tour guides to get some free time in
exchange for dutifully attending trips to the Mausoleum and the Museum of the
Revolution.378 In another case, Israeli tourists in Moldova who feigned illness in order to
avoid planned trips and meet their local relatives instead, brokered a deal with their
guide, under which the guide agreed to release two tourists from planned excursions
every day, in exchange for disciplined participation by others.379
Especially during the ideologically active Khrushchev era, at least some tour
guides attempted more aggressive action against hostile visitors. Foreigners who took
pictures of old and decrepit buildings and other unseemly sights that confirmed, to Soviet
minds, their intent to embarrass their hosts, where shamed by their guides, and sometimes
faced vigilantism by the Soviet public.380 Problematic tourists could expect to have their
bags carefully searched when they exited the Soviet Union - searches that sometimes
yielded lists of provocative questions, proving to Soviet authorities that subversive
activities by foreign visitors were organized and directed from above.381 In one case, a
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customs officer entered the tour bus of a group of Italian tourists waiting to clear the
border at Brest, and read to the group unflattering entries about his fellow travelers made
by one troublemaker who just had his papers impounded as anti-Soviet propaganda.382
Such divide-and-conquer tactics aimed to isolate and, if possible, humiliate ideologically
hostile visitors. Tour guides were encouraged to ferret out and utilize political divisions,
especially in groups from Italy and France, where at least some members or sympathizers
of local Communist parties could be expected to take the Soviet side in political
debates.383 West German tourists who “slandered” Soviet reality were pointed out to the
rest of the group as ingrates who did not appreciate the extent to which the Soviet
Union’s difficulties were products of the war.384 As indication of the success of such
strategies, an Intourist document cited the example of a story published in the Daily
Pennsylvanian by a “University of Philadelphia” student who denounced the behavior of
members of his group who were expelled from the Soviet Union for throwing literature
they received from their embassy (the journal Amerika) from the windows of their tour
bus.385
When all else failed, Intourist guides were forced to engage in debates in which, it
was hoped, their erudition and training would win the day. This is how things went in the
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case of the aforementioned Jesuit, Josephi. When the latter made the mistake of trying to
explain that the Bolsheviks rejected the concept of the family by citing Marxist classics,
his guide seized the initiative, noting that Marx and Engels discussed bourgeois families
only, and convincingly arguing that the Soviet family was fully intact. When the priest
cited article 142 of the Soviet Constitution, banning religious instruction of minors, the
next day the guide, T. F. Maniukova, having consulted experts, retorted that Article 143
penalized attacks on religious buildings and ceremonies. As a result of such clever
retorts, claims a report praising Maniukova, the Jesuit’s control over the group was
broken.386
Maniukova’s alleged victory over Josephi hints at perhaps the most important
asset Soviet propagandists possessed as they waged ideological struggle with hostile
visitors. As long as their charges stayed with their groups, the Soviet side controlled their
time and itineraries. Intourist guides, as mentioned above, were trained to drown
opponents with facts and figures, in a way that could generate respectful silence. One
hostile observer conceded the efficacy of this tactic: “during the bus ride from the airport
to the hotel where the guide would sum up an enormous amount of facts…whether
intended or not, this information overload caused the visitors to soon stop listening and to
accept the greatness of the Soviet system without any discussion.”387 The Soviet side also
controlled access to people and institutions visitors wanted to meet and examine. For
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professionals who visited the Soviet Union in the 1950s and 1960s in order to learn about
Soviet schools, hospitals, and scientific institutions, Intourist’s aid was instrumental,388
and the members of the Soviet intelligentsia for whom exchanging knowledge with
foreigners was a boon, must surely have appreciated the opportunity Intourist provided
and structured their words and behavior appropriately. Soviet officials could also appeal
to visitors’ egos: one 1961 delegation of Italian artists, ambivalent about the Soviet Union
due to the campaign against formal art launched by the regime, had its mood lifted when
cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin suddenly dropped in to visit the delegation.389
Finally, one must keep in mind that, as long as foreign contact with Soviet people
was mediated by Soviet institutions, even in this post-Stalinist era, it was a highly
choreographed affair. As Jeff Hardy demonstrates, in the1950s, foreign visitors to Soviet
prisons could still be convinced they served as laboratories for the “new man.”390 Muslim
clerics from Pakistan and Syria were impressed by the respect accorded to Islam in Soviet
society after a series of trips in the 1950s in which Soviet authorities pulled all the stops
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to make them feel welcome.391 Even, or perhaps especially, debates and round tables
could easily be stage-managed: a Komsomol document from the early 1960s
demonstrates the staging instructions of debates between Soviet and Western youth
groups. Komsomol authorities were charged with selecting Soviet participants, devising
the list of topics to be discussed, assigning roles to different Soviet participants and
anticipating possible questions the foreigners might raise.392 In such conditions, the
Soviets could be sure that a victory, or at least, conditions sufficient to report victory,
could be achieved in every battle in the war on “bourgeois ideology.”

Conclusion

The patterns of “ideological struggle” described above lasted all the way down to the
perestroika years. As Taylor and Polonsky archly observe, disputations between Soviet
propagandists and Western “Defenders of Freedom” became, by the 1980s, a well choreographed ritual that kept both sides satisfied.393 As mentioned above, in the run-up
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to the Moscow Olympics, Soviet authorities put massive efforts into cleaning up Soviet
cities, reconstructing churches and monuments, stocking their shops with food, and
protecting them from the approaches by problematic social elements, efforts that were
reported in the West as another proof of Soviet duplicity - “Potemkin Olympics,” as the
New York Times editorial board described it.394 The early 1980s saw Billy Graham’s
Soviet visit, where the venerable evangelist, formerly a fierce anti-Communist, attested to
the freedom of religion in the Soviet Union (and, for good measure, the excellent food
situation there.)395 The American twelve-year-old Samantha Smith, who wrote a
personal letter to Yuri Andropov and received a personal invitation to visit the Soviet
Union and spend some time in the Artek summer camp, became a media sensation on
both sides of the Cold War divide.396 In the increasingly heated atmosphere of the Second
Cold War, such peace tourism became a sufficiently common activity among left-wing
Westerners that the conservative satirist P.J. O’Rourke could publish a travelogue
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skewering participants of a “peace cruise” on the Volga and their fellow-travelling
naiveté.397 In the meanwhile, Intourist and other tourist organizations kept devoting
significant resources to propaganda work. In 1983, for instance, over 1,000 propagandists
provided lectures and roundtable discussions for over 443,000 tourists, in addition to the
daily labors of Soviet tour guides.398 The latter, in the meanwhile, kept honing their craft:
As late as 1987, guides were expected to read and digest a highly proffesionalized review
of recent Western historiography on the October Revolution.399
And yet, the tenor of “ideological struggle” shifted, in subtle and important ways.
As Shawn Salmon points out, antiquities once denounced by zealous planners, now
became officially enshrined as a key tourist draws.400 Careful reports about the mood,
ideological divisions, responses and questions asked by individual tour groups compiled
by Intourist and Sputnik guides in the 1950s and 1960s nearly disappear from Intourist
and Sputnik archives in the 1970s and 1980s, while propaganda work took less and less
space on the agendas of Intourist board meetings. As everywhere else in Soviet life, the
experimentation and urgency that characterized the 1960s was replaced by routine, sober
economic considerations, and a whiff of imperial nostalgia.
Does this shift mean that ideology no longer defined the struggle over the tourist
gaze in the Soviet Union? Not at all. Information sheets for Soviet tour guides
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(biulleteni), arguably more important than ever in this era of rote repetition, still brim
with directions on the proper waging of ideological struggle. Still, instructions from the
1970s and 1980s were no longer focused on enlightenment, persuasion or even coercion.
Rather, their aim is to deflect all questions and end all discussions. Thus, when asked
about human rights violations in the Soviet Union, guides were told to attack American
atrocities in Vietnam. When English visitors asked about the Soviet constitution of 1977,
they were rather bizarrely told that “England has no constitution, and that…no one asked
the English about how their country is governed.”401 When economic questions were
raised, data on inflation, unemployment and racial tensions in the West were cited, and
guides “reminded [listeners] that they know better about the material needs of their own
people than do freshly arrived guests [priezhye gosti].402 Canadians were told their
country was rapidly becoming an American colony. 403 Visitors who raised concerns
about freedom of travel in the Soviet Union in light of the Helsinki process were told that
it was the US that was sabotaging the agreement. If discussion in this vein continued,
guides were told to address the other members of the group and indicate that such
discussions were themselves proof of American imperialists’ hatred for détente.404 Such
statements could not, and I would venture to guess, did not, convince anyone to embrace
Soviet views. Rather, they were an invitation to remain silent, to let the ritual of
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hospitality take over, to accept the Soviet order of things as long as one was inside Soviet
borders, and to let guides be guides and guests be guests.
On some level, this switch from debate in the 1960s to expectations of silence in
the 1970s was an element of the general shift of Soviet socio-political life to silent
conformism during the Brezhnev period. However, I would argue, more was at stake here
than ideological apathy. The officially sanctioned image of the Soviet Union as a superior
alternative to capitalist modernity was, for reasons outlined above, unpersuasive to
foreigners. Manipulating physical surroundings to adjust Soviet realities to fit Western
demands proved beyond the capacity of Soviet propagandists. Changing Soviet narratives
to account for this failure was an impossibility as long as official ideology remained
sacrocant. In these circumstances, the defiance thrown back at skeptical foreigners by
Soviet tour guides served as evidence of the solidity of this ideology, a reminder that the
Soviet model of modernity was there to stay, protected not only by guns and tanks and
nuclear weapons, but also by the willingness of Soviet people to repeat its strictures, no
matter how hollow they seemed. In this sense, the most important “truth about the Soviet
Union” was that, as far as the Soviet Union was concerned, the self-images it generated
were immutable, irrefutable, and not up for discussion.
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Chapter 3: Speculators, Frivolous Girls and Other A-Social Elements

On September 15, 1960, several months after the Soviet shoot-down of Gary Powers’ U2 spy airplane trigered an international crisis and renewed concerns over imperialist
agression and espionage,405 the readers of the Komsomolskaia Pravda were treated to an
article with a familiar headline: “Vigilance is our Weapon.”406 The author, V.A. Liakin,
a raikom deputy from Leningrad, made a simple point. Given that the old exploiting
classes had been eliminated in the USSR, imperialist powers could no longer rely on
class-hostile elements to do their dirty work. Since “natural” opponents of Soviet power
had ceased to exist, imperialists had to invent them - and did so by cultivating
“speculators in goods purchased from tourists, frivolous girls [devochki legkogo
povedeniia] and other parasitic elements among morally unstable Soviet youth. These
405
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corruptible elements were the only potential source of espionage, subversion or
opposition to Soviet power. Westernization was a source of ideological infection, and the
proper prophylactic, Liakin concluded, was reporting wavering youths to the proper
authorities before harm came to the Soviet body politic.
While this op-ed was a product of an exceptionally heated moment, Liakin’s
clarion call reflects the basic dilemma Soviet authorities faced in the era of mass travel.
Shaped by a long-standing culture of suspicion stretching back to the revolutionary era, if
not indeed to Muscovite times,407 institutions in charge of political hygiene in the Soviet
Union - party and Komsomol organizations, official media, and coercive agencies - were
designed to create both mental and physical hindrances to unsupervised contacts between
Soviet people and foreigners.408 And yet, after Stalin, they operated in a context in which
Soviet borders became increasingly porous to ever-increasing numbers of visitors who
sought to create connections, fleeting or permanent, licit or illicit, with Soviet people,
who in their turn, proved stubbornly vulnerable to the attractions of foreignness. These
connections created a proliferation of contact zones between Soviet people and
foreigners, “spaces of freedom”409 in which the usual rules of Soviet life seemed
suspended. And yet, these spaces, which I term the demimonde, were a product of late
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Soviet society: its deficit-based economy, its combination of public consensus and private
free-for-alls, its fascination with the West, and above all, its growing capacity for selforganization outside state control.410 The clash between Soviet institutions and
demimonde residents provides insight into the ways in which Stalin-era mental and
institutional attitudes kept shaping the late socialist Soviet policy, as well as the growing
difficulty the Soviet state faced in realizing its claims of absolute sovereignty over its
citizens.411 In this chapter, I first sketch out the operations of the demimonde and then
proceed to show how the Soviet authorities sought to constrain it, by means of both
coercion and “political public relations”412- the use of the vast Soviet official media
empire to mark participants in the demimonde as pariahs.

Portrait of a Demimonde

As the Soviet dissident Andrei Amal’rik writes, for many Soviet people
Even for ones buying and selling jeans, [meetings with foreigners] were a
means of escape - a nearly metaphysical exit - from the world in which we
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existed; they wanted to convince [us] that the Soviet world is a closed
sphere…but by making tiny holes in it we could breathe another air.413

Foreigners, in this telling, had a semi-sacral status, as emissaries of a different world,
reorganizing the space around them so that it became, in an important sense, ex-territorial
and immune to pressures of Soviet life and its demands for conformity.
This sense of breaking barriers, of the ex-territorial nature of encounters between
Soviets and foreigners, is a common trope in both Soviet and Western memoirs of these
first encounters. To cite a famous example, accounts of Moscow’s iconic 1957 Youth
Festival are rife with ecstatic, sometimes sappy, emotional recollections of first
contacts.414 Art historian Mikhail German responded in a similar fashion when witnessing
the first Scandinavian ships entering the Leningrad port shortly after Stalin’s death:
Quiet, aggressively shy, crowds gathered on the shore, [gazing at ] incredibly
clean sailors… clean-shaven, like actors in foreign movies, and strangely
elegant in wonderfully tailored uniforms…What shone was not so much
their intellect, but their civilized stature [tsivilizovannost]: they all spoke
German easily…We could touch and feel this “abroad” [zagranitsu]… A
small crowd formed around each sailor. He was pressured by a silent,
persistent and obsequious crowd. The Swedes were embarrassed, could not
understand why they were so exotic [dikovinka] and carefully answered
ladies’ questions on whether they were married or if they wished to exchange
addresses. I barely spoke, or to be more accurate, pronounced some foreign
words, but thoroughly enjoyed myself: “I am speaking to a foreigner.” “Do
you speak English” [sic] I shyly inquired of one…sailor who sat at the bench
near the Winter Palace next to me. That was the first time I ever spoke a
foreign language to a foreigner. 415
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The appeal, whether practical or metaphysical, of encounters with foreigners so aptly
described by German remained in effect long after the initial excitement of the mid-1950s
passed. Wherever foreigners appeared in significant numbers, Soviet people
spontaneously reorganized space around them. In Moscow, the “pleshka,” the Gor’kii
street segment between Pushkin Square and Intourist’s Natsional hotel, was a commercial
hub, where black marketeers bought foreign goods, currency speculators eager to help
tourists to exchange their currency at comfortable black-market rather than confiscatory
official ones operated,416 and prostitutes plied their trade, with few interruptions from the
authorities.417 Along the Nevskii Prospekt in Leningrad, “hundreds of...fartsovshchiki,
currency speculators, thieves and burglars were circling” foreigners. The nearby
Gostinnyi Dvor metro station exit became an open market where “items of desire were
shot… into the closets of Soviet people.”418 In cities lacking such iconic spaces, tourists,
especially from Eastern Europe, were not above turning hotel squares into improvised
markets [barakholki].419 Even the Soviet sanctum sanctorum, the Lenin Mausoleum, saw
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similar scenes, as teenagers hungry for foreign goods, gum and currency swarmed the
Mausoleum’s foreign visitors.420

Figure 3.1: Black Marketeers on Nevskii Prospekt, Early 1980s
Source: online812.ru
Hotels hosting foreigners were, of course, spaces prearranged for such encounters.
The American journalist George Feifer describes how the vast restaurant of Hotel Rossiia
became a stage of impromptu demonstrations of friendship of the peoples, as visiting
Americans and provincial officials on komandirovka reassured each other regarding their
countries’ love of peace and progress.421 Intourist restaurants and other culinary venues
refined enough to be available to foreigners also inevitably drew members of both formal
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and informal Soviet elites. In such locations, foreigners, writers and artists, black market
speculators and prostitutes, army officers on leave and various officials danced, listened
to jazz and rowdy Soviet orchestras, and enjoyed the best material comforts the Soviet
Union could offer.422 In hotel lobbies, commerce flourished as foreigners were besieged
by black marketeers and “chewing gum knights.”423
Similar encounters occurred in less exalted locations. In resorts on the Black Sea
shores, Soviet women were berated for spending their time chasing foreigners instead of
following doctor’s orders.424 Foreign sailors’ clubs in Soviet ports (interkluby)
established by the Soviet authorities to propagandize these working-class visitors,
inevitably drew the attentions of black market traders and sex workers.425 The LeningradVyborg highway, on which large numbers of Finnish tourists seeking escape from strict
Finnish anti-alcholol laws travelled,426 attracted “highway men” [trassoviki], who
fashioned a series of impromptu rest-stops where tourists exchanged currency, clothes,
and consumer items for rubles, vodka, and sex.427
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Others forms of exchange took less commercialized forms. The kitchens and
studios of prominent dissidents, underground artists, and academics were places of
pilgrimage for politically conscious visitors (a point to which we shall return at length in
Chapter Four). For connoisseurs of more exotic fares, fashionable “salons” promised
meetings with Soviet “Catholics, fascists, homosexuals, poets, artists, and surrealists.”428
Prominent residences, like the “mansion” of American reporter Edmund Stevens and his
Soviet wife Nina or the Peredelkino dacha of journalist, guide book author, and alleged
KGB agent Viktor Louis were locations where Soviet elites and foreign diplomats,
journalists, and other dignitaries networked, exchanged gossip and, one presumes,
cheerfully spied on each other.429 A step below on the social scale, Western and Soviet
students argued about art and science and literature, exchanged gifts, souvenirs and rock
records, drank, and formed friendships and romantic relationships.430 Further below, the
aforementioned Polonsky and Taylor recommended participation in a drunken evening in
a “disreputable Soviet flat” as key point in familiarizing oneself with Soviet life.431
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Such transnational interactions produced a subtle shift in Soviet life, creating new
niches in which the usual rules and hierarchies applied loosely, or were reversed. In
Georgia in the late 1950s, for instance, the local KGB complained that one of the most
marginal of Soviet commuinities, local Molokan “sectarians,” were rapidly gaining
social prestige as they were receiving gifts and money from visiting Norht American coreligionists.432 Closer to the center, contacts with foreign visitors and the circulation of
texts, information and artifacts that these contacts allowed, were crucial for the
flourishing of marginal communities, ranging from Leningrad’s rock underground to
Moscow’s esoteric mystics.433
Most famously in this regard, contacts between Soviet underground artists and
Western afficionados profoundly transformed the Soviet art world by creating a
commercial space outside the control of official creative unions - the so called dip-art
scene.434 According to artist and collector Anatolii Brusilovskii, the origins of this form
of commercial exchange date to the Moscow Youth Festival of 1957 during which
foreigners for the first time made appearances in the underground studios of non-
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conformist artists.435 In the aftermath of the Festival, and the subsequent Khrushchevian
attack on modernist art, this scene expanded, to include foreigners resident in the Soviet
Union, Soviet collectors (like the aforemonetioned Stevenses), foreign collectors visiting
under the guise of tourists and exchange students, and, most importantly (as the term dipart indicates), diplomats. The latter not only used their diplomatic immunity and
connections to resident foreigners and elite Muscovites to scout out and discover new
artists, but also took advantage of their access to diplomatic pouches to overcome
draconian Soviet regulations regarding art exports. Thus, the world of dip-art united
foreigners, Soviet social elites and socially marginal artists, connecting them to a world
market that appreciated modern art than it did socialist realism. For foreigners, the world
of dip-art offered the thrill of finding “an avenue into real Soviet life,”436 of aiding
“dissenting artists,” and, not least, of acquiring original art at very low prices.437 For
underground artists, contacts with foreigners a possibility of international fame, a
measure of defense in the face of official assaults, and, of course, unparalleled access to
foreign currency and Western goods.
No less important, however, access to foreigners and the art market they created
represented reversal of fortunes. For artists living on the margins of Soviet life,
periodically attacked by the authorities and lacking access to the security, privilege, and
material perks that official favor and membership in creative unions offered, access to
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and purchase of their works by foreigners represented an inversion of the regular Soviet
order of things. As Brusilovskii puts it vis-à-vis the painter Vasilii Stepnikov: “here was a
provincial [chelovek iz naroda]… unrecognized by anyone, branded as mentally ill… He
was flattered by people from far away America buying his pictures…What he could not
receive in the sinking sands [zybkoi triasine] of Soviet life: respect, recognition, social
life, became a wonderful dream for him.”438 To borrow a Bakhtinian term, the
demimonde created small corners of topsy-turvy reality, in which these outcasts were on
top.
Sex workers “specializing” in foreigners constituted another community in which
material privilege was combined with deep marginality. This form of commerce also
first became visible in the 1957 Moscow Youth Festival. As Kristen Roth-Ey
demonstrates, despite the considerable efforts Soviet authorities took to “cleanse”
Moscow from unwanted social elements, “loose girls on the loose,” Soviet girls who had
sex with foreigners, sometimes in exchange for gifts or souvenirs, became one of the
most visible aspects of Festival life.439 A scant few years later, this field became
“professionalized” enough that the aforementioned journalist George Pfeiffer could
conduct an interview with a well-educated, English-speaking, full-time, hard-currency
prostitute, “a tall, blue-eyed blonde [who]…never wears a single crummy Soviet
stitch.”440
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Like most instances of sex tourism, sex work involving foreigners in the Soviet
Union involved not only “professionals” like Feifer’s interlocutor, but also various
relationships rooted in the privileged economic position of foreigners.441 For instance,
access on the part of students from the developing world to material goods made them
attractive to many of their Soviet female peers, while, as we had already seen, sex
between Intourist guides and their charges was a standing concern of Intourist and
Sputnik officials.
Yet, in the cultural imagination of the late Soviet period it was hard currency
prostitution that represented the most ubiquitous form of sexual encounters between
Soviets and foreigners. As mentioned above, prostitutes were drawn to all major
concentrations of foreigners, ranging from and sailors’ clubs to Intourist’s top hotels. The
bars and restaurants of the latter became the abode of the so-called “Intourist girls,” later
known as interdevochki, after the eponymous perestroika- era novel and film by Vladimir
Kunin. By the 1980s, “Intourist girls” were perhaps the most visible symbol of the
luxurious possibilities contact with foreigners offered. As late Soviet society saw it, with
either admiration or moral outrage, by dint of their access to foreigners vaulted to the top
of the Soviet material hiearchy, consuming clothes, cosmetics and foods other Soviet
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citizens could only dream of, and earning significant fortunes, 442 which moreover were
denominated in dollars, not rubles.
Yet behind this exotic façade lurked the usual realities of the sex trade,
overlayed with the peculiar arrangements of the late Soviet period. To operate, “Intourist
girls” had to pay exorbitant bribes to Intourist staff for access to foreigners,443 provide
bribes and sexual services for militia officers, and maintain a modus vivendi with the
KGB (see Chapter Four).444 Furthermore, perestroika-era studies of Soviet sex workers
show that “Intourist girls” fit the global profile of sex work: they were predominantly
young migrants from the provinces to Moscow and Leningrad, products of broken homes
and abusive parents, and suffered extremely high levels of alcoholism, mental illness and
venereal disease.445 Unsurprisingly, they were also defenseless in the face of violent
attacks by their clients.446
Sex work was but a small element the vast commercial community that sprouted
around foreigners. As with sex work, the generic term fartsovka, after the irrepressible
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black marketeers (fartsovshchiki)447 who badgered generations of foreign visitors to
exchange clothes and dollars for rubles and Soviet souvenirs, covers a myriad of
practices.448 The stereotypical fartsovshchik was a young, urban, bohemian, male, and
motivated by curiosity no less than material concerns – a stereotype largely generated by
the fartsovshchiki themselves. 449 To cite a typical example, one practicioner, the
pseudonymous Sergei Panov, proudly began his account of life on the black market with
the following boast:
My kommunalka neighbors call me scum (podonok). But if I am scum, I
am an intellectual scum. I am curious about the history of mankind, from
the troglodites to group sex. I visit museums and exhibits every day,
combining aestethics with business. Black business, of course.450

This view of a fartsovshchik as bohemian capitalist living in conflict with Soviet
philistines obscures the complex nature of black market exchanges involving foreigners.
Not all participants in the market were either young or motivated by “aesthetic” concerns
The British travel writer Collin Thubron recalls, for example, seeing elderly women
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picking through the garbage of an Intourist motel where he was staying, in search of
foreign items to resell.451 On the other hand, the most prominent black market traders
cared more for accumulation than adventure. Thus, unlike his flamboyant colleagues, the
eponymous protagonist of Maksim Veller’s “The Legend of the Founding Father of
Fartsovka, Fima Bliaishits,” is a quiet, reticent character who “ate little, almost never
drank, spoke quietly and politely, and bought himself a used Moskvich for necessary
transportation.”452
More importantly, after the “heroic” period of the late 1950s, when
fartsovshchiki were usually drawn from the Soviet “golden youth” who alone had the
courage and language skills to approach foreigners, fartsa became fully integrated into
late Soviet social networks.453 At the bottom of the pyramid, fartsovshchiki were
recruited among “chewing gum knights” – who were often “normal” Soviet children who
partook in the universal craze for Western consumer goods.454 At the top, fartsovka
increasingly became a component of late Soviet criminal structures. Even though it was a
victimless crime, its illegal nature brought practicioners into contact with “violent
entepreneurs,” who by the 1980s were “taxing” fartsovshchiki for access to prime spots –
and thus setting up the foudnations for the vast criminal empires of the late Soviet and
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early post-Soviet periods.455 Fartsovka became a hierarchical affair, where street level
traders (“bombily”)456 were subject to the upper echelon of market participants, the socalled “merchants” (kuptsy).457 The merchants bankrolled street-level traders, gathered
their hard currency proceeds and traded in icons, jewelry, gold, (and, at times, even rare
industrial materials).458
To ply these trades, “merchants” had to forge both domestic and foreign
connections. For instance, gold and foreign currency speculators were often connected to
Soviet underground millionaires, who both supplied them with products for sale (say, raw
gold stolen from state enterprises), and provided a market for the foreign currency and
other valuables gathered from street operations.459 Others obtained goods for sale by
launching expeditions to the Soviet countryside to gather ancient icons (which could be
obtained for a pittance or even received as gifts from naïve and generous villagers).
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These were then resold to visiting foreigners or diplomats, connecting decrepit churches
in Siberian kolkhozes to the growing international market in Russian religious art.460
Like all forms of informal economic activity in the Soviet Union, the foreignoriented black market was deeply dependent on cooperation with members of formal
institutions. As we’ve seen, the most crucial actors in this regard were Intourist staff who
sold access to foreigners or directly competed with black marketeers for tourist dolars.461
In the mid-1950s, employees of commission stores became a major node in illicit trade
networks, selling gold received from foreigners to Soviet speculators, and helping
foreigners buy rubles on the black market.462 Later on, smuggling and illicit trade
networks relied on the aid of Berezka clerks, jewelry and art assessors, and other Soviet
officials.463 Customs officers were especially open to graft, an issue that caused
significant heartburn to KGB and MVD officials, given their concerns regarding the
political and security implication of slackened vigilance at the border (see Chapter 4).464
Another important contribution was made by various Soviet employers who provided
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black marketeers and prostitutes with fictive employment, thus allowing them to live in
large cities and protecting them from charges of parasitism – all for a fee. Hard currency
prostitutes, for instance, were often registered as working in the service sector,
“employed” as cleaners, store clerks, hairdressers and so on465- making it difficult to
employ “the principle of socialist morality: he who does not work shall not eat” or use
laws against parasitism to deal with the demimonde.466
If collaboration from Soviet officials was necessary in order for fartsovka to
survive, collaborative foreigners were required to make it thrive. Tourists were, of course,
the most common market for street level deals. Polish tourists were especially prone to
black market activities, which, by the end of the Soviet period, reached gargantuan
proportions.467 Western tourists were also tempted by the easy ruble. In 1967, the
American embassy in Moscow complained that hundreds of American tourists and
exchange students systematically engaged in smuggling, resale of items purchased in
Berezka stores and illegal currency operations.468 Five years later, the New York Times
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reported on an American couple who funded their honeymoon trip to the Soviet Union by
bringing a suitcase of jeans, selling them for rubles at inflated prices, then exchanging
the rubles for dollars with other tourists at black market rates, and smuggling the
proceeds through Soviet borders in their underwear.469
Frequent border crossers were less famous but more profitable participants in
transnational black market networks. Members of diasporic communities (most often
Armenians and East-European Jews) could easily connect to Soviet underground trade
networks and reap impressive profits.470 In 1958, for example, the head of the Warsaw
pharmacy trust was apprehended in Odessa with 45,000 rubles, over 500 dollars, and 845
tsarist era coins. Further investigation showed that he sold 38 gold watches to a local
black market dealer, who was in turn arrested with a suitcase packed with gold.471 By the
1970s, the growing integration of socialist and Western economies opened space for
much more ambitious operations. In a case so brazen that it was used by KGB viceChairman Semen Tsvigun to highlight the dangers of contraband to the Soviet state, two
diaspora Armenian students brought 35 kilograms of gold for sale on Soviet black
markets, and smuggled 17 kilograms of platinum abroad over the course of their
studies.472
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Such activities were not contained to foreigners with pre-existing Soviet ties.
Third World students were not only avid importers of consumer items for sale or barter
on the streets and on campuses, but employed in a variety of trading schemes. Iurii
Aizenshpis, a pioneer rock producer who also doubled as a prominent currency
speculator, recalls how he used foreign students as straw buyers at foreign currency
shops, selling the items they acquired to underground Soviet millionaires.473 Icon traders
employed the same students as mules to deliver to clients in Western Europe, with the
proceeds plowed bulk purchases warm winter clothing that was resold in Siberian retail
black markets.474
As connections between the Soviet Union and the rest of the world thickened,
more and more opportunities for profit opened up for professional border-crossers. In the
era of détente, American ships brought not only grain, but contraband items stocked by
sailors seeking to make a quick dollar.475 Making use of this business opportunity
between 1974 and 1976, a group of black market traders in the Ukrainian port city of
Izmail bought 8,700 female handkerchiefs valued at over 170,000 rubles from foreign
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sailors.476 “Karl” a West German businessman who often visited the Soviet Union. “Karl”
provided funding for a group of Soviet art aficionados, who used the funds to buy art
works from Leningrad residents, which were then smuggled out by tourist bus drivers on
the Leningrad-Helsinki highway, who hid them in specially equipped chambers in their
buses.477 In the same vein, one Belgian diplomat formed a business partnership with a
Soviet illicit icon trader, and was apprehended in August 1982 trying to smuggle a store
of icons valued at 120,000 rubles out of the USSR478 while numerous African diplomats
were apprehended smuggling icons, art and jewelry from, and consumer items into,
Soviet borders.479 Encompassing myriad of operations, from street trade to major importexport operations, the demimonde helped the “little deal” go global.
The social milieus, commercial interactions, and transnational networks that
constituted the demimonde all had one common feature: they violated either written or
unwritten Soviet laws, norms, or regulations. The sex-workers, criminals, marginals and
outcasts who resided in the demimonde not only belied the “truth about the Soviet
Union” that Soviet authorities labored to construct but also to the norms that defined
normal existence within the Soviet system. The contradiction between the demimonde
and Khrushchev’s attempted re-launch of the socialist project on the basis of social
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mobilization was so clear as to be nearly comical.480 The contrast between the
demimonde and the rest of Soviet society became much more blurry after 1965, but if, as
Aleksei Yurchak convincingly argues, performance of rituals of belonging was a
precondition for “normal” existence in late Soviet society, denizens of the demimonde
still stood out, caring not one wit about these rituals (and not much about normality
either).481
Thus, the demimonde represented a profound challenge to Soviet authorities, a
challenge that was made even more acute by fears regarding the inherent link between
social and political deviance articulated by Liakin. One policy response to the problem,
erecting a massive surveillance system to police interactions between Soviet people and
foreigners, is the topic of the next chapter. However, I argue, policy-making towards the
demimonde cannot be reduced to secret policing. Rather, it was a dynamic process that
reflected the changing face of Soviet society and the rise and fall of official attempts at
social mobilization. The history of the confrontation between Soviet authorities and the
demimonde was a mirror for the ebb and flow of official attempts to rejuvenate Soviet
society – and the obdurate resistance of Soviet society to any such attempts at
rejuvenation.
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.

Vigilance is Our Weapon! 1957-1965

The 1950s, the period in which the demimonde emerged in its late Soviet form, was a
time of both unprecedented opening up to the world and a series of crises that highlighted
the dangers global exposure created for the Soviet party state. As a number of scholars
have demonstrated, despite the liberal myths surrounding the “Thaw,” the late 1950s
were an age of moral panic about crime, social anomie, dissolute youth, and a rising tide
of westernization.482 The combination of the political shock of de-Stalinization and the
echo of the 1956 events in Hungary trigerred anxieties regarding the loyaltties of
educated youth and denizens of the USSR’s western borderlands.483 Economically, the
demands of the rush towards Communism under Khrushchev demanded massive
technology imports, with expected proceeds from foreign tourism on Soviet soil slated, as
we saw in chapter 1, to help pay for the construction of new factories.484 Finally, despite
Khrushchev’s drive for “peaceful coexistence,” his era saw some of the tensest
international crises of the Cold War as well a series of espionage scandals. This
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constellation of crises made the increasing numbers of foreigners in the USSR and the
social ecology that was rapidly coalescing around them an important challenge for
Khrushchev’s attempt to revitalize socialism and forge a peaceful coexistence from a
position of strength with the “imperialists.” The disruption of this ecology thus became
an essential ingredient of Khrushchev’s drive to eradicate the emerging contradictions of
rapidly-maturing socialism.
On the most basic level, from the point of view of Soviet authorities, the
demimonde was but one of the unintended consequences of “expanding cultural,
economic, and other connections with capitalist countries,” which carried the risk of
“the spread of bourgeois ideology,” among educated, urban youth most likely to be
exposed to foreign bacilli.485 In line with the spirit of the time, campaigns against this
danger involved not Stalin-era purges, but attempts to mobilize the Soviet public against
the “westernizers” by manipulating populist economic and cultural grievances.486 The
most visible aspect of this strategy was using the violent enforcement arm of
Khrushchev’s battle for social discipline - Komsomol patrols (druzhinny) to police areas
frequented by foreigners and the Soviet “golden youth.” The early fartsovshchiki, likely
to be university students of somewhat privileged background, thus became a favorite
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target of the druzhinny - usually manned by working class youth who had no love for
their more privileged peers.487
In theory, these guardians of socialist morality were supposed to cooperate
with Intourist staff in keeping unwanted elements from hotels and restaurants, detain
black marketeers and loose women, and escort them to militia stations.488 In practice,
however, they often resorted to street justice: beatings and confiscation of western
clothing and other items.489 If a black marketeer did arrive to a militia station, he could
plausibly expect a “comrade trial” resulting in expulsion from the Komsomol and, if he
was unlucky, exile or imprisonment for “parasitism.” These “comrade trials” often
reprised Stalin-era displays. In one 1963 trial, the “comrades” constituted 1,200 “young
Muscovites, gathered in the Luzhniki stadium,” who sentenced 3 fartsovshchiki to “exile
from Moscow and hard physical labor.”490 Even when such trials were less elaborate
affairs, they received massive media coverage that named names, provided the
biographies of their subjects, highlighted their privileged backgrounds, disdain for work,
and subservient attitudes to foreigners.491
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Educated youths who went beyond simple commercial exchanges with foreigners
could expect even worse. Between 1957 and 1965, a number of young educated urbanites
were put on trial for associating with and receiving gifts and information from
foreigners.492 The most famous of these cases involved the “literary parasite” Joseph
Brodsky: in both the infamous 1963 Leningradskaia Pravda broadside that launched the
attack on him and in his trial, meetings with foreigners were mentioned as evidence of his
alienation from Soviet life.493 In a similar manner, when Sally Belfrage, a “progressive”
American who for a few months worked as translator in a Moscow publishing house
composed a memoir of her life among Moscow’s “golden youth” that Soviet authorities
considered slanderous,494 the wrath of the authorities was turned towards members of her
circle. Various “friends of Miss Sally” were expelled from the Komsomol and
universities, suffered imprisonment in psychiatric hospitals and violent media assualts.495
Two especially unfortunate friends (Rybkin and Repnikov) were put on a publicized trial
for espionage, with coverage focusing not as much on their alleged blackmail into
espionage by foreigners who plied them with gifts but on their pampered upbringings (the
Komsomolskaia Pravda coverage of the trial began with a vignette describing how
Repnikov threw a shoe at his grandmother for failing to get him breakfast in bed – at 11
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AM).496 Whatever the truth in these accusations,497 rhetorically, they filled a number of
important functions. First, for the urbanites who associated with foreigners, such exposes
were a shot across the bow. For the rest of the Soviet public, they conveyed a message
about citizenship and social hierarchy. If, seemingly, the residents of the demimonde
enjoyed a privileged existence, this was not cause for envy, as the Soviet state stood
ready to restore justice swiftly and ruthlessly. By tying their material existence to
commerce with and handouts from foreigners, residents of the demimonde broke the
Soviet social compact - just rewards for honest labor - and took themselves outside the
circle of protection offered by the “all people’s state.”
As is often the case, such boundary policing was especially ferocious when it
involved female bodies. The late 1950s and early 1960s were, indeed, a period of violent
assaults, rhetorical and physical, against Soviet women engaged in sexual liasions with
foreigners. As Roth Ey demonstrates, even during the halcyon days of the Moscow Youth
Festival rumors that “loose girls” were assaulted by vigilantes, had their hair cut, and
were exiled outside Moscow were in wide circulation. Even in a moment of maximum
affection for the outside world, elemental discomfort with the idea of Soviet women
besmirching national honor by cavorting with materially privileged foreigners was
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exhibited by both authorities and rank-and-file Soviets.498 Subsequent years indeed saw
action from below aimed to police “transnational” sexual encounters. Soviet girls who
slept with exchange students could expect violent reactions from their fellow students and
the general public. 499 Druzhinniki joined in the effort, roughing up women who dated
Western visitors,500 and in some less reputable Soviet hotels, waging pitched battles
against tourists who opposed this treatment of their dates.501
The fact that Soviet women were seduced by the temptations of foreigners and
their goods was so detrimental to the self-perception of the Khrushchev era Soviet state,
that in the mid-1960s, its official media broke the total taboo on the topic of prostitution
in socialist society. Here too, names were named. For instance, Svetlana Trofimova, a
19-year-old who worked the hard currency bar of Hotel Metropol, became the subject of
an intermittent three-month long attack in Komsomolskaia Pravda, which traced her
moral dissolution, contempt for her parents and child, and intention to commit treason to
both her family and her nation by marrying a foreigner. Tellingly, the first article in the
series was entitled “Offal” [Nechist’] a term that captured well the purity politics that
were hiding not far below the surface of the campaign against sexual relations with
foreigners.
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The undercurrents of purity and taboo that lay just below the surface of official
discources on the demimonde were understood (and promoted) as such by at least some
Soviet ideologues. Thus, when Valerii Skurlatov, an early organizer of the Komsomol
partrols and a member of the incipient “Russian Party” of apparat nationalists, was asked
by the ideological department of the Moscow Komsomol to prepare a document on
struggle with bourgeois ideology, one of the ten points of the “Moral Code” [ustav nrava]
he penned called for “corporal punishments, branding and sterilization of women giving
themselves over to foreigners.”502 While Skurlatov’s text was quickly suppressed for its
outlandish content, the shrill tone of the Komsomolskaia Pravda articles about Trofimova
indicates that his positions had at least some support among other members of the
nationalist wing of the Komsomol leadership.503
If loose girls and rag merchants harmed the reputation of the Soviet state and
broke the boundaries of proper Soviet citizenship, the currency speculators who besieged
foreigners materially harmed the Soviet treasury. Given the failure of the Soviet tourism
industry to meet policy makers’ expectations discussed in chapter 1, the extraction of
extra cash by means of confiscatory official exchange rates was a powerful means for the
Soviet state supplement its foreigh currency holdings.504 However, the gap between these
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rates and what foreign money could fetch on the Soviet black market created arbitrage
opportunities for generations of entrepreneurs, who successfully siphoned millions of
dollars that the Soviet state felt rightfully belonged to it.505 Due to concerns with this
monetary drain as well as the reputational damages caused by by this activity,506 foreign
currency speculators became the most prominent targets of the drive against the
demimonde.
Ian Rokotov (1927-1961), also known as Kosoi (cross-eyes), was Moscow’s
most prominent currency speculator in the late 1950s. Born to an intellectual Jewish
family, Rokotov, then an MGU student, was imprisoned under article 58-10 (counterrevolutionary activitiy) in 1945 and rehabilitated in 1954.507 He began foreign currency
operations in 1957. By 1961, he headed a network of 450 street-level dealers,508 owned a
significant fortune (including a suitcase laden with gold he kept in storage in various
Moscow train stations), and was one of Moscow’s top playboys.509
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Inevitably, Rokotov’s rise contained the seeds of his fall. In 1959/60,
responsibility for investigating hard currency speculation was transferred from the MVD,
where Rokotov reputedly had excellent (and well-paid) contacts, to the KGB.510 In
parallel, the new RSFSR legal code set to go into operation on January 1st, 1961, raised
penalties for large-scale currency speculation from 3 to 8 years imprisonment.511 In June
1960, following a massive surveillance operation, Rokotov was arrested while getting his
suitcase from storage. Several days later his junior partner Vladislav Faibishenko
[Fainberg] and other members of their network were apprehended.
At this point, the Rokotov affair evolved into a massive show trial. Soviet
newspapers published numerous exposes exploring Rokotov’s earnings, extensive social
networks, lifestyle, and criminal connections.512 In March 1961, the Supreme Soviet
further raised penalties for large-scale currency violations to 15 years.513 In an
unprecendented step in response to Khrushchev’s rage at the criminal system’s alleged
leniency, this decree was applied retroactively to Rokotov and Faibishenko. This,
however, did not satisfy the First Secretary. In a meeting of the Presidium on June 17th,
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he browbeat Chief Procurator Rudenko for “liberalism,” and demanded the death penalty
for both men. Tellingly, Khrushchev phrased his demand as a populist appeal, citing a
working-class friend from the Donbass who allegedly demanded rough justice for the
“scoundrel” for whom “the grave cries,” thus pitting the Soviet state and Soviet workers
against corruption and its elite enablers.514 In response to this pressure, on July 1st, the
Supreme Soviet released another decree, stipulating the death penalty for currency
speculation. In a violation of legal norms unseen even under Stalin, Rokotov and
Faibishenko were retried, with their second trial broadcast on Soviet TV,515 condemned
to death based on retroactive application of the July 1st decree, and executed on July 28th.

Figure 3.2: Ian Rokotov
Source: aif.ru
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The Rokotov affair was the opening shot in a wave of nearly 1,000 trials of
currency speculators over the next four years.516 As was the case with Rokotov, these
trials were widely publicized, with coverage focused on the unearned privileges the
defendants enjoyed. Given that, like Rokotov and Faibishenko, about 50% of the
defendants in these trials were Jewish and many others bore Caucasian or Central Asian
last names,517 the messages that this press coverage conveyed were surely well
understood by Soviet readers. Thus, it was not hard to read messages about the loose
Soviet identity and dubious loyalty of foreign currency speculators encoded in a 1962
Trud story about one Basia Khaimovna Reznitsky, a Vilnius speculator, her partners
(Kaminer, Ebenstein, Rabinovich, and Zismanovich), and their trade partners: foreign
tourists and Catholic priests connected to North American émigré groups and the
Vatican.518 By playing on stereotypes about the commercial prowess, parasitic
tendencies, and possible disloyalty of certain ethnic groups, such stories subtly
emphasized the double foreignness of contact zones between foreigners and Soviet
people: they were not only a space where Soviet and foreign met, but also dominated by
Soviet people who were not quite Soviet people.
The link between the economic corruption and dangers to Soviet national security
implied in these messages was reinforced by an-all-out campaign against espionage
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launched by the Soviet authorities in the 1960s. As we shall demonstrate in Chapter
Four, Soviet authorities did have ample reasons to suspect that “imperialist” powers were
using travel to the Soviet Union for their purposes. However, in the late 1950s, probably
due to Soviet interest in cultivating international connections and dispelling “slander”
about the Soviet surveillance state, the issue was kept relatively quiet. For instance,
according to testimony from a CIA case officer, American tourists asked to gather
intelligence on Soviet industrial installations felt that “as long as they did not openly
violate regulations, the KGB treated them with benign indifference.”519
Even when travelers strayed from the bounds of legality and yet remained
discreet, the Soviet authorities kept things quiet. Thus, while Rybkin and Repnikov’s ties
to Belfrage and her volume triggered a campaign against their “espionage” activities, a
number of similar court cases did not evoke much in way of public response, perhaps
because Soviet authorities were concerned the meagre details of the cases would make
them seem like Stalinist witch hunts.520
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This period of discreete silence ended in 1960 when the Powers shootdown both
highlighted Soviet sensitivity to American espionage efforts and offered an opportunity
for Soviet authorities to remind people of the dangers of foreign subversion during an era
of sagging commitment to Cold War battles.521 On June 2, a month after the U-2 incident,
the Central Committee issued a resolution calling for “heightened revolutionary
vigilance.”522 In it, it roundly criticized Soviet institutions for endangering state security
by letting foreigners access their facilities and staff without concern for proper protocol,
among other breaches of secrecy.
This resolution, followed in short order by a frenzy of discussions of secrecy
and carelessness all across the Soviet Union,523 triggered a noisy national campaign for
vigilance (of which Liakin’s op-ed was undoubtedly a key component). Readers of the
Soviet press were treated to innumerable stories describing in great detail the
machinations of “tourist-spies” and their henchmen.524 KGB officers, eager to rehabilitate
the name of Soviet security services, fanned out to Soviet institutions, providing briefings
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on security, vigilance, and ideological struggle for both the intelligentsia and the general
public525while professional propagandists, armed with an array of pamphlets with titles
like Vigilance is our Weapon, No Entrance for Spies, and Spies under Guise of Tourists
and aimed to remind Soviet people that the enemy was near.526 The latter volume, for
instance, explained to its readers how:
These types couldn’t care less about science, technology, culture, or the Moscow
subway. They are mysteriously pulled to the outskirts of Soviet towns to gather
tendentious information… try very hard to “get lost” near some defense installation
and, confusing it for some monument, snap a quick photo. These are the types that
are trying to hand out anti-Soviet literature. A real enemy stands in front of you, but
try and recognize it! He kindly smiles, cheerfully laughs, pretends to be a decent
fellow. But his hand is inexorably drawn to the camera button. 527

Writers and filmmakers were also recruited to the vigilance campaign. Rapidly
proliferating spy novels (often co-authored by KGB officers)528 were laden with plots
involving Western spies disguised as tourists and marginal elements as their
henchmen.529 The Soviet movie industry was not far behind. For instance, the 1965 film
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Dark Business [Chernii Biznes] grafts a spy story onto a ripped-from-headlines plot about
an underground textile production ring run by Jewish black marketeers, covering the
adventures of an American femme fatale spy sent (for reasons that are not made totally
clear) under the guise of tourist to help the culprits smuggle their profits abroad.530
Perhaps the clearest juxtaposition of the demimonde, material privilege,
subversion and espionage was presented in a May1963 feuilleton by Melor Sturua, a top
international reporter for Izvestiia.531 The protagonist “Oleg Penkovskii“ (not to be
confused, Sturua adds, with Pen’kovskii, “the notorious traitor and spy”
[Пенковский/Пеньковский]),532 was a Moscow loafer who made his living roaming
hotels, restaurants and other “foreign” spaces, exchanging anti-Soviet stories and jokes
for Western trinkets. Penkovskii, Sturua concluded “was not a spy but SCUM, dirty scum
that is sometimes formed on the surface of clean pools...such people are needed by
foreign scum-gatherers, first because they are becoming rarer, and second because it is
not so hard to push a soft sign into their last name” (i.e turn Penkovskii into Pen’kovskii).
In case this warning was not clear enough or readers were confused, Sturua’s
feuilleton was accompanied by an appendix by Lev Kassis, a KGB officer who doubled
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as an Izvestiia international reporter. 533 “Penkovskii,” Kassis reveals, was Boris
Umanskii, a Gulag returnee and freelance journalist who parleyed his job into an informal
position of tour guide for visiting Americans. From this perch he helped them stage antiSoviet provocations in swanky Moscow cafes in exchange for gifts and invitations to
diplomatic receptions.534 For good measure, Kassis mentioned two other “Penkovskiis”:
the future prominent human rights activist Aleksandr Ginzburg,535 an associate of
Umanskii, who was allegedly begging a Western embassy to loan him movies devoted to
abstract painters so that he could screen them to his “buddies” [druzhki], and Liakhina, a
graduate of the English language faculty of a teacher’s institute, who instead of working
or caring for her family, spent her time “serving” [prisluzhivat] foreigners, as “all she
cares about are French perfumes and American lipstick.”
The lesson such narratives offered was simple: the distance between
unsanctioned exchange and outright treason was no more than one step, and it was the
responsibility of the Soviet kollektiv, embodied most prominently in the KGB, to police
such the former in order to prevent the latter. Thus, to borrow Amir Weiner’s term,
residents of the demimonde were symbolically excised from the Soviet body politic. As
defectors from the last great Soviet mobilization drive, they stood with imperialism and
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against the Soviet people and its party – and the very definition of Soviet patriotism was
to recognize that beyond the glitter of material goods, fartsovshchiki and ethnically
suspect black marketeers and prostitutes and dissolute youth and emerging dissidents
were, morally speaking, foreign.536

Lenient Times: c. 1965- c. 1980.

And yet, a scant few years later, as the Soviet Union became ensconced in the “little
deal” era, calls to excise merchants and harlots from the Soviet temple became
increasingly incongruent with the real existing USSR. The shift from Khrushchev-era
mobilization to Brezhnev-era accomodation did not fail to transform relations between
the Soviet state, Soviet society, and the demimonde, allowing the latter to enter into a
golden age of sorts.
At the most basic level, as the Rokotov case demonstrated, the only way to
eradicate the demimonde was to both publicly acknowledge the problem and employ
Stalin-style draconian methods of social discipline. Such forthrightness and ruthlessness
were thoroughly foreign to the Brezhnevite state. For instance, the official presumption
that prostitution was eradicated meant that the Soviet legal code did not in fact contain
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penalties for prostitution, pimping, or solicitation – thus letting “Intourist girls” largely
off the hook, as long as they arranged for fictive employment and paid appropriate
bribes.537 Either due to the reputational damage the antisemitic undertones of
Khrushchev’s campaign caused to the Soviet state abroad, or since, as Sovietologist
Charles A. Schwartz speculated, the Stalinist echoes of the Rokotov show trial had a
negative impact on Soviet public opinion, both the prevalence of and public attention
devoted to trials of foreign currency speculators and other “economic criminals” plunged
after 1965.538 The penalties large-scale currency speculators could be expected to receive
were reduced from death to 8-12 years.539 While this surely was no walk in the park, the
combination of the vast riches the black market offered, and the relatively lenient
conditions (and early releases) their profits could buy made participation in the black
markets worthwhile for the “merchants.”540
The same calculus applied to street level operators. The key here was that as
historian Larissa Zakharova writes: “fartsovka was not mentioned in the legal code:”
Soviet legislation did not forbid purchasing (as opposed to selling for profit) consumer
items from foreigners. 541 This legal issue was only settled in 1970, with a Supreme
Soviet decree that defined small-scale currency violations and purchase of consumer
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items from foreigners as administrative offenses. As such, first violation was punisheable
by fines of 10-30 rubles and confiscation of illegally obtained currency or items. A
second violation within one year entailed a fine of fifty rubles. Only a third violation of
currency laws (but not a third instance of fartsovka) carried a prison term - of up to one
year.542 In 1977 penalties were further loosened.543 Needless to say, Soviet authorities
had other means to penalize black market operators: penalties for parasitism, public
shaming, transfer to junior delinquent schools for minors544 and expulsion from
universities for students. However, the (relative) liberality of post-1970 legislation meant
that, given one could make hundreds of rubles on a single deal, the potential benefits of
fartsovka far outweighed the risks.
Resource constraints further dampened the war against the demimonde. In
Leningrad in 1969, local militia complained that while the city received 300,000
foreigners, the department in charge of policing interactions between foreigners and
Soviet society in Leningrad and its environs had only 50 officers, charged with a dizzying
variety of duties (security in international events, maintaining order and preventing
fartsovka in Intourist locations and on the Leningrad-Vyborg highway, investigating
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crime both against foreigners and black market dealers).545 Fifteen years later, a
Leningrad official bemoaned that while black market traders operated hundreds of
automobiles on the Leningrad-Vyborg highway, the militia had only 2 squad cars
operating in the area.546
Worse still, as we had seen, the very high profit margins offered by the
demimonde made on-the-ground officials resolutely ambigious about constraining it.
Most telling in this regard was the behavior of militia officers. Even in the Khrushchev
era, some friendly visitors wondered why Soviet militiamen let black market operators
openly work the Red Square: “if we could easily recognize their faces, why couldn’t the
militia, since they come back to the same places over and over again?”547 The answer
here was simple: militia officers were systematically bribed by fartsovshchiki and their
bosses to turn their eyes away from their activities, which were, after all, victimless
crimes.548 Furthermore, high-ranking militia figures sometimes circulated in demimonde
circles. The writer Georgii Vainer tells how when fellow scribe Iulian Semenov got into a
scruff with “some fartsovshchiki and hooligans” in a prestigious Moscow restaurant and
got arrested, he and his brother Arkadii, the head of the investigative department of the
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Moscow militia, “discovered” both sides to the row were among their circle of friends.549
Needless to say, charges were dropped as a favor, a favor that was no doubt repaid.
Even, or especially, the druzhiny were not immune to the seductions of the
demimonde. As Joseph Brodsky recalls: “whenever these patrols frisked black marketeers,
plenty stuck to their hands - money and icons.”550 The ethical distance between skimming
off the top to playing both sides was short: Ilia Lerner, the druzhina chieftain who
instigated the assault on Brodsky in 1963, was few years later imprisoned for extorting
fartsovshchiki in exchange for protection.551 Soon, it became common knowledge among
black market operators that “they beat you only if you don’t give them some dough
[bablo].552 In some cases things went even further: Mikhail Dakhia, the kingpin of the
Leningrad foreign currency speculation market in the 1980s, began his career as a
druzhinnik.553
Statistical data, to the extent they exist, seem to bear out the impression that
struggle against the demimonde slackened in the Brezhnev era.While the number of
foreigners visiting the Soviet Union kept growing, the number of people detained for
commercial relations with foreigners declined from 2,283 in 1963 to 1,960 in 1968. More
important than the raw numbers were statistics on the treatment meted out to the
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detainees. In 1968, only 102 people were subject to fines and 5 were charged with
criminal offenses. Over 1,100 detainees were subjects of profilaktitka, and the rest,
apparently, were released without consequences.554 In Ukraine, a republic with no
shortage of commercially minded tourists, only 6 foreigners and 68 locals were detained
(and not all were tried) for contraband activities between 1970 and 1973.555 National
figures show similar trends: between 1959 and 1962, 582 people were either arrested or
underwent profilaktika for foreign currency speculation. That number declined to 382
between 1970 and 1974.556 In short, beyond the most brazen (or unlucky) of operators,
the rest enjoyed a near total freedom of action.
This relaxation of attitudes was undoubtedly a silent acknowledgment of the
role fartsovka played in supplying educated urbanites with the Western-produced goods
they craved and a general Brezhnev-era bias against rocking boats.557 However, I argue,
the growing official tolerance of the demimonde was rooted in something deeper: the
radical incongruity between the language of excision employed during Khrushchev’s
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assault on the demimonde and the post-Stalin relationship between Soviet state and
society.
On the most basic level, perhaps because they were well aware of how central
fear of spies and saboteurs was to Stalinist discourse, Soviet officials and propagandists
were genuinely concerned about the possibility that the campaign for vigilance would
devolve into spy-mania [shpionomaniia]. For this reason, calls for vigilance were
generously leavened with warnings against paranoia and xenophobia. For instance,
during the 1961 22nd Party Congress, KGB chief Shelepin called on Soviet people not to
succumb to spymania in their pursuit of vigilance, as “spymania spreads mistrust and
paranoia [podozritelnost’] among our people.”558 As human rights activist Aleksandr
Esenin-Vol’pin points out, this rhetorical restraint had practical consequences: after the
1950s, acts that were previously classified as treason - exchanging information and
literature with foreigners - were under Brezhnev prosecuted, if at all, as anti-Soviet
agitation, a far lesser charge.559
Official hedging on the limits of vigilance opened a space for liberal resistance
against its extreme manifestations. Here, the travails of Vsevolod Kochetov’s 1969 novel
What Do You Want? (Chego zhe ty khochesh?) were a case in point.560 Kochetov, a
“fanatical Stalinist,” editor of the literary journal Oktiabr’561and key figure in the
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conservative faction in Soviet intellectual life,562 intended his novel as an all-out assault
on Westernizing Soviet elites. His plot follows the misadventures of a tourist group,
consisting of a Nazi war criminal, a former white émigré, an American photographer, and
a sexually loose American journalist, sent by a shadowy Western cabal with a mission to
corrupt Soviet culture.563 To do so, the “tourists” meet, greet, and seduce fartsovshchiki,
liberal intellectuals, the useless, hyper-sexualized children of Soviet bureaucrats and
working class youth attracted to shallow material benefits, only to have their plans foiled
by a Soviet writer (who bears a remarkable resemblance to Kochetov) and his ally, a
metalurgical engineer who has no time for nonsense and intellectual waffling.
With its conflation of foreigners, black marketeers, espionage, sex, and
espionage, Kochetov’s volume reads like a barely fictionalized elaboration of Liakin’s
article. And yet, whether because his novel was published too late, or because he went
too far by openly calling to reinstitute late-Stalinist isolationism, Kochetov’s novel
withered under savage liberal attacks. The novel was published by a provincial press,
with a small (by Soviet standards) print run of 65,000.564 In a review published in
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Literaturnaia Gazeta, the critic A. Andreev pointed at Kochetov’s ideological weak spot:
by focusing so heavily on negative elements, he made it look as though Soviet youth was
fully Westernized - something that by definition could not be true.565 During the 1971
Congress of the Writers’ Union, the poet Yevgeny Yevtushenko, one of Kochetov’s
targets, played on the same topic, denouncing “a certain writer who attempted to slander
Soviet youth as a gathering of spiritual currency speculators.”566 At a time when social
mobilization was out of fashion, Kochetov’s honest embrace of the language of excision
broke the rules of the game and thus left him defenseless against attacks from the left.
The gap between vigilance talk and the realities of the Brezhnev period left it
open to the most withering of the rhetorical tools of late Soviet liberalism: satire and
mockery. Kochetov’s heavy-handed Stalinism was a natural target. And indeed, two
parodies of his novel by Zinovii Paperno and Sergei Smirnov entitled, respectively, What
does he Want? [Chego zhe on khochet] and What is he Laughing About? [Chego zhe on
khokhochet], both enjoying wide samizdat circulation.567 Other satirical takes on
vigilance talk appeared under an official imprimatur. Efim Gamburg’s 1967 animated
film Spy Games brilliantly lampoons familiar clichés about Western attempts to steal
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Soviet secrets.568 Taking things one step further, the joint Italian-Soviet comedy The
Incredible Adventures of Italians in Russia [Neveroiatnye prikliucheniia Italiantsev v
Rossii] took a familiar plot - a search for treasure buried by a White émigré that draws
dubious foreigners to the Soviet Union - and turned it into a wild slapstick affair, ending
with a suspiciously “capitalist” denouement: the Soviet state gives the Italians 25% of the
treasure as finders’ fee, while the KGB agent who surveilled the group marries one of the
treasure seekers.569 The message of such works was clear: like everything else in late
Soviet culture, vigilance talk was not to be taken too seriously.
If calls for vigilance became leavened with some skeptical dissonance,
denunciations of the commercial demimonde increasingly became a rarity. As mentioned
above, the campaign against economic crime faltered shortly after Khrushchev’s ouster.
Foreign currency prostitution also disappeared from the Soviet press, to the extent that
perestroika-era publicists held as truism it was total taboo since the 1920s.570 Similarly,
unless they involved the politically fraught topic of Jewish emigration (see Chapter 5),
major trials of currency speculators were not covered in major Soviet newspapers.571
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The last point was part of a larger trend: while the Soviet press was generally
silent on the commerical demimonde, it still vigorously promoted vigilance against
foreign ideological subversion. The official press continued to issue warnings about
“vigilance and carelessness”572 while propagandists still warned their audiences about
“visitors from another world” rummaging after Soviet secrets.573 Even Khrushchev-era
arguments about links between fartsovka and espionage did not altogether fade. For
instance, The Secret Front, a collection of cautionary tales about foreign subversion
penned by Semen Tsvigun, the literary-ambitious Chairman of the KGB prominently
featured the demimonde as fertile ground for spies and saboteurs.574 On a less exalted
level, Soviet teachers attempted to deter “chewing gum knights” by spreading tales of
foreigners distributing syphilis-infected chewing gum - tales that brought back
xenophobic myths going back at the very least to the 19th century.575
Furthermore, on relatively rare occasions, the Soviet public still called to
participate actively in rituals of symbolic excision. While a relatively small number of
people underwent profilaktika for commercial relations with foreigners, for the unlucky
few, it was a harrowing experience.576 In Donetsk in 1975, for example, several students
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caught speculating in items bought from foreigners faced a series of public meetings in
front of over 1,500 komsomol members in which their sins were roundly denounced.
These meetings were widely publicized in the local and regional press.577 In the
Lithuanian port city of Klaipeda, groups of fartsovshchiki and girls dating foreign sailors
could expect not only “private” forms of pressure (“conversations” with KGB officers,
threats of loss of employment, possible charges of parasitism, expulsion from
universities), but public humiliation. Most strikingly, victims of profilaktika had their
photos set up in a “they shame our city” photo-array in the city square - a public shaming
that relied for its efficacy on general public acceptance of official denunciations of the
demimonde.578
Devastating as such attacks could be for their victims, statistically speaking,
they were surely exceptions to the general official trend of tolerance for the demimonde.
However, they served as reminder that the language of excision did not disappear from
the official toolkit – and demimonde residents faced the risk of the wrath of the Soviet
state falling on their heads at any moment. However, generally speaking, the focus of
Soviet assaults on the demimonde shifted from the Khrushchev era wide-ranging charges,
to selective targeting of Soviet citizens whose associations with foreigners were deemed
especially dangerous. In other words, the connections Khrushchev-era campaigns made
between youth, education, disloyalty and material privilege were no longer pointing at
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ill-defined (and largely a-political) “golden youth” or (even more a-political) black
markeeers but at a specific, identifiable group that, Soviet authorities argued, actively cut
it itself off from Soviet society: otshchepentsy - dissenters and human rights activists.579
For instance, the historian N.N Iakovlev, charged by the KGB with writing an
authoritative history of American subversion against the Soviet Union,580 employed such
themes when denouncing dissidents as “dropouts [nedouchki], idlers [lobotriasy], with
over-developed ambitions and pretensions.”581 Motivated by “vainglory” and hedonism,
they became easy marks for “all sorts of scum with diplomatic passports [or] simply
tourist visas.”582
And indeed, while unlucky fartsovshchiki were publicly humiliated in their
towns, ritualized humiliations of dissenters were national affairs, broadcast on television
and covered in central newspapers. For instance, the confessions of Peter Yakir and
Viktor Krasin, human rights activists who broke under interrogation, dictated by the
KGB and undoubebly reflecting official perceptions of their activities, included tales of
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receiving money from the anti-Soviet émigré organization NTS, payments by Western
journalists for “slanderous materials” and receiving “handouts” from foreigners.583 The
dissenting priest Dmitrii Dudko made similar confessions, stating on Soviet TV that he
was led astray by Western journalists, diplomats, and other foreign malefactors who plied
him with gifts and media attention.584 On the republican level, the Literaturnaia Gazeta
and the Georgian Zaria Vostoka both described how the Georgian nationalist Zviad
Gamsakhurdia “grew up in great privilege” and despite everything Soviet power did for
him was recruited by American diplomats and “anti-sovetchiki who abuse their status as
guests” to betray his country in exchange for gifts and publicity abroad.585
To what extent was vigilance talk accepted by the public, and to what extent
was it deemed parody-worthy prattle? The limited available evidence suggests that,
outside rarefied intellectual circles, denunciations of the demimonde – even in its
commercial guise - had real and lasting effect. A scintillating hint in this regard is offered
by a svodka of questions asked by the public in KGB-sponsored talks about vigilance
prepared for the Ukrainian Politburo in 1981, featuring numerous examples of “Soviet
toilers” inquiring why the state didn’t tamp down on fartsovshchiki, foreign spies,
subversive tourists, diplomats and journalists, and the dissidents who served as their
henchmen.586
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Other evidence points in the same direction. Both contemporary and postSoviet accounts emphasize the extent to which fartsovshchiki were despised by other
Soviet people, including their clients.587 More strikingly, warnings against espionage
seem to have taken effect among the Soviet public. Esenin-Vol’pin rememebered the
early 1960s as a period of “hysteria… and spymania.”588 Similarly, Soviet dissidents and
informal artists remember with some pride being spied on and viewed with suspicion by
their communal apartment neighbors for their dubious Western connections and
visitors.589
Furthermore, at least some Soviet people were willing to take vigilance talk as
a call for action. For instance, tourists taking suspicious pictures could expect vigilant
reactions. In one such case from Smolensk in 1963, a pair of young American tourists
taking pictures of garbage piles left after construction were “apprehended by our Soviet
citizens, who forced them to expose their films,” to help avoid embarrassment to the
Soviet state.590 Even in nationalist-minded Lithuania, locals took similar actions against
nosy foreigners.591 Finally, no matter how often they were lampooned by the intellectual
classes, vigilance was certainly taken seriously by some young men, including very
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famous ones, who, influenced by Soviet spy thrillers, choce fighting “dangers coming
from abroad” as their calling.592
In short, official attitudes to the demimonde underwent a significant shift under
Brezhnev. On the one hand, the Soviet state learned to live with all but the most
ideological interactions between Soviet people and foreigners. On the other hand, the
master narrative that doomed demimonde residents to symbolic excision from Soviet
society remained intact. Dissidents now absorbed the entire brunt of association of
foreignness, corruption, privilege, and treason. In the early 1980s, as international
conditions deteriorated and the Soviet state once again attempted to use reinvigorate
socialism by enhancing social discipline, the demimonde again recast as ideological
problem.

The Andropov Interlude, or the Last Soviet Campaign, Late 1970s - 1986

Soviet historiography, usually well-attuned to periodization, has yet to either delineate or
provide a convenient title for the years between the slow disintegration of Brezhnev’s
rule and the moment when perestroika ceased being a mobilizing slogan and became a
revolutionary force. For some scholars, Aleksei Yurchak most prominently, the years

592

Masha Gessen, The Man without a Face: The Unlikely Rise of Vladimir Putin (New York: Riverhead
Books, 2013), 52. See also: Sergei Gorlenko, Zapiski opera. Ot KGb do FSB (Moscow: Tradistsiia, 2013),
22.

209

between 1980 and 1986 saw nothing new in particular, as nothing new could exist, by
definition, in the “eternal state.”593 For others, period was the quiet before the storm with
a series of crises gathering as Soviet society awaited the Brezhnev gerontocrats to exit the
scene.594 And yet, as the following pages make clear, enough evidence exists to see this
time frame as a period in its own right, defined by a last desperate drive for social
discipline and coercive reform. I term this period “the Andropov interlude,” after the
man whose agenda shaped Soviet policy from the late 1970s until 1986/7.595
As in the Khrushchev era, this period was defined by an intermingling of
international and domestic crises: a series of Cold War crises that exacerbated fears about
foreign subversion, coupled with growing concern regarding the impact of corruption and
moral degeneration on economic performance and the future of the socialist project.
Subsequently the Andropov interlude was was a period of coercive reform, focused on
social discipline, moral exhortation, and attempts at ideological revival.596 As the
problem of unsanctioned contacts between foreigners and Soviet people was closely
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related to both fears of ideological subversion and moral degeneration, Andropov’s
coercive reform efforts included a renewed assault on the demimonde.
One indication of official loss of patience with the demimonde came
immediately after the highpoint of Soviet diplomatic achievement, the signing of the
Helsinki Accords. According to an intelligence estimate prepared by the CIA in 1977,
while initial Soviet intentions were to apply “carrot and stick methods” to dissidents who
attempted to leverage the Accords for their purposes, their success in riling global public
opinion moved the Soviet authorities to decisive action. In short order, the Soviets shot a
broadside at dissenters and their Western allies by arresting and deporting the
Washington Post reporter Robert Toth. Even more alarming, his contact Anatolii
Shcharanskii, one of the top links between Moscow dissidents and the West, was arrested
and indicted on treason charges. Both incidents, the CIA concluded, were violations of
recent Soviet practice, which stipulated leaving reporters in peace, and charging their
sources only with anti-Soviet agitation.597
Whether the details of this assessment are accurate or not, it constituted an
accurate prediction regarding future Soviet actions. Dismantling the connection between
Westerners and Soviet dissenters became a key Soviet tactic in the late 1970s and early
1980s. Most famously, if in 1976, at the height of détente, Soviet authorities used
Sakharov’s freedom to engage with Western reporters in order to publicly refute Western
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“slander” regarding the Soviet human rights record,598 by 1979 his meetings with foreign
journalists, diplomats, and “intelligence officers seeking political information,” were
privately cited by Andropov and Prosecutor General Rudenko as both reason and legal
pretext for his exile to the closed city of Gor’kii.599
These measures were part of a conscious strategy of turning the screws on
interactions between Soviet people and foreigners. In a famous example of this trend, in
the run-up to the 1980 Olympics, Moscow was not only purged of undesireables, but saw
its school year shortened and its youth “exiled” to pioneer camps and other summer
facilities to avoid ideological contamination - a far cry from the optimism of 1957.600 In
another indication of the intensifying struggle against contamination from abroad,
Andropov’s short-lived KGB successor Vitalii Fedorchuk penned a memorandum
complaining about the liberal approach of Soviet film-makers to representations of social
(and sexual) contacts between foreigners and Soviet citizens (citing, among others, the
happy ending of Unusual Adventures), and the growing numbers of prominent Soviet
citizens marrying foreigners.601
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Perhaps in response to this liberal trend, the late 1970s and early 1980s saw
a resurgence of vigilance talk. In 1979, the KGB established its own literary and
cinematic prizes, an apogee of its post-Stalin public relations efforts.602 These awards
were just the tip of an immense iceberg. In 1984, in Ukraine alone, the Republican KGB
helped party propagandists prepare 3,000 talks about vigilance and sponsored over
10,000 talks and lectures on the same topic by KGB veterans and reserve officers. The
KGB also organized about 150 “authors’ groups” that “released 1 fictional and 11
documentary films, published 55 books and 24 pamphlets, prepared 1,209 radio
segments and composed 3,739 newspaper articles [devoted to] exposing the machinations
of foreign intelligence services , centers of ideological subversion, foreign Zionist,
nationalist, clerical, and other anti-Soviet organizations, of hostile and anti-social
elements.”603
If this was rather familiar fare, under Andropov, these broadsides at corrupt
dissidents and their foreign benefactors were accompanied by something new- a
systematic assault on corruption and informal economic activity.604 For this campaign,
the demimonde was a natural target. Intourist, criss-crossed as it was with networks of
corruption, was under assault of such intensity that one Intourist official complained that
an average Intourist barman could expect to work no more than 2 or 3 years before going
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to prison.605 These legal attacks were accompanied by media coverage that, for the first
time, acknowledged the systemic nature of the demimonde problem. In one letter by a
whistleblower, a barman recently fired from a Sochi resort, published in Sovetskaia
Rossiia, the author described how his bosses demanded “tribute” (dan’) which they then
disbursed to the rest of the hotel kollektiv, and to local militia organizations.606 Pravda in
its turn ran an expose on “young specialists” who refused their raspredelenie and found
instead employment at an Intourist motel in Northern Ossetia, with the clear insinuation
that they did so to gain access to the imported goods and foreign currency so easily
obtainable at Intourist facilities.607
This assault on the commercial world surrounding foreign visitors was not
limited to Intourist. Starting in the late 1970s, authorities moved to re-energize the
struggle against fartsovka.608 According to figures collated by Catriona Kelly, in
Leningrad, detentions of Soviet citizens festering foreigners skyrocketed from 1,500 to
above 3,400 between 1977 and 1978.609 Around 1980, Intourist hotels were ordered to
launch security departments, charged with disciplining Intourist labor force and
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coordinating actions against “a-social elements” with the militia and druzhiny.610 Most
tellingy, Soviet authorities seriously discussed a reinstatement of the Khrushchevian
practice of instating quotas of “parasites” to be exiled from major cities- a move that was
understood by them as the only effective measure against fartsovka.611
Indicating the lasting impact of Andropov’s coercive reform agenda, assaults
on the demimonde only intensified early in Gorbachev’s reign.The years 1985-1987 saw
the issuance of a major Central Committee resolution on the reorganization of the fight
against prostitution and speculation,612 the formation of militia units designated to police
Intourist hotels,613 and even, in Riga, the first Soviet vice squad.614 In Moscow in 1986,
the Gor’kii Street pleshka was declared an “Komsomol Influence Zone” and was flooded
by militia and Komsomol patrols.615 Following a major publication in Sovetskaia Estonia
on the prevalence of prostitution and speculation involing Finnish tourists there, over 800
druzhinniki and significant number of militia officers were sent to patrol tourist areas of
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Talinn.616 Thus, in theory at least, the early perestroika years saw the worst clampdown
on the demimonde since the Khrushchev period.
Yet, as is so often the case in late Soviet society, this activity faced obdurate
resistance from both Soviet society and Soviet institutions. Intourist hotel managers had
little enthusiasm for policing, and often shortchanged or diverted the employees of
security departments to other tasks,617 and the MVD did not care about the assignment
much either.618 In Tallinn in 1986, only 16,500 Finnish marks, 100 DMs, and 3 US
dollars were confiscated from black market participants – surely less than a drop in the
ocean of black market activity surrounding Finnish tourists.619 Even black marketeers so
clumsy or unlucky to be captured had little to worry about, since, as Estonian party and
KGB officials complained, universities and places of employment did not particularly
care about the “moral profiles” of their students and staff and sometimes openly refused
to participate in profilactic measures.620 Most strikingly, in February 1985, the All-Union
Council of Ministers, alarmed at the high percentage of empty rooms at recently built
Intourist hotels, instructed Intourist to start selling packages to Soviet citizens, in rubles,
but at “prices equivalent to those paid by foreign tourists.” 621 This resolution not only
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provided exactly the same idlers and parasites Andropov’s campaigns were aimed at
legitimate access to the top of the Soviet pyramid of consumption (who else, after all, had
the available income to purchase an Intourist tour?), but also allowed fartsovshchiki and
“Intourist girl” a perfectly legal method to purhcase access to foreigners in rubles, in
order to make profits off them in dollars - thus making perfect mockery of this last Soviet
mobilization drive.
If such quiet subversion of official strictures was in itself nothing new,
renewed media attention to the demimonde created new and unintended consequences.
As was the case in the Khrushchev era, authorities sought to publicize the misdeeds of
black marketeers, in order to both warn others and mobilize the public against their
misbegotten lifestyles. The practice of public show trials of major currency speculators
was therefore revived, with the 1986 trial of the aforementioned Mikhail Dakhia
broadcast on Leningrad TV.622 In Estonia, profilaktika measures now included TV
coverage of the public shaming of street operators.623 In the realm of fiction, narratives
about the link between demimonde and espionage triumphantly returned to Soviet
screens: the highest grossing Soviet film in 1986, Dual Trap, was seemingly a standard
thriller, detailing the stuggle between the Latvian KGB, a Western businessman sent by
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shadowy forces to subvert Soviet youth, and a gang of fartsovshchiki that do his
bidding.624
While much of the resurgent coverage of the demimonde was resolutely
orthodox in tone, in the contex the late Soviet culture, the messages it broadcast to the
public were complex, contradictory, and sometimes subversive. For instance, even
though Dakhia conducted criminal operations on a scale far surpassing Rokotov’s, he
received only a six-year sentence –a clear indication of the distance the Soviet justice
system had traveled since the 1960s.625
Even more importantly, coverage of busted demimonde networks in the Soviet
press no longer depicted the culprits as foreign elements, but rather emphasized the extent
to which they were product of “native” social forces. For example, a 1984 multi-part
Komsomolskaia Pravda expose on an Arab student running a vast commercial network in
Rostov, made it very clear how his network depended on local officials, who protected
him in exchange for bribes and regular gifts of jeans for their children.626 Other pieces
denouncing fartsovka focused on the demand side of the problem: the instatiable demand
for Western consumer goods from law-abiding Soviet urbanites.627
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And here was the heart of the issue: unlike in the Khrushchev era, even the
briefest glimpse at the demimonde could not fail to reveal the extent to which it became
embedded in Soviet urban life. As a result, coverage of the demimonde often exhibited
not so much denunciation as elucidation of desire. Thus, in the successful 1985 romantic
comedy The Most Charming and Attractive One [Samaia obaietalnaia i privlekatelnaia],
a matter-of-fact visit to the well stocked apartment of a fartsovshchik is a key moment in
the transformation of Nadia, the protagonist, from a reticent engineer a glamorous beauty.
Even more strikingly, despite its traditional plot, much of the imagery of Dual Trap
celebrated material excess associated with the demimonde. The first “Soviet” scene in the
movie is set in a bar/cabaret catering to foreigners, and features near-naked dancers
gyrating to jazz music. In a key scene, the fartsovshchik ring leader, known as Banan,
effortlessly bedazzles “normal” Soviet girls with his money and endless stock of Western
consumer products. Even the KGB officers who vanquish Banan seem for a moment
transfixed with the images in the pornographic journals he distributes. Commissioned as
warning agains the dangers of the demimonde, Dual Trap visually celebrated its
temptation. This ambiguity gave rise to a thorny question: were black marketeers
renegades excised from Soviet life, or were “normative” Soviet people excised from the
good life the black marketeers enjoyed?
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Figure 3.3: Scene from Dual Trap: “Banan” seduces visitors to his apartment

Figure 3.4: Scene from Dual Trap: Investigator Peeking at Pornographic Journal
Source: Alois Brancs (dir.) Double Trap.
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Conclusion: The Demimonde Becomes the World, 1986-1989

If such dangerous questions were but a subtext in 1985/6, by 1986/7, the twin forces of
glasnost’ and commercialization made them absolutely central to media coverage of a
hitherto unspoken aspect of the demimonde: hard currency prostitution.628 According to
an interview with Evgenii Dodolev, the author of the first high-profile piece on the issue
published in the Soviet media629 his article was commissioned by the KGB, and was
meant to signal to Intourist and local authorities to finally tackle the problem.630 Indeed,
Dodolev’s publication was followed by a massive media campaign aimed to
propagandize a Central Committee resolution that acknowledged the problem for the first
time since the 1920s.631 Inevitably, such coverage elicidated responses couched in
violent, excisionary, language: one letter to the editor proposed to burn prostitutes alive,
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while a group of teenagers from Brest boasted that they founded a group devoted to the
violent eradication of prostitutes and fartsovshchiki.632
And yet, the vast majority of publicity associated with hard currency
prostitution veered far from the initial design of the campaign. By far the most prominent
example of this trend is Kunin’s Interdevochka. Like Dodolev’s piece, Interdevochka was
commissioned by Soviet authorities for propagandistic purposes.633 Nevertheless, both
the novel and the movie it inspired present the protagonist, Tatiana, and her fellow
interdevochki as largely positive characters, fighting to navigate a reality rife with
poverty, meaningless ideological speech, and misogyny. At the same time, Interdevochka
not only celebrated the material comforts obtained by Tatiana and her friends, but did
what very few Soviet movies did before: sell sex, in vivid color, to an audience that, as
ticket and book sales indicated, was starved for it.634
This rejection of official views of the demimonde in favor of both moralism
and unabashed commercialized sexuality rapidly became the dominant themes in the
coverage of hard currency prostitution. Reforming academics and journalists pointed out
that hard currency prostitution was a social problem, and that the decades-long policy of
pretending it did not exist caused great harm to sex workers by blocking all attempts to
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tackle the issue or protect them from abuse and disease.635 The playwright Alexander
Galin used the Olympic deportation of undesirables from Moscow as background to Stars
in the Night Sky, a play set in a barrack in a mental hospital to which deportees were sent,
using the setting to discuss the plight of marginal social groups.636
With their mixture of empathy, moral horror, and paternalism, such
treatments of the prostitution problem were, in their own way, no less moralizing than the
official line. As such, they were soon overshadowed by coverage of an altogether
different tenor. Increasingly released from both censorship restrictions and state
subsidies, Soviet media found hard currency prostitution an irresistible topic.
Significantly, while such narratives did not of course, lack for sex, their nearly obsessive
focus lay elsewhere: the mad profits and luxuriant lifestyles of the interdevochki.637
Khau du iu du, a documentary film about the hard currency scene in
Moscow, was perhaps the most powerful indication of the extent to which the campaign
against the demimonde became an advertisement for it. Initially conceived as a
Komsomol educational vehicle, it turned instead into a commercially-minded celebration
of the demimonde, showcasing luxurious fixtures of Intourist hotels, meals consumed in
Intourist restaurants, apartments stocked with Western consumer goods where
demimonde participants resided. Above all, Khau du iu du emphasized the mental
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satisfaction offered by the demimonde and denied to Soviet toilers (“Don’t I have the
right to be happy?” one interdevochka inquires of the camera in a key scene). The only
voice expressing moral indignation belonged to a doorman at the Metropol hotel, who,
the movie made clear, was accepting bribes from prostitutes for access to “his” hotel- a
higly effective visual representation of the failure of Soviet efforts to excise the
demimonde, and the moral failure of the language of excision.638 It was in this
atmosphere that a poll taken among Riga teenagers found hard currency prostitution,
alongside black market trading and waiting in Intourist bars, the most desired
professions.639 Released from the discursive and coercive limits that kept access to
foreigners and their wealth to those daring to leave normative Soviet existence behind,
the demimonde rapidly colonized the Soviet (soon to become post-Soviet) imagination.640
As Liakin and Kochetov prophesied, speculators, parasites, and girls of easy behavior did
indeed help lay the foundation for the defeat of the socialist project
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Chapter 4: Vigilance is Our Weapon! The KGB, Foreigners, and the
Limits of Surveillance

Sometime in August 1972, the Jewish-American lawyer Samuel Dash was in Kharkiv,
fighting to keep his pants on. Dash, a law professor at Georgetown who recently issued a
widely circulating public rebuttal to the British account of the Belfast Bogside Massacre,
was a man on a mission. As he recounted in an oral history interview in 2003, he was
asked by an “emissary from the Israeli government” to “do an errand on behalf of Israel
and the Refuseniks:” to go to the Soviet Union as a tourist, make contact with Jewish
emigration activists, and draw public attention to the plight of Soviet Jewry upon return
home. To fulfill his assignment, Dash carried around a little notebook with the names and
numbers of the activists he was to meet. After a series of unsuccessful attempts to extract
the notebook from Dash’s hotel rooms, the KGB devised a plan: his Intourist guide
pushed him to visit the Kharkiv subway construction site, where, over his protests, the
site manager forced him to strip and put on protective gear for a tour of the tunnels. This
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gave KGB operatives time to ruffle through his pants in search of the notebook - a plan
that was foiled because Dash prudently stuffed it into his underwear.641
If Dash’s account reads like a farce, it was also, from the point of view of the
officials who authorized this sartorial heist, a deadly serious representation of the
dilemmas created by growing foreign presence inside the USSR. As we’ve seen in the
preceding chapter, the official Soviet view of contacts between Soviet citizens and
foreigners was imbued with what sociologist Andreas Graeber terms state paranoia. This
“highly indexical suspicion which radiated from the center of the party state to its
periphery,”642 made the Soviet official mind presume that even seemingly a-political
contacts with the outside world undermined the Soviet state and were therefore
systematically employed as weapons by its imperialist foes. What made things worse
was that while the Soviet state and especially its security services had a rich tradition of
generating paranoid attitudes about foreign subversion of the Soviet collective out of
mere phantoms,643 the Dash incident indicates that, in the post-Stalin period, the Soviet
obsession with foreign subversion had a solid foundation in fact. From the moment moreor-less obstacle-free travel to the USSR became a reality in the mid-1950s, a variety of
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groups, individuals, governmental and non-governmental institutions in the West did see
in the Soviet opening up to the world a real opportunity to promote a variety of agendas
harmful to Soviet interests.
This chapter explores how the ideological dangers, operational challenges and
security risks created by visiting foreigners were read by Soviet security services through
an analytic lense rooted in state paranoia. From this perspective, the threats to social
discipline and political unanimity created by encounters between Soviet people and
foreigners were seen not as set of disparate problems created by various groups pursuing
limited objectives, but as coordinated aspects of an all-out assault on the foundations of
the socialist project. Faced with this challenge, the Soviet security service set out to
surveil, police, and disrupt unauthorized connections between foreigners and Soviet
people – and, as the Dash incident indicates, fell short in this task.
In this chapter and the next, I reconstruct the epistemological structures that
underpinned the Soviet view of foreign danger, and how it adapted the classical elements
of Soviet policecraft to meet it. Then, I demonstrate a curious and yawning gap between
the KGB’s threat perceptions, the resources it put into surveillance of foreigners, and the
very limited scope to which these threat perceptions translated into aggressive action to
deter them from subverting Soviet power. This conundrum leads to the central question
posed in this and the following chapter: why this immense gap between perception and
action? Why did the Soviet alarm at the subversive effects of foreign travel did did not
lead to resolute action to reduce interactions between the Soviet Union and the outside
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world, or at least to determined action against subversive travelers like Dash? Before
raising and answering these questions however, I sketch out a quick profile of the
perceived security threat Soviet authorities faced in the era of (almost) open borders.

Spies, Saboteurs and Subversive Travelers

Harmful as it might have been judged by post-Stalin Soviet authorities, the Soviet selfisolation of the late 1940s and early 1950s posed two intractable problems to Western
Cold Warriors. First, at the end of the Second World War, their knowledge of their
erstwhile ally was rudimentary and intelligence gathering capacities on Soviet soil
negligible.644 In subsequent years, Soviet and British attempts to clandestinely infiltrate
agents (usually members of various émigré groups) to gather intelligence and foster
clandestine resistance networks on the Soviet periphery were easily foiled by Soviet
security services.645 Second, the complete closure of Soviet physical and cultural spaces
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to foreign presence made spreading Western propaganda behind Soviet borders
practically impossible.646
For state and non-state actors in the West seeking to learn about the Soviet Union
in order to change (or, in case the Cold War turned hot, more effectively incinerate) it,
the opening of Soviet borders was a golden opportunity to recover lost ground. For
instance, when the Soviet Union removed its ban on diplomatic personnel travel outside
Moscow, Western military attachés could return to their core mission: using travel under
the protection of diplomatic immunity to conduct visual and signals intelligence.647 In a
more innovative manner, as the CIA’s in-house journal Studies in Intelligence put it in
1963: “during the past seven or eight years of increased tourist travel to the USSR and
official exchanges … [The CIA] devoted a great deal of time and energy to briefing and
debriefing those who may thus have opportunities to make useful observations, seeking
to exploit these sources of opportunity with reference to targets of opportunity [sic].”648
Translated from bureaucratic language, what this meant was that for “spies and
saboteurs” the price of admission to Soviet territory suddenly dropped, from life-
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threatening parachute drops to purchasing an Intourist package. From 1959 onwards, the
CIA ran “Operation Lincoln,” which tasked about sixty visitors a year with identifying
possible missile sites by means of “visual, photographic, or conversational observations.”
From 1962 onward, this program was converted to gathering information by means of
elicitation: making contacts with Soviet scientists and engineers in order to “draw…
out… a friendly conversation to the point of revealing something useful.”649 The
American Air Force ran an even more ambitious program, using engineers, scientists, and
members of official delegations to help create a wartime targeting database by observing
and photographing strategic sites.650 In a similar endeavor, the Pentagon offered a number
of young Americans studying in Europe funds to purchase a car and take a trip across the
European part of the USSR - in exchange for taking photographs of Soviet military
installations.651 Some “tourist-spies” were so brazen as to openly take pictures of officers
entering and exiting the KGB’s headquarters at Lubianka Square.652
By the mid-1960s, such blatant use of tourism and exchanges for espionage
purposes seems to have tapered off, due to both Soviet counter-measures (see below) and
technological advances that made direct observation less useful.653 However, travelers
still provided the United States with helpful intelligence. For instance, the era of mass
travel finally allowed the CIA to put its émigré assets to good use, by employing diaspora
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Lithuanias and Ukrainians who were visiting relatives to both conduct visual intelligence
and gather information on local Soviet officials. 654 In a less voluntaristic vein, American
authorities could and did apply pressure on exchange students and scholars to obtain
information about their Soviet experiences.655
Using travelers to gather intelligence is of course a tactic of statecraft at least as
venerable as, at least, the Book of Joshua. More unusual by historical standards was the
uses to which Western actors put foreign travel in their efforts to change Soviet society.
Both governments and individuals saw the opening of Soviet borders as golden
opportuniy to directly deliver Western messages to the Soviet public. Settings for such
efforts ranged from iconic locations like the 1959 Sokolniki Exhibit to everyday
manifestations of friendship outside the control of Soviet authorities. For instance, as an
Intourist document from 1960 complained, members of the Yale and Harvard university
choirs, “acting according to instructions they probably received in the US” used their tour
of the Soviet Union for propaganda purposes by: “leaving their hotels in the evening
hours and singing Russian songs…starting conversations with Soviet people drawn to
these improvised concerts… making provocative statements and attacking the Soviet
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government.”656 At times, Soviet fears of clandestine links between unruly travelers and
the CIA proved true. Historian Karen Paget recounts, for instance, the tale of two
students who, armed with CIA funding, infiltrated the American delegation to the 1957
Moscow Festival in order to “debate democracy in Red Square:” to sow division within
the (Communist-dominated) American delegation, and reach out to both other
delegations and ordinary Muscovites.657
While, as Susan Reid brilliantly demonstrates, such engagement attempts did not
always produce the desired effects and could repel Soviet citizens disgusted with
American materialism,658 subversive travelers achieved a measure of success by
operating on a narrower front. Namely, from the 1950s onward, various Western groups
employed travel to the Soviet Union to give aid and succor to sundry Soviet dissenters
and non-conformists. Worse still from the point of view of Soviet authorities, they found
no shortage of Soviet interlocutors who sought out the visitors in order to actualize,
enunciate, and publicize their departures from Soviet normative existence. Together,
subversive travelers and their interlocutors created a variety of transnational networks
that, while immeasurably smaller than the demimonde, posed no greater threat to Soviet
claims of ideological unanimity.
Yet again confirming that Soviet fears of the link between subversion,
“imperialism” and foreign travel were at least to some extent justified, the links that
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connected Soviet non-conformists to the outside world were, at times, state-sponsored.
To cite just one example, a CIA-funded book-smuggling operation enlisted American
travelers to distribute hundreds of thousands of copies of Russian language translations of
Western literature and samizdat publications among Soviet elites.659 In the late 1970s,
during the Carter administration’s human rights push, a number of diplomats at the
American Embassy in Moscow had “contact and reporting responsibilities for the Soviet
dissident community”- or, in other words, aided them in their core activity of publicizing
Soviet human rights abuses.660 As Dash’s case demonstrates, smaller states such as Israel
could also get in on the action (and, as we shall see in chapter 5, did so with gusto).
More important still, as was the case with so much of the cultural Cold War,
much of this subversive activity was organized by non-governmental groups, often
entangled in various ways with Western governments. The émigré organization NTS
(narodno-trudovoi soiuz), a frequent collaborator with the CIA in the immediate postwar
years and in all probability a recipient of American funds throughout the Cold War,661
refocused much of its activity on legal travel after the 1950s. It recruited and trained
“eagles”, Russian emigres, Russian-speaking students, or members of European youth
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right-wing organizations, to serve as its emissaries on Soviet soil.662 There, they were to
distribute subversive literature and smuggle out samizdat, (rarely) engage in public
protest, make contact with dissenters, and provide money, gifts, and clandestine
technology to would-be resistance groups (missions that could and sometimes did end
with disasters for all involved).663 Baltic and Ukrainian nationalist organizations
employed similar tactics with a larger measure of success – with continued CIA backing.
A probably numerically more significant transnational network connected
evangelical believers in the West to their Soviet brethren. From the 1950s to the 1980s,
religious travelers, ranging from tourists armed “with cameras and the Bible,”664 to
professional “God’s Smugglers,”665 driving across the Soviet Union in cars equipped with
hidden compartments storing thousands of Holy Books, distributed vast amounts of
religious literature among Soviet “sectarians.” This large-scale (yet historiographically
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obscure)666 movement was initiated in the 1950s as the brain child of largely apolitical
activists like the Dutchman Andrew van der Bijl (better known as Brother Andrew). By
the late 1970s, Bible smuggling became a cottage industry, with dozens of organizations,
some closely tied to right-wing circles in the West, vying for tens of millions of dollars in
donations to fund their endeavors.667 Furthermore, as Brother Andrew freely concedes in
his memoirs, significant components of this godly network were funded by various antiCommunist organizations, who, in, turn, could have plausibly been connected to Western
governments.668
Brother Andrew’s contribution to the evangelical cause underlies an important
point: that even if the politicized demimonde enjoyed governmental support, it was, in
the final account, a product of myriad individual commitments. Thus, many Western
journalists residing in Moscow took cultivating, publicizing, and at times materially
aiding dissenters as key ingredients of both their professional and ethical duties.669
Journalists, students, and scholars made the apartments of dissidents and Soviet
intellectuals’ places of pilgrimage where they could partake in the practice of resistancevia-kitchen talk.670
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Such encounters begat perhaps the most substantial contribution of foreigners to
Soviet non-conformity: the smuggling of samizdat and subversive manuscripts abroad.
One of the earliest texts of Soviet dissent, Sergei Yesenin-Volpin’s “Why I am not a
Communist,” was, for instance, smuggled abroad by a member of the aforementioned
Yale choire, in its 1959 tour of the Soviet Union.671 Later on, samizdat smuggling took
more organized features. As Alexander Solzhenitsyn revealed in the post-Soviet edition
of his memoirs, foreigners - journalists, literary scholars, diplomats, and others were an
essential ingredient in his network of “invisible” collaborators [nevidimki].672 One such
“invisible,” the French-Russian diplomat Anastasia Durrouf, smuggled large segments of
Solzhenitsyn’s manuscripts abroad, disguising them as gifts she asked French tourists and
businessmen returning home to present to her Parisian “friends.”673 In Ukraine, “ethnic”
foreign students from Czechoslovakia and Canada formed an important channel through
which Ukrainian nationalists could smuggle their works abroad.674 On an individual
level, Dutchman Robert Van Voren describes how, as a teenager, he became so obsessed
with Soviet dissidents he reached out to exile dissident Vladimir Bukovsky who “trained”
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him to become a journalist posted in the Soviet Union- and a publicity agent for human
rights defenders.675
Of course, such devotion was but a faint reflection of the determination that was
required from the Soviet participants of these transnational networks of dissent. Most
telling in this regard was the zeal with which individuals outside Soviet capitals pursued
opportunities to engage with sympathetic foreigners. Siberian Baptists often undertook
long journeys to contact religious emissaries in the Soviet West in order to receive Bibles
that were then copied by hand and recirculated in the Far East.676 Desperate petitioners
from Soviet provinces found ways to deliver their complaints about injustices to
Moscow-based journalists.677 One Tbilisi engineer spent nearly three years in the 1960s
trying to contact foreigners willing to take his letters to Western editors abroad. For this
purpose, he repeatedly travelled to various foreign exhibitions in Moscow, sent his
friends there with the letters and, when those connections bore no fruit, attempted to
convince tourists he met at Tbilisi churches to smuggle them out in exchange for
Georgian souvenirs.678
Finally, the most dramatic illustration of the subversive potential of foreign
presence on Soviet soil was the use that potential “traitors to the motherland” made of it.
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Western embassies in Moscow were magnets for non-conformists and, especially,
religious activists, who could spend years living as refugees inside them if they were
lucky, or be immediately expelled if they were unlucky. 679 While such desperate ploys
were treason only under Soviet standards, other “traitors” targeted travelers with bona
fide attempts to instigate espionage. Oleg Pen’kovskii, for example, made his first contact
with Western intelligence services by contacting two American exchange students who
delivered his message to the American embassy.680 Similar attempts, by amateurs
wishing to escape the Soviet Union as well as professional intelligence officers wishing
to defect, continued throughout the Cold War era.681 Attempts to seek out foreigners to
divulge secrets were apparently so common that, in locations where foreigners
congregated, the KGB employed baits (agents dressed as foreigners) to flush out potential
traitors.682
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Reading the Foreign Danger

In short, from an official Soviet standpoint, illicit interactions between foreigners and
disloyal elements represented a raw body of facts sufficient to classify foreign travel into
the USSR as a national security threat. However, in order to craft a policy response to
these raw facts, they had to be analyzed and weighed alongside additional factors,
ranging from the benefits of international exchanges to Soviet scientific and
technological development (as well as Soviet intelligence gathering operations),683 to the
reality that the Soviet opening up to the world coincided with a long era of political
stability. As all intelligence assessment does, this analysis took place in a specific
political, institutional, and epistemic context. Namely, it lay more or less entirely in the
hands of the KGB, the organization charged with all aspects of defending the Soviet
Union from peacetime dangers: intelligence gathering and assessment,
counterintelligence operations, border controls, and political secret policing.684
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The KGB, the successor organization to the Stalin-era NKVD, was formed at a
moment of crisis of legitimacy for Soviet security services. Faced with the necessity to
reformulate its raison d’etre in the wake of Khrushchev’s revelations of Stalin’s crimes
(and the ensuing drastic cuts of secret police payrolls) the defense of the Soviet state from
external enemies became absolutely central to the KGB’s mission statement - both as
public relations strategy and as a statement of organizational ethos.685 Thus, the
introduction to its official History stipulates that while in the early days of the Soviet
Republic the focus of the Cheka was on battling domestic enemies, after the war its main
task was “to vigilantly defend the achievements of socialism from the machinations of
imperialism, its intelligence and other services.”686 Vladimir Semichastnyi, the first KGB
Chairman appointed after Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin, proudly describes how he
reoriented the Soviet security services from Stalinist diversions to their proper focus “intelligence and counter-intelligence.”687 In his appearance before the anti-Stalinist 1962
Party Congress, his successor, Alexander Shelepin, emphasized that in the era of the allpeople’s state, the KGB “concentrates… [its] main efforts on exposing and firmly
suppressing the activities of hostile intelligence agencies.”688 Shelepin’s successor,
Andropov, repeated the same refrain, reminding his listeners that the KGB’s main task
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was to “closely observe the machinations of imperialist intelligence services” in a parting
talk before KGB senior cadres in 1981.689
More specifically, the KGB identified two major dangers stemming from foreign
“machinations.” First, the KGB was well-informed regarding Western uses of tourism for
subversive purposes. Tsvigun, in his Secret Front, accurately described the origins and
function of Operation Lincoln while warning Soviet scientists that “it would be irrational
to presume that every visitor is an intelligence officer… but we might find among them
some people who wouldn’t object to grab some secret information.”690
While potential espionage activity was described by Tsvigun in a nearly matterof-factly tone, KGB officers viewed Western efforts to encourage dissent in similar
terms to Liakin and Kochetov’s warnings – and many of them still view the link between
foreigners, foreign subversion, dissent, and moral dissolution as a key causal mechanism
for the Soviet collapse in their post-Soviet recollections. According to Semichasntyi, “as
early as during Khrushchev’s ‘Thaw’ American political strategists started shifting the
ball to our court [perenisti igru na nashe pole], and started building ‘an organized
resistance movement’.”691 N.M Golushko, a long-serving deputy chief of the KGB’s
notorious Fifth (ideological) Department, believes that throughout the post-Stalin era, the
West engaged in an elaborate psychological warfare campaign, by “assisting dissent and
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treason… subverting morals [and the] spiritual [nravstennye] foundations of society,
promoting ideological erosion [and] provoking a disruption of the self-defense instincts
of [our] country.”692 His long-serving commanding officer, General Filip Bobkov, applies
the same framework, crediting Western “agents of influence” for the destruction of the
Soviet Union in his many post-Soviet publications.693
Bobkov’s long career commenting on such matters provides us with an
opportunity to compare such retroactive assessments with contemporary information
delivered to both decision-makers and subordinates - a comparison that clearly
demonstrates the continuities of the Chekist mind. In a 1960 seminar on combatting
ideological diversions, Bobkov warned Lithuanian KGB cadres that Western secret
services aimed to “make use the international links of socialist countries with the
capitalist world (tourism, scientific and cultural exchanges)” in order to “negatively
influence ... student youth and the creative intelligentsia,” and thus “activate certain antiSoviet elements” and forge them into an opposition movement.694 16 years later, as head
of the Fifth Department, Bobkov kept to the same line. Shortly after the Soviet Union
signed the Helsinki Accords (which included, inter alia, a commitment to increased
international exchanges and tourism)695 he penned a memo to the Politburo on “negative
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phenomena among students and educated youth,” crediting such phenomena- ranging
from dissent to rising popular religiosity- to the influence of “hostile ideological centers”
which made use of travel and exchanges to “propagandize bourgeois philosophical values
[and]….ways of life… [to] make contacts with representatives of Soviet youth in order to
ideologically convert [obrabatyvat’] them.”696
While, as we see below, the KGB struggled to translate these warnings into
coherent action, these were not mere words but expressions of a deeply ingrained and
well-operationalized institutional ethos. Daily reports filed by the republican KGB to the
Ukrainian Politburo throughout the 1970s and 1980s on domestic life in the republic,
recently made available to researchers, are perhaps the best indication of the extent to
which this ethos guided practice. These reports invariably started with a careful statistical
breakdown of visiting foreigners. Even most a-political incidents involving foreigners
(accidents and heart attacks, suicides, and brawls between foreign students and Soviet
citizens) were reported to the Central Comittee.697 Reports on visits of journalists, foreign
delegations, and diplomats to Ukraine invariably included lists of questions asked by the
visitors. Such lists, no doubt useful in the ideological battles described in Chapter Two,
also revealed a barely hidden anxiety that curiosity about any aspect of Soviet life was,
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ipso-facto, an attempt to obtain information that was better kept hidden.698 At times, this
institutional paranoia veered into conspiracy theorizing: a report from spring 1972 on the
aftermath of a major cholera outbreak reveals that the republican investigative
department of the KGB devoted significant resources to tracing the possibility it was
caused by deliberate sabotage by Western travelers.699

Figure 4.1: Daily KGB Report, Ukraine, 6/5/1972
Source:DGA SBU, F. 16.
Concerns about the link between visiting foreigners and dissent were also
operationalized by the Ukrainian KGB. Here, it is again important to emphasize the
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distinction between facts regarding Western aid to Ukrainian dissent, of which the KGB
had many, and the analytic framework it used to assess the threats these facts represented.
Despite much mythologizing by both Soviet sources700 and nationalist historiography,701
recent scholarship heavily emphasizes the extent to which late Soviet non-conformism
was a product of domestic factors: tolerance for limited forms of pluralism, the Soviet
state’s promotion of certain cultural forms of nationalism, relatively low levels of
penetration of Soviet identities in the countryside, and even the popularity of Western
counter-culture in Ukrainian cities.702 Furthermore, as Zbiegnew Wojnowski recently
demonstrated, even in troublesome Western Ukraine, anti-Soviet activities hardly
threatened either political stability or the evolving “Sovietness” of the local population.703
While, as we have seen, concerns about the link between foreign machinations
and dissent go back at least to the late 1950s, the Ukrainian KGB’s understanding of the
problem seems to have been rooted in its reading of the crisis of 1968. As Amir Weiner
demonstrated, the events of the Prague Spring deepened endemic fears about
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nationalisms, social stability, and ideological pollution brought by both Western and
Eastern visitors to the Soviet West.704 Archival evidence shows that the Ukrainian KGB
faithfully transmitted information from Czechoslovak security services, which pinned
much of the blame on the unrest that led to the Prague Spring on the activities of Western
embassies and security services who allegedly planted “emissaries” disguised as tourists
and exchange students to help generate political opposition.705
Documents from the late 1960s and early 1970s show that such views of the
Prague Spring had lasting effects. Instead of a loosely organized constellation of groups
and individuals pursuing various agendas, the KGB wove all forms of dissent into a
looming opposition movement, funded and organized from abroad. According to this
image, diaspora Ukrainian nationalists, controlled by Western intelligence services, used
emissaries, visitors on tourist or exchange visas, to help organize and support the
dissident movement. Ukrainian nationalists, emboldened by this support, sought contacts
with Jewish nationalists (either controlled by the CIA or representatives of the forces that
controlled the CIA)706 and Moscow dissidents, (witting or unwitting accomplices of CIA
–backed Western journalists and diplomats), to create an all-Union oppositional force.707
This narrative shaped the security perceptions of the higher party leadership, with Petro
Shelest, the Ukrainian party leader, complaining to the all-Union Politburo that his
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republic was witnessing “a merger of the NTS with bourgeois nationalists of all shades
and colors and with Zionist elements…a forging of active political formations
[oppositional to the regime]”, and calling for “re-examination of certain aspects of our
policy regarding foreign tourists.”708
While there is no evidence that the restrictions on foreign tourism Shelest hinted
at ever materialized, the picture of an emerging opposition monolith controlled by foreign
“ideological centers” bankrollled by Western secret services, was convincing enough to
inspire a massive wave of arrests. Held under the tellingly codenamed “Operation Bloc,”
this wave was triggered by the arrest of the Belgian-Ukrainian student Yaroslav Dobosh,
a member of an émigré youth organization, who was indeed visiting Ukraine to make
contact with local dissidents. His interrogation focused heavily on obtaining information
implicating him in facilitating contacts between the émigré community and local
dissidents. Soviet arrestees were pressured to recount any and all encounters and
exchanges of information they had with diaspora Ukrainians, other foreigners, and
Moscow dissidents – and thus provide confirmatin to the threat inflation in which Soviet
security services engaged.709
While the massive wave of arrests that followed Operation Bloc never repeated
itself, similar fears animated Ukrainian KGB reports well into the perestroika era. Thus,
throughout the late 1970s, the Ukrainian KGB framed the activities of human rights
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activists, especially their connections to diplomats, journalists, and “emissaries,” as
attempts to revive the organizational structure allegedly dissolved by Operation Bloc.710
As late as 1987, KGB reports fretted that the Vatican used missionaries disguised as
tourists to manipulate Ukrainain Uniates into forming into Solidarność -style protests,711
and, more surprisingly, that the activities of local hippies, punks, and yoga practitioners
were enhanced by meetings with visiting members of Western pacifist organizations,
recruited by the CIA to dissolve “the ideological vigilance of Soviet youth.”712 Until the
very eve of the dissolution of Soviet power by a combination of grassroots activism and
elite rebellion, the agency charged with protecting it looked westward rather than inward
in determining the weaknesses it had to guard against.

A Bug in Every Room: Policing Foreigners713

If foreign presence in the Soviet Union seemed to the KGB the thin edge of a massive
wedge threatening the unity of the party and people, it was not without resources it could
employ to deter this danger. A massive state-within-a-state, the KGB had hundreds of
thousands of employees, significant numbers of uniformed troops in its border guards and
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other militarized units, still unknown numbers of informants and unofficial collaborators,
and a complex set of relationships with all institutions interacting with foreigners.714 It
was also a store of institutional knowledge about surveillance and population
management techniques that extended back at least to the Bolshevik Revolution.715
While some of these techniques- say, mass terror - were no longer available in its
dealings with the local population, let alone foreigners, the KGB could and did make use
of tried and true technologies of power to deal with the challenges of foreign travel. Such
methods included mobility controls (rezhim), surveillance of both foreigners and Soviet
people who had even fleeting contact with them, profilaktika, and, at times, “active
measures”- violence and provocations, aimed to dissuade or penalize especially difficult
“clients”- or turn foreigners into assets.
The most important asset Soviet coercive agencies possessed as they sought to
police foreigners was their rich experience of managing Soviet society by creating subgroups defined by disparate legal and administrative standings. In the strict legal sense,
foreigners on Soviet soil “enjoyed all the rights, privileges and obligations of Soviet
citizens,” as Soviet jurist M.M Boguslavskii put it.716 Just like Soviet citizens, foreigners
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were eligible for free healthcare, and just like them, they were bound by Article 70 of the
RSFSR criminal code, banning anti-Soviet activities and propaganda (a point that
Boguslavskii politely omits). Outlandish as such contention would doubtlessly have
occurred to Soviet people aware of the vast privileges afforded to foreigners, it contained
within it important seeds of truth. As Russian historian T.S Kondrat’eva points out, long
after the Soviet state ceased to officially categorize its citizenry according to their class
origins,717 Soviet society still contained multitudes of “regimented people” [rezhhimnye
liudi]. These groups, ranging from prisoners and collective farmers at the bottom to
academics and family members of senior Soviet officials at the top, all enjoyed (or
suffered) special rights, privileges, restrictions on and barriers to mobility that separated
them from the mass of the Soviet urban population.718 Seen from an angle informed by
this administrative practice, the challenge of managing foreigners seems less like an epic
clash between a totalitarian state and unruly “liberal subjects,” than a history of the
Soviet struggle to create the proper balance of privileges and restrictions to accommodate
an especially challenging group of “regimented people.”
What this meant in practice is that foreigners travelling on Soviet soil were
hemmed in by a thicket of regulations that strove to control where they went, what they
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could and could not do and (at least in theory) with whom they could interact. The most
obvious and famous of these restrictions was the practice of closing vast tracts of Soviet
soil to foreigners (and, sometimes, Soviet people). As geographer Pavel Postel shows,
these closed zones could be divided into three major categories. First, there were vast
tracks of Central Asia, the Far East and the Soviet Pacific that housed sensitive military
bases, nuclear bases and experiment zones, and similar sensitive locations that were
closed to foreign eyes. In the European parts of the Soviet Union, closed zones included
cities housing major defense industry factories (most famously, Gork’ii and the “rocket
city” of Dnepropetrovsk) and a plethora of closed zones surrounding “post boxes” erected
in the vicinity of major cities- most prominently Moscow and Leningrad. Finally, in areas
annexed by the Soviet Union in 1939-1945, nearly all space outside large cities was
closed to foreigners, due to both political sensitivity and prevalence of military bases. At
the end of the Soviet period, about 20% of Soviet territory was still closed to foreigners a land area roughly equivalent to India in size.719
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Figure 4.1: Closed Zones c. 1988 (Source: demoscope.ru)

The closed zones were but a tip of the iceberg in regards to attempts to regulate
foreigners’ movements and social interactions across the Soviet territory. Most
fundamentally, (again, just like Soviet citizens), even within open zones, foreigners
enjoyed freedom of movement only within strictly delineated boundaries. As late as
1959, travelers were still encumbered by Stalin-era regulations stipulating that foreigners
could travel between large cities only with a costly Intourist escort,720 and de-facto
banned the practice of photography by foreigners (foreigners were not allowed to take

On travel regulations, see “Dudorov to TsK KPSS, 1/5/1959,” GARF, f. 9401, op. 2, d. 506, l. 16. On
photography,
720

252

negatives across Soviet borders, while the Soviet Union’s only shop able to develop
Western-made film was unable to handle Kodak products).721
While such strict regulations were gone by the early 1960s, travel into and across
the Soviet Union remained a tightly regulated affair. Tourists were allowed only to travel
to areas included on their Intourist itineraries. Resident foreigners (journalists, diplomats,
and exchange scholars) were forbidden to travel more than 40 kilometers from their place
of residence without prior notification and permission from Soviet authorities.722An
Intourist booklet from the 1970s cited by journalist Robert Kaiser reminded Anglophone
travelers of the long list of don’ts maintained by Soviet authorities. Among other
regulations, travelers were banned from taking pictures from the windows of airplanes,
snapping photos of railroad stations and bridges, and importing “pornographic literature
and pictures… negatives…records, cinema films, manuscripts ... and other items harmful
to the Soviet Union politically and economically” – a fluid enough definition to include
anything Soviet authorities disdained.723
Such formal restrictions probably paled in comparison to the efforts Soviet
authorities took to de-facto isolate foreigners from Soviet society. As was the case with
privileged groups of Soviet citizens, some of this isolation stemmed from the foreigners’
place on top of the Soviet hierarchy of consumption. Arrangements like the exclusion of
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anything but the top Soviet hotels and restaurants from the list of facilities catering to
foreigners, separate housing for foreigners resident in large cities, Intourist’s service
bureaus charged with helping tourists navigate Soviet bureaucracy and deficits (for
instance by providing them with theatre tickets and thus obviating the need to stand in
lines with Soviet theater goers),724 foreign currency stores, separate facilities for
foreigners in airports and train stations were surely intended to make the Soviet
experience as pleasant as possible. However, they also served the important secondary
purpose of keeping foreigners (in theory at least) in well-controlled spaces.
Other aspects of informal mobility controls Soviet authorities imposed on
foreigners were not nearly as benign. Maps, charts, and telephone directories, due to both
secrecy considerations (as travelers and Sovietologists surmised)725 and paper deficits and
sloppy publishers (as Intourist officials complained)726 disorientated and confused
generations of travelers. Other barriers were physical. For instance, apartment buildings
housing resident foreigners were surrounded by walls and “defended” by militia block
posts, widely assumed to be manned by KGB agents, as were Western embassies.727 Still
more importantly, a plethora of regulations and informal norms governed foreigners’
access to Soviet people in whom they were interested. Tourists, for instance, were only
allowed proffesional contacts with specific Soviet citizens only by arrangement with
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Intourist (which, many of them felt, mostly sought to forestall such meetings).728
Especially after the vigilance campaign of the early 1960s, Soviet scholars and officials
who wished to meet foreigners could do so only after receiving security and secrecy
briefings (and could land in hot water for unsanctioned meetings).729 On a smaller scale,
generations of foreign scholars in the Soviet Union had to battle Soviet archivists and
librarians, pressured by the KGB to exhibit proper levels of suspicion of these “spies in
the archives.”730
While regulations and mobility controls could slow down the formation of illicit
links between foreigners and Soviet people, surveillance could provide an even more
valuable asset: the identities of both subversive foreigners and the Soviet people who
came into contact with them. And indeed, as a number of scholars have recently
demonstrated, the opening of the Soviet Union to the world was (not coincidentally)
concomitant to a profound transformation in the Soviet practice of surveillance.731 As we
have seen in chapter 3, after a short resurgence of surveillance as a social mobilization
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device, it was not used to forge a socialist body politic, nor did it serve to generate targets
for repression. Instead, surveillance became a form of social epidemiology, aiming to
penetrate every nook and cranny of Soviet society, in order to identify and disrupt
“diseased cells” before they spread further - and if possible, to make the formation of
such cells impossible. This refined method of surveillance was the perfect tool for
battling the spread of foreign-introduced ideological infection.
Perhaps the best way to assess the operational assumptions that overlay
surveillance of foreigners is to begin examining it via a somewhat indirect means, by
looking at how the KGB solved an obvious problem: given the ever-growing volume of
interactions between Soviet people and foreigners, how to tell which contacts were
innocent and which an indication of dangerous intentions? The answer seemed to be as
simple as it was telling: contacts with foreigners were ipso-facto seen as positive
indication of danger. In short, the KGB collected all the information about transnational
contacts it could, and sorted it later. Thus, a 1961 report from Vilnius, issued about a year
after the city was opened to foreign traffic, indicated that over 2,300 residents (about 1%
of the total population of the city)732 came into the KGB’s purview due to encounters
with foreigners. Of this number, 110 were put under close surveillance, several others
were undergoing a thorough examination (pod proverkoi), while the vast majority of
cases were deemed innocuous- and yet were maintained in the KGB’s card catalog of
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possible suspects.733 Inclusion in such card catalogs could have life-long implications,
even when such contacts were fleeting indeed. A Jewish Leningrader, for instance,
recounted to an American journalist that after he applied to immigrate to Israel, he was
invited to a meeting where he was questioned about an encounter he had had in a
bookstore with a Frenchman a decade earlier.734 If such stories could be discounted as
sour grapes or exaggeration to impress symphatetic foreigners, they fully mesh with
Bobkov’s account of a case in which a Donetsk resident was deemed perpetually suspect
(and thus denied promotions and travel abroad) after spending thirty minutes sharing a
park bench with a Canadian tourist – one of the few criticisms of the KGB culture of
suspicion Bobkov makes in his memoirs.735
Despite such retroactive misgivings about over-reach, it seems that during Soviet
times, the KGB had few qualms about the scope of its surveillance operations. The best,
if tantalizing, indication of the vast ambitions of its counter-intelligence empire is a copy
of an instruction sent from Moscow to the Lithuanian KGB (and to all other republican
organizations) on July 4, 1973. The instruction describes a soon-to-be-activated computer
program, code-named FORT-67, aimed at “gathering, processing, and distributing
information about contacts of foreigners from capitalist and developing countries with
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citizens of the Soviet Union.”736 Based on the description provided in the document, the
purpose of this project was to convert local index-card holdings into digital forms and
allow easier cross-checking and cross-referencing across regional and republican lines. In
theory, at least, this document describes a vast grid aimed to make any and all social
interactions between foreigners and Soviet people visible to proper authorities.
Whether they were digitized or remained in paper format, to function properly,
these databases needed a constant stream of input that could be generated only as long
foreigners were closely observed. Figures on the extent of the resources devoted to this
task are not easy to find, but scattered impressions from Lithuanian and Ukrainian
archives give a good image of the scale of the KGB’s surveillance effort. For example, in
the early 1970s during the summer season, the border crossing in the Ukrainian town of
Chop, on the Slovak-Hungarian-Ukrainian border triangle, saw about 600 tourists from
the West arriving daily. These were “served” by a staff of over 200 KGB officers, agents,
and “trustees” [doverennye litsa].737 From Chop, foreigners advanced in train cars
intensely surveilled by the KGB agents under guise of train conductors and passengers, as
well as wiretaps, with suspicious foreigners (and Soviet people who interacted with
foreigners) tagged for further surveillance.738 In the rural parts of the Donetsk oblast’, a
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local officer complained, agents and officers assigned to surveil the few foreigners
arriving to the area actually outnumbered the latter.739 The Crimean port city of Yalta
experienced a large seasonal migration of KGB officers and agents who received highly
desired hotel rooms in exchange for helping the local KGB department with surveillance
of foreigners and their contacts during the summer tourist season. 740 To the north, in
Lithuania, in the key strategic port city of Klaipeda, the local port and other facilities
visited by foreigners were honeycombed by surveillance: KGB agents tracked foreign
sailors on the streets and in port facilities, set up multiple safe houses and wiretapping
posts across town, worked to recruit Western crew members as agents to keep an eye on
prospective spies and saboteurs, and recruited hundreds of locals as agents tracking
“unhealthy elements” (nationalists, people with relatives in the West, Zionists, and so
forth) who came in contact with them.741
Institutions dealing with foreigners exhibited similar levels of penetration by state
security agents. For instance, UPDK [Upravlenie po oblsuzhivaniiu diplomaticheskogo
korpusa], the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ department that handled the needs of
foreign diplomats and other resident foreigners in Moscow, was widely assumed by its
“clientele” to be a cover for intelligence operations, no doubt for very good reasons,742
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while international departments of Soviet universities, handling exchange scholars from
the West and students from the developing world, were heavily staffed with officers from
the “active reserve” of the KGB (officers serving in and drawing their salary from a
different Soviet institution while still maintaining their KGB rank and benefits, a practice
that lasted well into the 1990s).743
Intourist, the Soviet institution that interacted with by far the largest number of
foreigners, naturally stood at the epicenter of this surveillance effort. From top to bottom,
involvement with the peculiar social ecology that sprouted in its facilities meant some
entanglement with official mechanisms of surveillance. At the very bottom of the
Intourist universe, both contemporary observers and post-Soviet accounts widely
presumed that in order to ply their trade, foreign currency prostitutes and black
marketeers had to provide information on their business partners to the KGB.744 The
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same was true of many other Intourist employees. For instance, the son of a dissident
who returned from exile in the early 1970s and was assigned to live in a communal
apartment in Kaluga recalls that he and his father were especially wary of a neighboring
couple, as both were employed in the local Intourist motels and thus, they surmised,
“were surely KGB, like all waiters in hard currency hotels.”745
For other people employed at or by Intourist, surveillance was part of the job description.
Doormen in Intourist hotels (many of whom were former or reserve KGB officers),746
charged with barring a-social elements from entering hotels, and the renowned
dezhurnye, “the elderly ladies who were positioned on every hotel floor to monitor the
comings and goings of guests,”747 were key to facilitating control over foreigners. In
hotel lobbies, officers of the KGB’s Seventh Department were in constant
communication with their “volunteer collaborators” and stood ready to take up visual
surveillance of suspicious foreigners (and their Soviet contacts) pointed out by the
latter.748 Other officers manned surveillance stations to which audio (and, later, video)749
signals from rooms housing suspect foreigners were broadcast. In Tallinn’s hotel Viru,
for instance, about on in five rooms was bugged.750 Similarly, in restaurants receiving
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foreigners, the latter were shunted to tables containing hidden microphones.751 This
activity was coordinated by “active reserve” KGB officers embedded in Intourist hotels
and departments. The responsibilities of these officers included “the study of foreign tour
firms and their representatives in order to locate persons of operational interest752…
Locating potentially suspicious foreigners ... [and] controlling foreign compliance with
travel regulation… Heightening the political vigilance of Intourist workers, discovering
their informal contacts with foreigners… [and] improving the KGB’s agent apparatus [i.e
recruiting more agents] among Intourist staff.” In theory at least, these officers served as
the central processing node of a powerful surveillance matrix that touched any and all
Soviet people who were involded with Intourist.753
Given their central role in accommodating foreign visitors, Intourist guides were
surely the most essential component of this surveillance matrix. And indeed, for any
Intourist guide, interactions with “men from the sixth floor,”754- security briefings,
background checks, inspections of morals and good behavior, and political education
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talks – were an inevitable price of employment.755 Furthermore, recollections of former
Intourist guides almost universally contain tales of KGB recruitment as a necessary rite
of passage.756 While, judging by the evidence of said recollections, as well as scattered
available figures,757 one could easily avoid recruitment as agent, none could escape the
duty of generating information for the KGB’s surveillance mechanisms. Specifically, an
Intourist guide recruited as an agent had to commit to reporting on colleagues behaving
suspiciously758and to seek out contacts with foreigners “of interest.”759 Other Intourist
guides might have avoided such unpleasant tasks but had to make a daily trip to the “sixth
floor” to fill out a report on the activities of their charges, their possible contacts with
unsavory elements, possible provocations, and responses to Soviet life. These reports,
filed in a special notebook accessible only to embedded KGB officers,760 were then
collated, processed, and and moved up the ladder to officers of the Second Chief
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Directorate, where they were scoured for behavioral irregularities and suspicious
activities – and, one presumes, served as foundations of myriad personal files.761
As was the case with the policing of Soviet society in the post-Stalin era, this
massive surveillance project operated like a giant funnel, gathering information on any
and all foreigners crossing Soviet soil, in order to identify a narrow band of targets that
could then be deterred, punished or “turned” with minimal disruptions to “channels of
tourism and international exchange.” In simpler terms, while information was gathered
on all foreigners, some selection criteria had to be applied to pick foreigners “eligible”
for profilaktika and active measures. In addition to resident foreigners (mostly diplomats
and journalists) these groups included, according to the KGB’s official textbook:
Officers of military, political and propaganda institutions... scientists seeking access to
institutions.. where the enemy could receive information that interests him, people seeking
informal relationships with Soviet officials, representatives of the ‘Civil Exchange Corps’762 and
‘Peace Corps,’ employees of ‘research institutes’ of politics, economics, sociology and various
‘Russia experts,’ members of reactionary student organizations and Zionist elements, tourists
interested in specific areas and population groups, people who know Russian and hide it, and
people on return trips to the Soviet Union. 763
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Moscow became a subject of intense surveillance, as his habit of taking long daily walks
seemed like a potential agent-running operation.764
What did profilaktika and “active measures” mean when applied to foreigners?
For once, for many, the knowledge that they were surveilled surely served exactly the
prophylactic purposes the KGB intended. With more obdurate souls, the KGB again used
tactics clearly borrowed from its domestic toolkit. The most basic and probably most
common disciplinary action taken by the KGB was a “friendly warning” issued to
misbehaving foreigners at Intourist offices or militia stations under KGB tutelage. 765 In
tune with its growing tendency to maintain legal fictions, often when encountering
troublesome foreigners, the KGB documented their behavior by taking in “complaints”
from Soviet citizens that could be used as a foundation for deportation and barring them
from further entry to the Soviet Union.766 Foreigners who especially aggrieved Soviet
authorities (most often journalists and exchange scholars) often underwent public
humiliation: publications in the Soviet media charging them with everything from
collaboration with the CIA to distributing pornography.767
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At times, Soviet authorities strayed from such psychological measures into the
realm of direct action. For instance, an Italian journalist in Vilnius, under suspicion
because of her meetings with staff members at the Italian embassy, “slander of Soviet
reality,” and taking photos of “negative aspects” of Soviet life, was the subject of an
elaborate operation. During her first visit to Vilnius, she was introduced to an agent
(“Neman”), who became friendly with her. On her second visit, alongside an Italian
diplomat “fond of women and drink,” Neman invited the two to a dinner in the company
of a local actress. As the Italians ate and drank, the KGB surrounded both the hotel and
restaurant with a surveillance squad to make sure they were not disturbed, entered her
room with a portable x-ray machine, and destroyed hundreds of negatives she kept
there.768 Perhaps employing similar methods, KGB agents in Moscow entered the hotel
rooms of foreigners keeping pornographic literature and confiscated it.769 Less subtly,
suspect foreigners often faced “resistance [otpor] from of “operative groups” made of
Komsomol aktiv members, agents and trustees” –everything from provocative questions
meant to stop them from interacting with Soviet people, to harassment and open
violence.770 Journalists, especially in the years of the “Andropov interlude,” were
especially likely to experience what British reporter Robin Knight described as “pitfalls
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des étrangers, 2/2/1970,” cited in Nicholas Werth (ed.) Rapports secrets soviétiques. La société russe dans
les documents confidentiels, 1921-1991 (Paris: Gallimard, 1997), 441. No record remains of what KGB
operatives did with this particular form of contraband.
770
“Spravka o rabote 2 otdela 2 upravleniia pri SM LSSSR v svete trebovanii Predsedatelia KGB pri SM
SSSR tov. Andropova Iu. V, dannykh na maiskom (1975 g.) soveshchanii rukovodiashchikh rabotnikiov
organov i voisk KGB,” LYA, f. k-41, p.1, b. 731, l. 173. On harassment of Western diplomats, see
Williams, Hot Seat, passim, and Barron, KGB, 121-122.
768
769

266

of the Soviet kind”- assaults ranging from defamation in the Soviet press, through violent
provocations, and up to charges of espionage (which however invariably led to
deportation, not imprisonment).771
Finally, the presence of foreigners on Soviet soil represented not only danger but
opportunity for Soviet secret services. Here, the KGB took a decidedly carrot and stick
approach. On the one hand, even in the cynical late Soviet period, attempts to show
foreigners the benefits of the Soviet way of life were not abandoned- and not left to
Intourist and Sputnik only, either. In Lithuania, for instance, participants in language
classes for North American heritage students lived inside a veritable bubble. The KGB
helped filter out unwanted candidates for the classes, helped the rectorate “plan the
leisure time of the foreign students to avoid contacts with undesirable people,” cleared
teachers assigned to the class and Soviet students sharing their dorms, made plans with
the Polish secret services to infiltrate the group with the latter’s “ethnic” agents,
wiretapped a significant proportion of the rooms students stayed in, made contacts with
relatives of incoming students to “make use of them for our benefit,” designed a plan for
KGB agents from among “youth and creative intelligentsia of the Lithuanian Republic”
to slake their thirst for intellectual contacts – all in order to “exert positive ideological
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influence.”772 On a more personalized level, members of nationalist émigré organizations,
including ones with a rich past as “emissaries” and book smugglers, were often given
repeated access to the republic, with the hope that extensive wooing and manipulation of
their disagreements with current tactics of their organizations would help divide émigré
communities at worst, or even better, turn them into KGB “sources.”773
Turning foes into friends was not, of course, the only or most common method of
turning visitors into assets. Agent recruitment was, in this regard, a far more cost-efficient
proposition. Here, again, carrots were at times used: the Lithuanian and Ukrainian KGB
both used tactics similar to the ones described above to entangle visiting “ethnic”
scientists and engineers, the best way these moderately-sized republican organs could aid
in the KGB’s crucial task of industrial espionage against the West.774 At other times,
more aggressive approaches were taken. Many visitors, were, for example, targeted by
alleged dissidents who asked for help or fartsovshchiki offering to exchange dollars to
rubles – a quick and easy way to get a foreigner in some trouble that could be used as
leverage against them in a recruitment attempt.775 More subtle KGB operatives
attempted to forge relationships with foreigners, hoping that fear of entanglement and
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exposure of their connections to the KGB could turn them into informants.776 Finally, and
most famously, the KGB specialized in the use of “honey traps” – sexual entrapment of
married or homosexual foreigners who were then blackmailed with scandal and exposure
and enticed to work for the KGB.777

Glitches in the Matrix: Surveillance as Late Soviet Institution

Round the clock surveillance, secret databases, break-ins and harassment, honey traps
and provocations: in theory at least, travel to the Soviet Union had the potential of
becoming an admixture of dystopian nightmare and a not particularly good spy movie.
And, from the point of view of the KGB, to reach its goals of minimizing interactions
between foreigners and Soviet people, maximizing the information it possessed on such
interactions, and turning this information to the Soviet state’s favor, creating the
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perception or (even better) reality of total surveillance would have plausibly counted as a
positive policy outcome.
To what extent was this outcome achieved? The isolation, surveillance, and
harassment of foreigners formed a significant ingredient in Cold War era accounts of life
in the Soviet Union. For instance, the Washington Post’s Anatole Shub, in his New Soviet
Tragedy (1969), complained that “the foreigner in Moscow... lives in a state of permanent
disability,” detailing life in fenced “ghettos,” the strain of every Soviet “local helper”
being a KGB informant, bugs in hotels rooms, wiretaps and blackmail attempts.778
Writers specializing in security services went even further. John Baron, the author of
KGB: the Work of Soviet Secret Agents, the defector testimonials-based best-seller
purporting to show the immense scope of the KGB, concluded that “a visitor
unknowingly passes through the Soviet Union wrapped in an invisible KGB cocoon that
effectively shields him from what the KGB does not want him to see or hear.”779 Less
prominent but much more piquant, David Lewis’ Sexspionage mingled details about
verifiable Soviet “honey trap” operations, and tales of the “secrets of sex schools,” where
“tall, blonde and elegant” Soviet seductresses were taught to ensnare Westerners.780
If such fare could be considered a blatant attempt to capitalize on prurience and
Cold War paranoia, there can be little doubt that surveillance left its imprint on the minds
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of foreigners in the Soviet Union. The Soviet practice of naming and shaming scholars
who aggravated them was rather efficient in breeding fear and anxiety.781 Soviet
hounding of unruly journalists during the Andropov interlude created a deep rift in the
Moscow reporter community between activist journalists who considered many of their
colleagues subservient to the Soviets and others who viewed activists as provocateurs
who broke the bounds of professional ethics.782 Even foreigners friendly to the Soviet
Union were discomfited with the level of surveillance they encountered.783 Less friendly
travelers also experienced strong levels of discomfort. For instance, then senatorial aide
Robert Kennedy refused to eat Soviet food or be “doctored by Communists” out of fear
of poisoning during his 1955 Central Asian trip.784 The renowned child writer Kay
Thompson, visiting Moscow in 1959, “got spooked” by the suspicion she was watched
everywhere, spending much of her time in the hotel rooms looking for bugs “in the
chandeliers ... below the rugs... in cupboards.”785 The anxiety produced by Soviet
surveillance did not disappear even 25 years later, when travel to the Soviet Union was a

781
782

On the psychological effects of such attacks, see Fitzpatrick, Spy in the Archives, 47.

Nagorsky, Reluctant Farewell.
The historian Ron Suny, for instance, reports he wished to ask his KGB shadows: “I’m on your side;
why are you following me?” Cited in Engerman, Know your Enemy, 175. See also Pereira,
“Vpechatleniia,” 231-232.
784
Robert Caro, The Years of Lindon Johnson. The Passage of Power (New York: Knopf, 2012), 235.
785
Sam Irvin, Kay Thompson: from Funny Face to Eloise. A Biography (New York: Simon and Schuster,
2010), 277-278. For similar example of dread among early cohorts of visitors See also “Protokol
soveshchaniia…16-18/5/1957” GARF, f. 9612, op. 2, d. 237, l. 50, for an example of Soviet officials
making fun of an American tourist for his “cowardice” and manic suspicion he was followed everywhere.
Tellingly, they gained this knowledge from his (presumably pilfered) diary.
783

271

mundane affair, with travelers reporting paranoia, isolation, and fear as inevitable
consequences of Soviet travel.786
And yet, such somber views of the Soviet Union were not universal or uniform.
Just like Soviet wags, many Westerners perceived spy games as just that –and had little
affection or respect for people who took them too seriously. Lewis’ Sexspionage was
savaged in the New York Times as “a skimpy little book…telling patriots to look for Reds
not underneath their bed, but inside it.”787 Polonsky and Taylor mercilessly spoofed
travelers who, like Thompson, succumbed to wiretapping mania: “his type, on entering
his hotel room, will spend the first ten minutes searching in tense silence for listening
devices. To flatter such guests' egos, the hotel management has equipped rooms with a
range of sinister and suspicious fittings… which very stupid people may knowledgeably
identify as sophisticated surveillance equipment.”788 Despite her fright in Moscow, the
bestseller Thompson produced after the visit, Eloise in Moscow, also recognized some of
the hilarity of spy games. The animated tale of the adventures of the titular six year old
“rich girl” in her hotel and around it, turns surveillance into a game: Eloise bribes the
dezhurnaia with a copy of Life magazine to get keys to other rooms, uses disguises to
confound KGB officers, speaks absurdities on the phone to confuse her KGB audience,
and then coyly reports to the American ambassador that she was “an absolutely darling
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Sweetnik.”789 Such playful attitudes were taken by at least some real-life travelers. One
art professor, for instance, recalled the mixture of thrill and danger generated by dealings
with informal artists, American collectors and the KGB: “It was a game. For me, it was
dangerous living.”790
Which of the two visions of foreign experience in the Soviet Union rings truer?
Without diminishing the psychological costs of Soviet surveillance so acutely felt by
some travelers, the evidence is overwhelming that the Soviet Union was hardly a
panopticon. On the most basic level, the mechanisms of evasion that defined so much of
Soviet life were not unknown to foreigners. As early as the mid-1950s, for instance,
foreign researchers easily bypassed Intourist restrictions regarding meetings with Soviet
colleagues by simply calling them up directly.791 Despite regulations to the contrary, the
economist Norman Dodge, in the Soviet Union on a tourist visa, researching a
dissertation on women in the Soviet economy, discovered that he could “just take a cab to
this and that Soviet institution” and obtain all the information he required.792 Just like
Soviet citizens, foreigners felt that paradoxically, it was the ubiquity of Soviet laws and
regulations that made them inconsequential- and if Soviet authorities tried to enforce
them, hardly a foreigner would remain on Soviet soil. The exchange scholar Norman
Pereira, for instance, lists the violations he committed as a matter of course without any
consequences:
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crossing Red Square in a car-only zone... visiting the Chinese embassy…participation in
religious propaganda (I visited the Moscow synagogue for Passover), meetings with
‘speculators and criminal elements’ (book and art sellers), secret meetings with unhealthy
elements (acquaintances who didn’t want to invite a foreigner home and met.. in a subway
station), violating travel restrictions (how should have I known that Khimky was outside
the allowed zone and had a military installation nearby?), and spreading “false
rumors”…(as I was expressing my own opinions). 793

Resource constraints and the structures of the Soviet economy represented another grain
of sand in the wheels of the Soviet surveillance machine. For once, as we’ve already
seen, such constraints made it impossible to keep Soviet people from Intourist hotels, or
foreigners from non-Intourist hotels. In restaurants serving foreigners, 100-150 rubles
slipped to the head waiter could get any “unhealthy element” a good table.794 While trains
were, as we have seen, heavily policed by the KGB, Soviet authorities didn’t seem to
have even tried to separate foreigners from Soviet citizens, and accounts of train car
transnational bonhomie are an important ingredient of many a Soviet-era travelogue.795
On board Soviet airplanes, seat deficits overrode concerns for keeping foreigners away
from “secret-bearers.”796 Even in theaters, foreigners faced an onslaught of scalpers and
desperate music-lovers that nullified the efforts of Intourist service bureaus.797
Furthermore, the KGB and other coercive agencies were not exempt from
resource constraints and coordination problems. On the one hand, as the official KGB
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textbook conceded, the KGB gathered too much information and included too many
people in its surveillance target lists.798 On the other hand, as a 1971 meeting of the
Ukrainian KGB leading cadres revealed, it lacked resources to maintain the level of
surveillance it found appropriate. Manpower for surveillance squads outside major cities
was insufficient.799 The KGB could not raise sufficient numbers of agents with
knowledge of relevant languages, and thus was forced to lower its recruitment
standards.800 A KGB officer in charge of border oversight estimated that due to lack of
manpower and backward technology, no more than 10% of printed materials smuggled
by foreigners was apprehended.801 The latter problem especially was noted by enemies of
Soviet power: one NTS official recalled that he had “eagles” drop clandestine methods of
smuggling literature, because “border guards thoroughly checked only 1 in 15 people.”802
In a similar spirit, Los-Angeles based literary agent Olga Andreeva-Carlyle, a key part of
Solzhenitsyn’s “invisible” network, recalled that she sent one of her “couriers” to conduct
negotiations and exchange materials with the author armed with an array of Bic pens to
bribe customs officials, and made sure he would arrive “on the eve of the October
Revolution celebrations. Everyone was drunk and the vigilance of customs and Intourist
was blunted.”803
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Most significantly, however, the KGB was a Soviet institution, functioning in a
planned economy, where quality could count more than quantity. Republican KGB
departments, bound by strictures of plans, conducted operations that one could safely
surmise brought no benefit to Soviet security. More than one traveler, for instance,
reported that the Uzbek KGB conducted crude provocations aimed to get foreigners into
brawls and then be either forced into signing documents testifying to their improprieties,
or pressed to provide “secret” information (which they did not possess).804 In the city of
Ulianovsk, one former Intourist guide recalled, local counter-intelligence officers,
convinced that, just like in Soviet practice, tourist groups were accompanied by secret
security minders, staged a provocation, arranging for one of the tourists to be seduced by
a local girl, and hoping that the alleged minder will reveal himself when he realizes he
“lost” a tourist.805
Intourist, yet again, represents a useful case study of the difficulties surveillance
faced in the late Soviet era. KGB officers often complained that Intourist officials were
too interested in “commercial” affairs and did not devote enough resources and attention
to the “political” aspects of their organization’s work.806 Doormen and dezhurnye often
were interested not so much in conducting intelligence work as in gathering “tribute”
from various unwanted elements in exchange for access to foreigners.807 While
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undoubtedly, their assistance in surveilling suspect foreigners as part of the tribute they
paid to the KGB in exchange for this graft opportunity, at times, even self-interest failed
to motivate them: a 1965 inspection of the hotel Natsional revealed that the dezhurnye
there were more interested in knitting than in maintaining order.808
Guides were a still more significant element of weakness in the surveillance
scheme. Especially in the late 1950s and 1960s, some of them seem to have taken their
surveillance tasks seriously, with reports from that era full of minute details of foreign
behavior and interactions with Soviet people.809As late as 1977, two senior guides sent to
an inspection tour of the Kazakh Intourist wrote back complaining that the local KGB
and military authorities let military officers mingle with tourists in a hotel bar in the
remote town of Taraz (Jambyl). However, we already seen how, even during the
ideologized Khrushchev years, Intourist guides often failed to meet the expectations set
by the KGB and their superiors, whether politically, culturally, or sexually. In line with
the general drift of Soviet culture, in later years, open dissent did become rare, but quiet
disobedience seems to have become the norm. Perhaps wishing to avoid unnecessary
headaches, some guides failed to report on tourists who left their groups, stayed outside
Intourist hotels, or entered closed regions.810 Going further, some Intourist guides
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protected their charges from KGB and vigilante attacks,811 helped tourists obtain
permission to visit closed areas under false pretenses,812 or took pride in their charges
thinking they were “the freest person they met in the Soviet Union.”813
Most importantly, however, at least according to post-Soviet recollections,
when it came to compliance with KGB regulations, many guides took “formal”
approaches. The Crimean guide Ivanova describes, for example, how compliance with
regulations banning tips from foreigners were subverted: “when the minder approaches
you, you give him some money from one pocket, but keep what’s in the other. If they ask
whether you got tips, you say “yes” give him some, and keep the rest for yourself... [And]
later, you could see them [the minders] sitting in hard currency bars, that’s for sure.”814 In
a similar vein, Kenderovskaia recalls being terrified when being summoned to the “sixth
floor” for the first time, but then discovered that the local embedded active reserve officer
was “a tiny little white-haired grandpa, and you wanted to do something nice for him.
Later we met the other chekists and they all looked old, slightly senile retired nice guys
[dobriakami] who simply adored playing spies.” And accordingly, when time came to file
her reports, “I had my stable of tourists making the pilgrimage from one report to the
other. Their names were monsieur Tomate... monsieur Konkombr, and my favorite
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monsieur Pamplemousse. They all exhibited uniform enthusiasm for the socialist way of
life and the Soviet foreign policy... due to the heroic efforts of their guide.”815 While such
accounts are clearly self-serving and probably should not be taken literally, they do jibe
with the memoirs of retired KGB General Oleg Kalugin, who found that cooperation
between Intourist and the KGB yielded “little if anything in way of concrete results.”816
These weaknesses no doubt blunted the effectiveness of KGB operations on the
margins. However, the most telling evidence about the gap between the analytic
assumptions behind the Soviet surveillance effort and its actual performance may be
gleamed in a more straightforward manner - by looking at facts and figures. Yearly
reports by the KGB to the Politburo, available to researchers from the mid-1970s to the
mid-1980s, provide a breakdown of the numbers of foreigners the KGB pinpointed as
spies or expelled for political, administrative, or criminal offenses. In 1976, 114
foreigners were deported from the Soviet Union and 11 foreigners were exposed as
officers of foreign intelligence services.817 In 1978, the former number declined to 100
and the number of “burned” intelligence officers declined to 2.818 In 1982, at the height of
the Andropov interlude, the combined number for both categories was 75.819
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Given what we know about the extent of illicit activities foreigners conducted on
Soviet soil and KGB knowledge of these activities, such numbers demand a better
explanation than operational weaknesses or late Soviet malaise. Rather, while direct
evidence on the considerations that led to this relative leniency is lacking, the vast
discrepancy between threat assessment and coercive action leads one to conclude that
policy choices were involved.
Crucially, no matter how hard the KGB borrowed policing mechanisms from
domestic practice and no matter their de-jure status, foreigners were de-facto imbued
with privileges and immunities no Soviet citizen enjoyed. First and foremost among these
was, of course, the right to exit the Soviet Union at will. To cite an easy example, while a
commitment to work for the KGB was very much an enforceable contract for a Soviet
citizen, Kalugin recalls that his review of dozens of cases involving victims of honey
traps showed that “few if any could be persuaded to fulfill their promises once they were
back in their native land.”820 Even in the USSR, the coercive capacity of the Soviet state
was limited, in both in formal and informal ways. The most a foreigner could typically
expect from entering a “closed” area was a short detention, followed by a fine and a
prophylactic talk at Intourist or other relevant organization.821 While buildings housing
foreigners were surrounded by militiamen and KGB operatives, Soviet people brave
enough to pass these barriers had temporary immunity, a fact which, for instance, allowed
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dissidents space and time to provide vital information that then was smuggled abroad by
friendly journalists.822 In a less inspiring manner, fartsovshchiki and sex workers knew
that leaving an Intourist hotel and walking to the nearest subway station alongside a
foreigner meant immunity from assaults by police, hotel staff, or druzhinniki.823
The band of immunity enjoyed by foreigners on Soviet soil was especially evident
when it came to the thorny issue of emissaries and “tourist-spies.” Here also,
circumstantial evidence suggests that after the vigilance campaign of the early 1960s was
rolled back, the Soviet state treaded very carefully.
The legal clash between the Soviet authorities and subversive foreigners began
shortly after the Powers shoot down. According to the authorized biography of General
Dimitrii Boiarov, then head of Ukrainian counterintelligence, the U-2 incident was
followed by a quick set-up of a defensive grid around military installations near roads
frequented by “tourist-spies.”824 And indeed, these traps ensnared a number of victims.
By October 1960 three Americans were charged with taking photos of secret activities or
military installations and deported.825 The following year, Soviet policies hardened.
American chemistry graduate student Marvin McKinnen was apprehended in Kiev while
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spying on Soviet military facilities in a Beetle purchased for him by American military
intelligence and was sentenced to 8 years in prison camps. He was shortly followed by
six West European tourists, imprisoned to terms of 7-13 years.826
While this harsh strategy was rather successful in signaling to Americans that
the Soviet Union would not tolerate espionage under guise of tourism, imprisoning
foreigners carried significant downsides. This became clear as early as November 1963,
when Yale political scientist Frederick Barghoorn was arrested on espionage charges in
Moscow- an arrest meant to facilitate an exchange of a Soviet agent recently arrested by
the KGB.827 Barghoorn’s detention, however, triggered massive negative coverage
abroad, and a direct threat from President Kennedy (who, KGB chief Semichastnyi
surmised, was a personal friend of Barghoorn)828 to cut off bilateral negotiations.829
Barghoorn was quickly released, with the whole issue laconically regarded as an “error”
at a Politburo meeting.830
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Whether due to such negative consequences or to other factors, cases in which
Soviet authorities arrested foreigners after Khrushchev’s ouster tended to follow similar
patterns. All imprisoned “tourist-spies” were released by the late 1960s.831 As British
historian Roger H. Platt shows, the last case of a tourist charged with espionage, the NTS
emissary Gerald Brooke, went to trial in 1965 due to British authorities’ refusal to
exchange him for a British couple caught spying for the Soviet Union.832 Two years later,
another NTS emissary, the Russian-Venezuelan student Nikolai Broks-Sokolov, was
indicted for a lesser charge: anti-Soviet propaganda, confessed to his “crime,”
condemned to a six-month suspended sentence, and deported from the Soviet Union.833
For the next decade and a half, similar patterns were exhibited in the cases of other
emissaries, usually released before trial in exchange for televised confessions (as was the
case with Yaroslav Dobosh, the main protagonist of the “Block” drama),834or as a display
of Soviet leniency.835 The only foreigner to be put on trial and convicted under Article 70
after the 1960s, the Belgian student Antoon Pype, caught distributing NTS leaflets on the
campus of LGU in an attempt to test Soviet commitment to the human rights basket of
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the Helsinki accords, was released 3 months after his conviction.836 As we’ve seen in
chapter 3, charges for espionage could also be filed against foreigners- with the last such
case being the arrest and weeks-long detention of journalist Nicholas Daniloff occurring
as late as 1986.837 Without denigrating the dire straits such arrests and detentions caused
for foreigners so affected, the small number of these incidents, and rapid releases of all
involved, indicate that they were exceptions that proved the rule regarding foreigners’
band of immunity.
Even more strikingly, some evidence exists that coercive agencies did not win
all battles to control foreign traffic flows. For instance, the KGB, MVD and the Red
Army all objected to loosening restrictions on unescorted car travel by foreigners in the
Western USSSR in the late 1950s - to no avail.838 While as late as 1988/9, the KGB
successfully held off demands from local authorities to open closed cities to foreign
travel and investment,839 it also lost its share of fights over geographic restrictions – for
instance over opening the Moscow-Vladimir road to tourists in the mid-1960s (despite
the many “post-boxes” strewn around the area).840
Most crucially, enough evidence exists to offer the tantalizing possibility that,
from the 1960s onward, KGB efforts to reduce the flow of foreign traffic to the Soviet
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Union were largely unsuccessful. Less than a year after the Prague events, Andropov sent
out a circular letter to republican-level KGB chiefs regarding the ideological dangers of
incoming tourism. While the letter itself is not available, local reactions make its contents
is clear: in Estonia, the only Soviet republic where foreign tourism formed a significant
sector of the economy, the local KGB demanded to reduce the number of foreigners
visiting the Republic. When local leadership resisted this push, it agreed to a compromise
under which the number of tourists was to be kept from rising for several years.841A
Lithuanian KGB follow-up to an Andropov talk to leading KGB cadres in May 1975
indicates that, even at the height of détente, the KGB was pushing for more mobility
restrictions on foreigners.842 In a 1981 talk, Andropov conceded that this push failed
during the détente years: “after Helsinki… we faced pressure from the West, which tried
to use the accords to pursue its own goals… we had to make some concessions, loosening
restrictions [poslablenie rezhima] ... for diplomats, journalists, tourists”; concessions, he
implied, could be safely rolled back.843 This rollback was evident already in the run-up to
the Olympics, as the Soviet leadership, inundated with KGB warnings that “imperialists,”
Zionists, and émigré organizations planned to use Olympic travelers as provocateurs, 844
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banned 6,000 foreigners from entering the Soviet Union, and extended wait periods for
receiving tourist visas.845
During Andropov’s short reign and its aftermath, attempts to restrict foreign
travel both into and around the Soviet Union gained more traction. For the first time, the
Soviet leadership took active steps to curtail travel to the Soviet Union from both socialist
and capitalist countries. Least surprising in this regard was treatment of travel from
Poland: during the Solidarność crisis, travel from Poland to the Soviet Union was
significantly curtailed—by as much as 40%—in the wake of reports on subversive
activities of Polish tourists all across the Western borderlands.846 Furthermore, as
Zbigniew Wojnowksy discovered, Soviet authorities cracked down on Polish citizens in
the Soviet Union: in the city of L’viv, over 1,500 KGB troops stopped more than 21,000
Polish tourists from entering the town without permission in 1981 alone.847 Even more
strikingly, Soviet authorities, who had long been bothered by the “nationalist” activity of
Romanian tourists in Moldova,848 stopped receiving Romanian tourists, unless they
purchased a tour of other Soviet republics.849
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Finally, under Andropov, for the first time since the Stalinist period, Soviet
authorities were willing to sacrifice international exchanges and hard currency proceeds
on the altar of state security. Dimitrii Volkogonov, who examined Andropov’s “special
file” for the period when he served as General Secretary, found that in 1983 the Soviet
Foreign Ministry and the KGB were working on new procedures to make obtaining
Soviet visas for Americans more difficult.850 In the subsequent year, Karl Vaino, First
Secretary of the Estonian Communist Party, wrote to Intourist Chairman Abrasimov,
proposing to reduce Finnish travel to the Republic from 80,000 people in 1983 to 45,000
in 1986, by making travel to Estonia more expensive and less pleasant, as “the vast
majority of visiting Finns evade their itineraries… establish friendly, family, contrabandspeculative or intimate connections” with locals.851

Conclusion

The chronological coincidence of these victories for vigilance with Andropov’s reign
emphasizes the seriousness with which Soviet coercive agencies took the problem of
foreign travel. And yet, they were incomplete and transitory in ways that highlight the
limits of coercion and surveillance in the late Soviet period. Even as it was receiving
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pressure from Estonia to reduce tourism there, Intourist celebrated capitalist tourist traffic
hitting 40% of its total tourist base, and planned further expansion in the second half of
the 1980s.852 By that time, needless to say, both tourist travel and illicit activities by
Finnish and Polish travelers were in full recovery.853 Finally, not only did the KGB fail to
prevent the 1986 Council of Ministers resolution that allowed Soviet people to stay at
Intourist hotels (see Chapter 3), but in Lithuania at least, it was involved in efforts to
effectively implement it.854
So, in the end, we are forced to return to the question with which we started:
why did the KGB’s actions did not track with its threat assesment? Why did the KGB
struggle to translate the dire warnings of its security services regarding the dangers of
foreign presence on Soviet soil, and the vast resources it piled into surveilling foreigners
failed to translate into resolute coercive action? Some answers come easily to mind. A
cynic might conclude that, to the extent the KGB was a massive bureaucracy operating in
a state that enjoyed an exceptional level of political stability, resolving the problem once
and for all would have put a crimp on the job prospects of many a KGB officer, whose
livelihood after all depended on maintaining high levels of threat perception among
Soviet policy-makers. More seriously, a quick counter-factual thought experiment could
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suggest that the question itself is misplaced, as the late Soviet political stability might
very well have been a product of the KGB’s surveillance efforts –and that without such
efforts, the impact of contact with the outside world would have been much more
explosive - as it became in 1985-1991.
However, the discrepancy between the genuine alarm exhibited by the KGB
regarding the subversive effects of foreigners on Soviet soil and the relatively feeble
nature of its response requires more than snide dismissal or counter-factual analysis.
Rather, we must seek to understand the political calculus that restrained Soviet policymakers from taking appropriate measures to address the problem. Unfortunately, sources
produced by the Soviet state are to no avail here, as the entire rhetorical intent of KGB
reportage was to convince the decision-makers that its efforts were indeed appropriate to
the level of threat the Soviet state faced. We are faced therefore with a conundrum: how
do we explain this curious gap between perceptions and actions, when the documents at
our possession ignore the very existence of this gap? To truly answer our question, we
must gain a better understanding of the constraints under which the KGB operated in an
era of growing Soviet integration with the outside world – constaints about which the
KGB’s archives are conspiciously silent. Therefore we would do well to give a second
look at Dash, or rather at the way the movement which he represented used transnational
mobility to challenge the total sovereignty claims of the Soviet state.
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Chapter 5: Transnational Nationalists: ‘Zionist Emissaries’ Tour the
Soviet Union

As Dash was struggling for his pants in Kharkiv in 1972, he was participating in a
historical confrontation that went back to the late 19th century, and was about to enter its
culminating point. As Yuri Slezkine argues in his Jewish Century, the 20th century
history of Russian/Soviet Jewry was defined by a long argument between Zionists,
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Bolsheviks, and proponents of emigration to America, or, as he memorably put it, the
children of Tevye’s daughters Chava, Hodl, and Beilke.855
While in the first 40 years of Soviet history, this argument seemed to have been
resolved by a mixture of persuasion, social mobility, and violence in favor of the
Bolsheviks, since 1948 and the founding of the State of Israel, the Zionists rejoined the
fray. After 1967, when Israeli access to Soviet soil was strictly curtailed, American Jews
put their considerable weight on the side of the Zionists, forging the transnational Soviet
Jewry movement – perhaps the Cold War’s most prominent and succesful human rights
campaign.856 Dash’s mission to meet and greet the refuseniks was an expression of its
most powerful tactic- using international travel to support, publicize and, to the extent
possible, protect Soviet Jewish activists.
In other words, this tactic was a powerful confirmation of the KGB’s institutional
view of the dangers of foreign travel. The history of the encounter between the KGB,
Jewish nationalists, and foreign “emissaries” was therefore a microcosm of the Soviet
state’s struggle to accommodate both its institutional paranoia and the realities of the
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post-Stalin era. In this chapter, I sketch out the history of the transnational effort to aid
the Soviet Jewish emigration movement, survey KGB’s lackluster policy response to it,
and demonstrate how this reaction was limited by the uses transnational Zionist activists
made of channels of international exchange to constrain the policy choices of Soviet
security services.

Diplomats from Lilienblum Street: 1948-1967.

From its inception in 1948, the year in which Israel obtained its independence, the
struggle for Soviet-Jewish allegiance was rooted in a clash between two claims: the
Soviet state’s claim for the absolute, undivided allegiance of its citizenry, and the Jewish
state’s claim on the hearts and minds of Jews everywhere. In less florid language, for
both ideological and demographic reasons, fostering nationalist, Zionist and migratory
moods among Soviet Jews was a central Israeli foreign policy goal.857 In the context of
the xenophobic late Stalinist period, this was a direct provocation - and still ran
contradictory to Soviet claims of multiethnic harmony in the more tolerant era that
followed.
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These realities came to a head already during the short “honeymoon” between the
Soviet Union and the fledgling Jewish state in 1948/9. While the USSR provided Israeli
forces with arms and diplomatic support, authorities were alarmed by numerous instances
of Soviet Jews who wrote them with offers to volunteer and fight in Palestine.858 Even
more concerning from this point of view was the mass outpouring of Moscow Jews who
came to see the Israeli ambassador, Golda Meir, attending High Holidays services there
in September 1948.859 Images of tens of thousands of Soviet Jews massing on Moscow
streets rapidly became a powerful international Zionist icon (they were, for instance, until
recently featured on Israeli currency).860 In the Soviet Union, however, they served as
catalyst for the anti-cosmopolitan campaigns of Stalin’s later years, and contributed to the
anti-Semitic atmosphere that culminated in the “Doctor’s plot” of early 1953.861 In these
circumstances, it was little wonder that the only Israelis on Soviet soil, members of the
small Israeli legation, didn’t make much headway in connecting to Soviet Jews. And
even that link with Soviet Jewry was broken when the Soviet Union broke diplomatic
relations with Israel in February 1953, in the midst of the Doctor’s Plot crisis, and the
antisemitic campaign it wrought.862
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Figure 5.1: Crowd outside the Moscow Synagogue, September 1948)
(Source: israelim.ru)

Faced with these realities, Israeli authorities could do little but to prepare the
ground for future activities. In 1952, the Israeli government established a clandestine
organization named Lishkat ha-kesher [Bureau of Communications], better known as
Nativ [the Path], charged with facilitating clandestine Zionist organizations Eastern
Europe, seeking ways to establish connections with Soviet Jewry, and swaying Western
public opinion to apply pressure on Soviet authorities to open their borders. 863

863

The archival files of Nativ are not available for researchers. However, two of its chiefs released their
memoirs: Nehemiah Levanon, ha-Kod: Nativ (Tel Aviv: ‘Am ‘oved, 1995), Ya'kov (Yasha) Kedmi,
Milhamot avudot (Tel-Aviv: Matar, 2011). Additionally, the Israeli Association for the Documentation of

294

Stalin’s death and the attendant Soviet opening up to the world completely
transformed the environment in which Nativ operated. Within months, the Israeli
embassy in Moscow was reopened, with a number of Nativ operatives, most prominently
Nehemiah Levanon, its future long-serving head, installed there under diplomatic
cover.864 Various bilateral agreements, from cultural accords to commercial deals that
brought Israeli oranges (and sailors) to Odessa ports, allowed Israelis access to Soviet
soil.865 Israeli tourists, most often former residents of the Soviet West coming to see
relatives, started appearing in Soviet cities.
These circumstances proved an opening for the renewal of Israeli activity on
Soviet soil. In secret, Nativ’s diplomats worked to re-establish connections to prewar
Zionist circles, hoping that they could be used as nuclei of a new Zionist movement.866
Beyond this clandestine activity, they traveled widely through the Soviet periphery,
hoping that encounters with living, breathing Israelis would trigger Soviet Jews’ interest
in Israel and Zionism. In the Ukrainian town of Chernovtsy, for instance, a local official
complained that representatives of the Israeli embassy publicized the ambassador’s visit
to the local synagogue by “walking around town with a large bag emblazoned with the

Clandestine Activity for Soviet Jewry, a veterans’ association of Nativ, published an oral history of its
operations, a condensed version of an unpublished, and probably classified, manuscript (Shelomoh Rosner,
Bi Netiv ha-demamah: ha-peilut ha-hashai le-maan yehudei Verit ha-Moatsot (Jerusalem: Merkaz Zalman
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word ‘Israel’ in large foreign [i.e. Hebrew] script” – and were successful in triggering an
extremely high (and mixed gender) turnout in the local synagogue.867
With or without Nativ nudging, Israelis without diplomatic passports also
participated in this effort. For instance, the “Zionist” section of the Israeli delegation to
the Moscow Youth festival was staffed with many recent IDF veterans with connections
to Nativ.868 According to Levanon, all Israeli ships sailing to Odessa had a Nativ agent on
board, charged with meeting local Jews and distributing Israeli paraphernalia (postcards,
pins, and religious objects).869 Additionally, Israeli tourists, Soviet authorities fretted,
were spreading Zionist propaganda and bourgeois influence by everything from
providing their relatives with Israeli gifts to favorably comparing kibbutzim with Soviet
kolkhozes.870
All this activity had an important, but limited effect on the development of Soviet
Jewish nationalism. As was the case in Chernovtsy, Israeli diplomats were often mobbed
by crowds of excited Jews during their travels. Israeli travelers to Moscow, even ones
friendly to the Soviets,871 invariably reported being the objects of intense interest by
Soviet Jews.872
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As was the case with so many other transnational phenomena, the Moscow Youth
Festival was the most brilliant success the Israeli strategy of encounters enjoyed. Many
young Soviet Jews made the trip to Moscow, as individuals or informal delegations, for
the specific purpose of meeting the Israeli delegation.873 Despite efforts to isolate it and
close surveillance of its members,874 Komsomol authorities had to concede that “many
Muscovite groups are causing a sensation [azhiotazh] around this delegation. They gather
around theaters, hotels, invite the Israelis to their apartments… declare they are being
repressed and dream of moving to Israel.”875 Overall, Israeli historian Bin’yamin Pinkus
estimates that the Israeli delegation was seen by between 30 and 60 thousand Soviet
Jews.876
While it would be misguided to presume that anyone who excitedly met an Israeli
was ipso-facto a Zionist, such encounters often provided emotional jolts that provided
intense nationalist awakenings. One fan of the delegation, Minsk's Anatolii Rubin, recalls
that “I did not budge [from the delegation] for days… I just wanted to look at them, at
boys and girls like me, but proud and independent.”877 Other festival attendees
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interviewed by historian Vladislav Zubok adored the Israelis for their “demeanor, dignity,
[and] fearlessness.”878
Such emotional effects were not limited to 1957 alone. Nine years later, Hillel
Butman, a young Leningrader who recently lost his job as militia officer, experienced a
near-mystical rapture while watching a show by an Israeli mime acting out the role of a
soldier planting a flag on enemy soil:
This was the people of Israel in its difficult march forward! This is an IDF [the Israeli
Army] soldier, fighting alone against ten [foes], because the dozens of young guys sitting
in this concert hall cannot run to his side and support this flag with dozens of powerful
hands.879

One on one encounters also produced moments of ideological activation. During his
short posting in Moscow, Levanon was able to seed several Zionist circles centered on
venerable activists who now started raising a new generation of acolytes.880 The Riga
scientist German Branover recounts a chance encounter with Israeli diplomats in a
restaurant, leading to a trip to the embassy where he received holy books and ritual items,
as well as instructions to go on a conspiratorial trip to the resort town of Sochi where he
was supposed to discuss avenues for further activity.881 During his festival stay, Rubin
received Zionist literature and Hebrew textbooks from his interlocutors, and promptly
established a Zionist network when he came home to Minsk.882 Even people who did not
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have direct contacts with Israelis were influenced by their presence: Yasha Kazakov, then
a Moscow teenager, recalls being energized by materials a friend received from an Israeli
diplomat, and deciding on the spot to become a Zionist.883
And yet, it would be an error to classify Israeli-led activities on Soviet soil as an
unqualified success. By 1967, Soviet-Jewish emigration numbers were still a trickle, and
the Zionist movement there numbered, at most, several hundred people, heavily
concentrated in less-assimilated areas of the Soviet West, rather than the major cities
where the majority of the Soviet Jewish population lived.884 Communications between
the Zionist underground and the Israelis were encumbered not only by the realities of a
closely surveilled society, but also by ideological factors. Israeli diplomats were almost
universally members of the ruling socialist party Mapai and advocated quiet work behind
the scenes with minimal aggravation of Soviet authorities, while local activists,
overwhelmingly from areas where the Zionist movement before the war was dominated
by right wing revisionists, were suspicious of all varieties of socialism, in sympathy with
revisionist (i.e, right wing) Zionism, and favored bold action.885
Most importantly, however, the structure of the early Zionist movement in the
Soviet Union - clandestine, reliant on communications with a single center and dependent
on support from an easily identifiable group of foreigners - was ideally designed for
surveillance and disruption by the KGB. In a clear signal about the limits of what Soviet
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authorities would tolerate, Levanon was detained in the apartment of a Moscow Zionist in
July 1955, and was shortly afterwards deported along with 3 other diplomats.886 His
principal Moscow contact, the 70 year old Zionist Ilia Guberman, was condemned for
espionage and spent 5 years in Soviet prison camps.887
Beyond such crudities, the comings and goings of Israeli diplomats were of
course well-known to the KGB, and they could be targeted for harassment and
profilaktika. For instance, a few months after the Moscow Festival, the Israeli diplomat
Eliyahu Hazan was attacked in Izvestiia as a “Diplomat from Lilienblum Street,” (the
location of Israel’s black dollar market, as Izvestiia helpfully pointed out to its readers),
for allegedly trying to bribe Odessa Jews with money and gifts in order to convert them
to Zionism – a familiar enough refrain to the general Soviet public. 888
Even worse from the Israeli point of view, the majority of their contacts were
from the Soviet West, where the Soviet security services achieved full penetration of preannexation political structures.889 The reactivation of Zionist circles therefore meant the
reactivation of long implanted agents. In Vilnius, one such agent, code-name Gobis,
managed to infiltrate the local “delegation” to the Moscow Youth Festival. There, he met
other “Jewish nationalists” and attended their meetings with Israeli diplomats. During his
conversation with the latter, he agreed to become one of their Lithuanian contacts. This
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connection was kept alive for at least 3 additional years, giving the KGB hours of
recordings of Israeli diplomats engaging in conspiratorial activities, the names of some of
their contacts, and helping it frustrate efforts to set up a Zionist network in Vilnius.890
Beyond such conspiratorial feats, the KGB possessed other means to penetrate
and disrupt ties between Soviet Jews and Israelis. In Vilnius, KGB documents show that
every Israeli tourist who came to town, their contacts, and sometimes their contacts’
contacts, became targets of KGB backgrounds checks, agent “penetration,” wiretaps and
other forms of close surveillance.891 The few Israeli tourists who visited Leningrad and
Moscow reported similar levels of surveillance that was often made visible to its targets
in a way that was clearly meant to deliver a message to them and their relatives.892 The
Israeli author Hanoch Bartov highlights the escalating nature of Soviet surveillance and
the effective chilling effects it created. During a train trip he and a small group of friends
took from the Polish border to Moscow and Leningrad, they first were able to freely
converse with small groups of Jews on the station platforms. And then:
After our second or third stop, nervousness was everywhere. In one town, I saw how the gate to
the station was locked. In another, men dressed in suits scattered small groups of people curious
about us. Whenever our accordion started playing some Hebrew song, some volunteer orchestra
drowned it.... Even in the smallest, poorest station, we saw the men in the brown suits and straw
hats … standing everywhere. They eavesdropped on every conversation. Their presence was
nuisance enough. But when things got far enough they started snatching our gifts: a pin, a record,
a postcard.893
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In short, as long as the international links of the Soviet Zionist movement depended on
the thin thread of a handful of Israeli tourists and diplomats operating under near-total
surveillance, its practical achievements were minimal.

Zionist Emissaries Are Coming: 1967-1989

1967 was the great watershed of the Soviet Jewry movement. Pride over the Israeli
triumph, horror at the stridently pro-Arab Soviet stance,894 the rising tide of anti-Jewish
discrimination,895 and (later and to a lesser extent) the crushing of the Prague Spring896
greatly expanded the numbers of Soviet Jews willing to emigrate. In parallel in the West,
the electrifying effects on the Six Day War created hosts of Western Jews eager to do
their part for the Jewish people – and the plight of Soviet Jewry was a cause on which
they could focus their energies (not without some guidance from Nativ’s North American
emissaries).897
In these circumstances, Butman finally managed to fulfill his patriotic dreams.
Now a leading activist of the clandestine Leningrad Zionist Committee, he helped plan a
hijacking of a small Soviet airliner in order to take it to Sweden (or, as other members of
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the group realistically assessed, to publicize the emigration cause by martyrdom).898
Soviet authorities, well aware of the operation, easily foiled it - and provoked a
maelstrom of international outrage by condemning three members of the group to death
and others to long imprisonment.899 Seeking to assuage Western public opinion in the era
of détente, Soviet authorities allowed increasing numbers of Jews, predominantly from
the Baltic States, the Caucasus and Central Asia, to emigrate. And yet, for a variety of
reasons having to do with concerns about brain drain, leaks of state secrets, objections of
Arab allies, and the deleterious effects of mass emigration on Soviet claims of the
superiority of the socialist way of life, many (and by the early 1980s, the vast majority of)
prospective emigrants - predominantly young, educated, formerly assimilated urbanites –
were refused permission to go, with some of them stuck in the limbo of “refusal” for
periods of ten to twenty years. 900
Thus, unwittingly, Soviet authorities provided Nativ with everything it worked for
before 1967: hundreds of thousands of Jews willing to emigrate, a cohesive, activist,
several-thousand-large nationalist community to serve as focal point of the emigration
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movement,901 and a sympathetic body of victims and martyrs to present to the
movement’s Western supporters. Its operatives, however, faced a significant hurdle: with
the end of Soviet-Israeli diplomatic and cultural ties after the Soviet Union broke
diplomatic relations with Israel in 1967, they lost their main means of access to Soviet
soil.
Fortunately for its purposes, Nativ, well aware of the limitations of the Israelionly strategy, already had a wealth of experience with using third country citizens for its
purposes. Already in early 1953, Levanon, then serving in Stockholm, bribed Swedish
marine officers en route to Leningrad (perhaps the very same officers that so excited
Mikhail German) to send letters with fake return addresses to old Zionist activists to let
them known they were not forgotten.902 In 1965, Nativ, possibly alarmed at the relative
success the Soviet authorities had in convincing visiting religious Jewish-American
delegations that all was well with Soviet Jewry,903 helped organize the trip of a young
French journalist, Elie Wiesel, to the Soviet Union to write a report on the conditions
Jews faced there. The text he produced, The Jews of Silence, rapidly became a rallying
cry and a central slogan of the international Soviet Jewry movement.904
Activist Soviet Jews also grasped the possibilities offered by foreign presence in
the USSR. On June 11th, 1967, Yasha Kazakov, already a semi-regular visitor to the
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Israeli embassy, decided that “if the Soviet Union breaks relations with Israel, I will
break relations with the Soviet Union,” stormed into the US embassy, delivering a letter
to the UN General Secretary in which he renounced his Soviet citizenship and demanded
the right emigrate. After this action failed to garner media attention, Kazakov approached
a group of German students and asked them to deliver a similar letter to an Israeli
newspaper – and in short order became an international media sensation.905 In a similar
maneuver, Butman and his Leningrad cohort, wishing to consult with Israel before they
started their adventure, intercepted an Israeli-Norwegian tourist who, like many other
young visitors,906 attended the local synagogue, briefed them on their plans, and had him
deliver word to Israel (they subsequently rejected Israeli advice to abandon the operationa sympthomathic miscommunication between the cautious Israelis and the radical Soviet
activists).907
According to available evidence, Nativ began systematically employing the
possibilities offered by travelers from third countries starting in the 1960s. Initially, this
group, the so-called tourist-emissaries (tayarim-shelihim), consisted of well-briefed,
tightly controlled members of the international religious Zionist movement Bnei-Akiva,
recruited by Levanon’s subordinate Aryeh Krol (incidentally, one of the few religious
non-socialists serving in Nativ). Their initial mission, based on hints in the memoiristic
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literature, focused not so much on providing aid or Zionist literature, as on helping to
keep the lid on often unruly activists.908
The consequences of the 1967 war vastly increased the numbers and importance
of the tourist-emissaries. As mentioned above, the Soviet stance on the Six Day war
provoked a wave of fury among American Jewry. Intourist guides in Moldova, for
instance, picked up anger among American-Jewish tourists that their tourist dollars went
“towards aiding Arab states against Israel.”909 Indeed, according to Levanon, American
Jewish organizations pondered a partial travel boycott of the Soviet Union- and were
quickly dissuaded by the Israelis who knew that without Western travelers, they would
lose their last links to Soviet Jewish activists.910 Over the next 25 years, as emigration
from the Soviet Union grew into a stream, then slowed to a trickle and finally surged into
a flood, Western travelers became the main connecting link between Soviet activists and
their international support networks.
While Nativ kept closely interacting with American activists throughout the Cold
War era, the growing scope of the American movement for Soviet Jewery mean that
Zionist travel to the Soviet Union soon escaped the narrow bounds of its control. Until
the end of the Cold War, Nativ kept its corps of tourist-emissaries under tight control,
preferring to send travelers with either an Israeli background or strong religious
affiliations, and provided them with military-style briefings and elaborate cover stories.
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No less importantly, it made strenuous efforts to steer them towards Soviet activists who
towed the Israeli “line.”911 American travelers were divided between “establishment”
organizations, operating under the umbrella of the National Conference for Soviet Jewry
and an array of “rebel” organizations, like the Student Struggle for Soviet Jewry, or even
the Rabbi Meir Kahane’s extremist Jewish Defense League.912 While originally, the
recruitment and preparation of American travelers were conducted by Nativ’s “local
friends,”913 by that the numbers and demographic profiles of American travelers seemed
to have sharply exceeded Nativ’s strict guidelines by the mid 1970s.914 Additionally,
many travelers lacking any particular affiliation also saw it as their duty to visit
refuseniks.915 Finally, outside the Zionist framework of the rest of the movement, ultraorthodox rabbis and activists worked to form Hasidic and ultra-orthodox communities on
Soviet soil.916 While hard figures are hard to assess, given the lack of access to Nativ’s
archive and the polycentric nature of the movement elsewhere, a safe assumption would
put the number of travelers to the USSR involved with Jewish affairs in a given year at
somewhere in the mid to low thousands by the 1980s.917
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Whatever their disparate agendas, taken as a whole, Zionist travel and the support
systems that underlay it amounted to a substantial transnational network linked to the
small world of Soviet Jewish activists in a myriad ways that made their plight much
easier than it would otherwise have been. Travelers heading to the Soviet Union were
thoroughly briefed, given names and addresses of refuseniks they were to visit and their
spiritual and material needs. Upon return, they composed trip reports, including
everything from the names and addresses of Jews who wished to emigrate and required
invitations from Israeli “relatives” (which were provided by Nativ- with very few actual
relatives involved in the effort), through rumors of Soviet clampdowns and relaxations,
and up to impromptu studies of demand on the Soviet black market.918 This information
was then processed, used to brief subsequent cohorts of travelers, and fed into files that
contained thousands of names of refuseniks and used to target them with aid packages,
letters and phone calls of support, future visits, and post-emigration aid.919
Inside Soviet borders, foreign travelers did much to reverse the the isolation,
ostracism, and penury that Soviet authorities attempted to impose on the refuseniks.
Travelers provided refuseniks (who as general rule lost their jobs) with various forms of
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material aid: Berezka certificates, cash, items to resell on black markets (ranging from
ever popular jeans to cameras and video equipment).920 Medical doctors were dispatched
to provide medications and emergency treatments for seriously ill refuseniks.921 On one
occasion, when a group of female refuseniks needed urgent gynecological checkups, a
“battle group” [desant] of doctors arrived from the United States to aid them.922 A stream
of artifacts brought by foreigners: Zionist literature, religious items, Israeli music
recordings, and, most crucially, Hebrew textbooks and study aids, helped spread the
Zionist gospel among hundreds of thousands of Soviet Jews, the majority of whom never
met a foreigner.923 Leon Uris’ Zionist epic Exodus was a key text in this regard, with its
fictionalized Hebrew warriors serving to inspire activists in the same way flesh-andblood Israelis did in 1957.924 This samizdat hit, first brought to the Soviet Union in the
mid -1960s by a tourist and widely circulating among the Jewish community there for the
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subsequent two decades,925 was still high on the list of items emissaries were
recommended to bring to the Soviet Union in the 1980s.926
Zionist travelers could, of course, do little about the things that made life in
refusal harrowing: unemployment, fear, systematic harassment, uncertainty about the
future, and regrets about lost years.927 Their aid to Jews imprisoned for Zionist activities
(iternationally renowned as Prisoners of Zion) was limited to aid packages and endless
streams of complaints to Soviet authorities. Yet, to the extent the policy goal of the
Soviet authorities was to use hardship, isolation, and repression to keep Jews away from
the emigration movement, the activities of Zionist travelers did much to frustrate these
policy goals. On the most basic level, the fact that foreigners cared enough about their
fate to risk a visit to their Soviet apartments could provide immense emotional sustenance
to people the Soviet state was determined to mark as pariahs.928 As Martin Gilbert wrote
in his account of encounters with refuseniks in 1983: “all of them are given hope when
visitors come, listen to their stories and talk about them when they come back to the
West” (and indeed, even though it was composed at a moment when Jewish emigration
was shut down by the authorities, Gilbert’s pointedly titled The Jews of Hope was a
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celebration of the end of isolation and fear Wiesel bemoaned).929 Refusenik activists
shared these lofty sentiments, at least to some extent: trip reports reveal that activists
whom Western travelers frequented attempted to direct tourist traffic to less “popular”
activists who they felt needed encouragement and support, lest they drop out of the
movement.930
On a more practical level, foreign aid was crucial for the survival and growth of
myriad informal institutions that allowed the refuseniks to live life outside the bounds of
the Soviet system. To cite one telling example, Leningrad refusenik Mikhail Beizer
developed a small private alternative to Intourist itineraries, taking both foreign travelers
and curious Soviet Jews on tours of “Jewish Leningrad.”931 On a far grander scale, given
the lack of Hebrew materials in the Soviet Union, the thriving network of Hebrew
teachers and classes (ulpanim) found it very hard to function without large amounts of
teaching aids brought into the Soviet Union by foreigners.932 Scientific seminars
organized by refusenik scientists and scholars were given protection and publicity by
visiting foreign colleagues, who also helped academic refuseniks keep their careers alive
by bringing scientific publications into and smuggling manuscripts out of the Soviet
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Union.933 In a more mundane fashion, by the 1980s, the joint efforts of refusenik doctors,
Western doctors on Zionist visits, and other visitors who brought as much medications as
the former groups required, led to the formation of an impromptu medical service which
probably provided its clients with better treatment than anything non-elite Soviet citizens
could access.934 Finally, by controlling access to foreigners and transforming certain
activists into distribution nodes of goods received from them, Nativ and establishment
American organizations could at least attempt to create a rough hierarchy among the
cantakerous Soviet Zionist community. This practice inevitably stirred both political
disagreements and personal jealousies,935 but also helped created a leadership structure,
conflict resolution methods, and international coordination mechanism that helped forge
the refuseniks into a coherent (if contentious) political force.936
Perhaps the best evidence for the possibilities transnational networks allowed for
the development of sub-cultures thoroughly alien to Soviet norms was the emergence of a
small, but thriving ultra-Orthodox communities in Moscow and Leningrad by the 1980s.
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Unlike the surviving pre Stalin-era orthodox communities in the Soviet periphery,
Leningrad and Moscow-based Orthodox groups were dominated by young, university
educated, Russian-speaking refuseniks, who had little preexisting knowledge of Jewish
law. 937 Given the tight control Soviet authorities exercised over religious education and
the manufacture of items necessary for Jewish religious life (kosher food, religious
literature, and prayer artifacts), support from abroad was the only viable path for living an
Orthodox life in the USSR. Foreign emissaries brought the Soviet Orthodox items as
diverse as compilations of Talmudic law, kosher cookbooks, and canned food.938 Even
more importantly, roving American rabbis conducted classes on Jewish law, brought and
interpreted halakhic literature, gave classes about the intricacies of running kosher
households, circumcised babies, and trained Soviet Jews to become the functional
equivalent of rabbis for their underground communities.939 And thus, in the seventh
decade of Soviet power, in Leningrad, the cradle of the Revolution, some of Hodl’s
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grandchildren experienced something completely unforeseen: a happy Hassidic
childhood.940

Battling the “Zionist Peddlers”

From the point of view of Soviet authorities, all this activity amounted to an embodiment
of their darkest fears regarding foreign subversion: an international movement, supported
by a hostile government manipulating a range of “ideological centers,” sending
thousands (and, cumulatively over a period of 25 years, probably tens of thousands) of
emissaries on missions of subversion that aided and abetted activities that shattered the
Soviet myth of the “friendship of the peoples,” highlighted the willingness of many
Soviet citizens to abandon the socialist way of life, and promoted activities that the
Soviet state deemed just short of treason.
As was usually the case with dangers rooted in the Soviet opening up to the
world, Soviet security authorities read this threat through the prism of institutional
paranoia, perceiving the Jewish problem in the context of an alleged global conspiracy
against Soviet power. Thus, the KGB’s 1956 textbook on the history of the clash between
Zionism and Soviet power lays clear lines of continuity between the ideological
foundations of Zionism (“a tool of the bourgeoisie...aiming to distract workers from class
struggle”) its past as “an ally of Denikin and Petliura despite the appalling massacres that
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their forces conducted in the Jewish shtetls of Ukraine and Belorussia,” and its present, in
which “foreign-based ideological Zionist centers are being used by the American and
Israeli secret services to subvert Soviet power.” 941
Here again, such ideologically inflected statements were not mere phraseology,
but building blocks of Soviet threat assessment. Semichstastnyi, for instance, considered
Nativ’s activities in Eastern Europe (which he ascribes to the more famous Israeli service
Mossad) as model that the CIA employed in its mission to create Soviet domestic
opposition to Soviet power.942 In a 1972 note to the Politburo, Andropov found that “the
Zionists wish to ideologically influence the Jewish population of the Soviet Union… to
create a nationalist underground... [in order to] change our Middle Eastern policy, cause
harm to the friendship of the peoples, to turn a segment of the Jewish population into a
destabilizing social factor [and] provoke anti-Semitic feelings among the Soviet
population.943 As Edith Rogovin-Frankel points out, even minor issues involving the
Zionist movement, like the case of an Intourist guide who maintained a correspondence
with a family in Israel and showed signs of studying Hebrew, crossed Andropov’s desk
and was rerouted to the highest level of Soviet decision-makers – a sure sign of the
seriousness with which the problem was perceived by the KGB.944 Even as late as 1989,
Vladimir Kryuchkov, the last KGB Chairman, complained that Jewish nationalists and
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“foreign agitators” were key elements in the efforts of “a-social elements” to slander the
KGB.945
In Ukraine, local KGB officers took an even more dour view of the Zionist
problem. The republican KGB considered the refuseniks as a key element in the
ephemeral dissenting coalition they fretted about in the years leading up to Operation
Block.946 Such fears lasted well in the 1980s. During Israel’s invasion of Lebanon (19821985), for instance, the Ukrainian KGB informed the republican Politburo that the
Israelis included in their ranks volunteers raised by the nationalist Ukrainian organization
OUN (presumably in order to use military experience they gained for future guerilla
operations on Soviet soil).947 In a darker key, for some KGB officers, Zionism seemed
less like the tool of an imperialist conspiracy and more like its puppet-master. Thus, one
report to the Ukrainian Politburo mentioned as a matter of fact that “Zionists” controlled
many large American monopolies and “up to 80% of international press agencies.”948
Given these fears, it was little wonder that Soviet efforts to combat Zionism
escalated after 1967. While before 1967, Israeli diplomats and emissaries were handled
by the general counter-intelligence mechanism, in 1971, the Fifth Directorate set up a
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Jewish section meant to battle Zionism and migratory moods.949 This, of course, did not
absolve territorial departments from joining the struggle.950 On the propaganda front,
Soviet authorities organized a vast anti-Zionist machine, featuring everything from the
“pocket Jewish” Anti-Zionist Committee of the Soviet Public to rabid anti-Semitic
elements among the Russian nationalist wing of the Soviet establishment.951
Therefore, despite the vast expansion of the Zionist network in the Soviet Union,
the level of surveillance its members could expect more than kept pace. Zionist meetings
were closely surveilled, wiretapped, and penetrated by KGB agents who both reported on
the movement and helped sow dissension and suspicion among authentic activists.952
Zionist “emissaries” were well-tracked, and even their future intentions were sometimes
known by the KGB.953 Foreign travelers reported constant low-level harassment: “tails”
that made no attempt to disguise themselves, midnight phone calls, and attempts to
provoke illegal activities.954 Detentions, KGB interrogation, and deportations were a
relatively rare but profoundly unpleasant possibility.955 In a less formal way, KGB
949
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operatives, especially in the periphery, were not above the occasional “hooligan”
beatings.956
Beyond such crudities (or for that matter, the clumsy Dash operation), the KGB
was more than capable of conducting complex operations that caused real harm to the
Soviet Jewry movement. For instance, a KGB agent recruited in the 1960s and given
permission to move to Israel in order to infiltrate the international Zionist movement957
was able to convince various Western Zionist organizations of the existence of a
powerful Zionist cell in Odessa, which was in fact controlled by the KGB. The members
of that “cell” then were used to divert material aid from authentic Zionist circles, to
provide false information to visiting American Jews, and, most importantly, to sow
doubts regarding the authenticity of other Ukrainian cells.958 In a much more famous
operation, Aleksandr Lipavskii, a doctor from Uzbekistan recruited as a KGB agent in the
1960s to rescue his father (a factory manager charged with “economic crimes”), was able
to infiltrate Zionist circles in Moscow and to become especially close to the Anatoly
Shcharanskii.959 On March 5, 1977, Lipavskii “published” an open letter in Izvestiia in
which he (or his KGB ghost writer) charged that Moscow Zionists were in the employ of
the CIA, providing it with state secrets and anti-Soviet slander- in exchange for dollars,
gifts, Western consumer goods, and lavish attention received from sundry Western
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visitors – an open letter that served as the opening shot of Shcharanskii’s unprecedented
trial for espionage.960
While even by the standards of Soviet treatment of dissidents, Shcharanskii’s trial
was unusual, the tactic of associating refuseniks with foreign money was perhaps the best
rhetorical weapon the Soviet Union could employ in the battle against transnational
Zionism. In the same way the rhetorical weight of the official assault on black marketeers
and frivolous girls under Khrushchev was transposed onto dissidents in the 1970s, the
language of Khrushchev’s campaign against “economic criminals,” and the stereotypes
that underpinned it were repurposed to combat would-be emigrants.
In this spirit, the Soviet media broke its silence on the topic of cross-border illicit
trade when it involved would-be Jewish immigrants. Sovetskaia kul’tura, in a story with
the tellingly dehumanizing title “Insects,” relayed the story of one David Klain, a former
Soviet citizen and now a Budapest factory manager, who used business travel to Moscow
to smuggle out the ill-gotten gains of Jewish-Azeri black marketeers so that they would
have them available upon emigration.961 Even more telling was the story of one Leviev,
as told by Trud. Leviev, a Tadjiki Jew, made a fortune from textile and jewelry trade with
the connivance of local authorities. He then used foreigners to smuggle his profits abroad,
to prepare for his pending emigration. Leviev, the story did not neglect to mention, was
the recipient of wartime medals, even though “he spent the War running around Central
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Asia and did not spend a day in the military,” an open allusion to the widespread myth
Soviet Jews avoided frontline service by escaping to Central Asia during the war.962
In a similar vein, Zionist travelers bearing gifts for refuseniks could serve as the
living embodiment of the official argument about Soviet Zionism as product of avarice
and treason. Mark Glotter, a 20 year old University of Michigan student, was one
emissary cast into such role. Glotter, an activist associated with the Student Struggle for
Soviet Jewry, was a member of a student tour group of the Soviet Union, doubling as a
Zionist emissary. In Kyiv, days before his scheduled departure home, he sustained food
poisoning,963 along with other members of the group. In the hospital, he recalls, he was
kept isolated from other patients, and underwent interrogation by men who he presumed
were KGB officers, who pressured him to write a letter of apology to the Soviet people
for his actions. After his release from the hospital, he discovered other members of his
group were sick, and was interrogated again, in his hotel group, and threatened with
lengthy imprisonment. Pressured and alone, he agreed to provide a televised confession
of his crimes against the Soviet people, and was subsequently deported.964 His
confession was broadcast on Ukrainian TV, incorporated into a widely circulating White
Book on Zionist subversion released by the Soviet authorities,965 and featured in a 1977
central Soviet television documentary entitled “The Soul Buyers” [Skupshchiki dush] which
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was widely interpreted by Soviet Zionists as an indication of a coming clampdown.966 And
indeed, in the following years, Soviet audiences were treated to similar “confessions” by seized
travelers.967
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Figure 5.2, Figure 5.3: Books, gifts and Money Seized from “Emissaries” and
Marc Glotter providing his confession
(Source: Belaia Kniga. Fakty, svidetelstva, Dokumenty).

Deterring the KGB

All this meant that the KGB enjoyed a share of successes in its battles against “Zionist
peddlers.” Even among Nativ’s carefully selected emissaries, some chose to abort their
missions when they hit Soviet soil, and others reported feelings of constant anxiety that
made every-day occurrences (like fartsovshchiki approaching to buy one’s jeans), or even
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approaches by Jews with a smattering of Hebrew appear as a KGB trap.968 Among the
refuseniks, uncertainty about who was and wasn’t a KGB source was a fact of life. 969
And yet, the fact remains that, even during the darkest years of the Soviet Zionist
movement (during the Andropov interlude, when emigration was frozen, “Prisoners of
Zion” proliferated, and many refuseniks gave up on the cause), foreign traffic didn’t taper
off, and the informal institutional environment built by Soviet activists and their Western
supporters remained intact. Briefing materials for travelers emphasized prudence, safety
protocols, and avoiding possible provocations and violations of Soviet law- but gave no
impression that they were preparing travelers for physical danger.970 A series of oral history
interviews with former emissaries reveal that few of them fretted or feared travel to the
Soviet Union.971 As one British-Israeli traveler put it: “the worst they could do was put me
on a plane to London, and I wasn’t enjoying the Soviet Union much anyway.” 972 And
indeed, during the 25-year run of Zionist travel, not a single visitor was put on trial for
violations of Article 70 of the Soviet constitution.
So, we are back to the inquiry with which we finished chapter 4. Why did the Soviet
alarm at Zionist machinations and awareness of the crucial role of Zionist travelers in
supporting the refuseniks not translate into resolute action? As usual, Soviet archives are
rather quiet on the question – and, with the exception of the KGB, the general impression
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they create is that many Soviet officials charged with dealing with the problem simply
wished it didn’t exist, at least as far as the paperwork they failed to produce about it
indicates.973 And yet, the scope of the Soviet Jewry Movement activities, the multitude of
fronts on which it engaged the Soviet state, and the vast paper trail it left behind, allow us
to infer some answers.
A good starting point is a series of Soviet actions, or rather pointed inactions, in the
summer and spring of 1973. In March of that year, Yossi Klein Halevi, a self-described
“Jewish extremist” loosely associated with Meir Kahane’s JDL (which made a name for
itself by direct action and terrorist activities aimed at Soviet targets on American soilincluding Intourist offices),974 organized a group trip of young Jewish radicals to the Soviet
Union, planning a demonstration at the central OVIR (the MVD unit in charge of
processing emigration requests). The purpose of the trip was to get arrested, and if possible
sent to Siberia, in order to become martyrs for the plight of Soviet Jewry. The group
infiltrated OVIR’s Moscow offices, unfurled its banners, and quickly got ejected from the
building by burly men who pointedly avoided arresting the Americans. Knowing that they
“simply had to be arrested,” Klein Halevi’s group loitered outside- until they were taken
to a police station, where they were given cookies, and then told that as first-time violators,
they were forgiven and could go back to their tour.975 A few months later, another group
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of JDL activists, in transit from New York to Istanbul and lacking Soviet visas, touched
down in Sheremetyevo airport, planning to break out to Moscow. Soviet authorities
responded by providing them with rooms at the airport hotel, and “proper leisure, food,
phone calls to the American embassy and offer of Moscow sightseeing in a bus with a tour
guide.”976
There was little mystery regarding why these two incidents unfolded the way they
did: in Klein-Halevi’s case, seven US Senators were in Moscow for official meetings on
the implications of the Jackson-Vannick amendment and were glad to be seen giving
support for the fight for Soviet Jewry,977 and the Sheremetyevo visit coincided with
Nixon’s visit to Moscow, and “neither side was interested in any excesses.”978
To the extent they cared about détente and bilateral negotiations, JDL-style
radicals considered such activities a betrayal of Soviet Jewry to “new Pharaohs.”979
However, while it was by no means enthusiastic about détente, the larger Soviet Jewry
movement, on both sides of the Iron Curtain, was very well aware that détente
represented only one facet of the larger Soviet bet on international exchanges as a
modernization strategy.980 Armed with this insight, the international Soviet Jewry
movement proved capable of leveraging networks of exchange that increasingly bound
the Soviet Union to the rest of global society, by both shrewdly nestling itself into these
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networks, and by being able to credibly threaten damage to them in case of Soviet
counter-attack.
Put simply, if in the 1950s Soviet authorities could relatively easily deter
provincial Soviet Jews - for whom emigration was a distant dream and the KGB a
concrete reality - from contacting rare Israeli visitors in small and easily surrounded train
stations, things were much more difficult in the 1970s and 1980s. The refusenik
movement was concentrated in the largest Soviet cities, where even the KGB’s enormous
resources did not allow it to surveil every foreigner at will.981 Zionist activists were welleducated professionals with good understanding of how Western media operated and also
had relatively little to lose from meeting with foreigners, having given up on their Soviet
careers.982 High profile visitors- most commonly American politicians,983 but also
celebrities such as the Indian maestro Zubin Mehta,984 relished opportunities to
demonstrate support for refuseniks. Celebrities who were hesitant to raise the issue while
on Soviet soil faced quiet pressure to do so. In March 1975, for instance, the NCSJ
appealed to the cast of the high-profile Soviet-American co-production Blue Bird, then in
Leningrad, with the request that they publicly address the cases of two young imprisoned
refuseniks.985 A decade later the star cast-member of Blue Bird, Jane Fonda, back in the
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USSR on a peace tour, was the first foreigner to meet with recently released Prisoner of
Zion Ida Nudel.986 While the KGB could sometimes prevent such meetings by detaining
refuseniks or forcing them to go out of town during high profile foreign visits,987 on the
rare occasions when such high profile personae were detained, reputational damages to
the Soviet Union were surely greater than any possible benefit it gained in deterrence.988
Even travelers not protected by celebrity status had ways to deter the Soviets from
punitive action. Most importantly, Zionist travelers (and their briefers) were surely
familiar with the Soviet dissident tactic of demanding the Soviet state respect its own
laws, and, unlike the former, had enough leverage to use it to their benefit.989 Thus, when
the Canadian human rights lawyer Irving Cotler, going to a wedding in a Moscow suburb
with the refusenik scientist Aleksandr Lerner, was detained for going into a closed area,
he stumped his Soviet interrogators by pointing out his permission slip from Intourist and
refusing to speak or sign any documents. After several hours, they had little choice but to
bring him back to his hotel and instruct him to leave the country. Even before he landed
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in London, the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs lodged an official complaint with
Soviet authorities.990
Beyond such dramatic encounters, foreigners had a myriad of ways to confound
Soviet authorities. To take an easy example, even if they knew that the person they were
examining was a Zionist emissary, customs officers could hardly confiscate the cameras
they carried (which were then gifted to refuseniks). Soviet regulations prohibited the
distribution of religious items and anti-Soviet propaganda, but foreigners were allowed to
bring these items for personal use. And how were customs officials to know which piece
of luggage was Zionist contraband and which intended for personal use?991 Nativ also
could manipulate the subtleties of Soviet customs: since tourists coming Scandinavia on
cruise ships enjoyed visa free travel, and faced much less stringent customs procedures
than foreigners coming through other channels, it engaged Christian Zionists from
Scandinavia to lease small tourist boats, sail up the Baltic shore, and off-load rucksacks
full of Zionist literature at every stop.992
Intourist was naturally the site of many such clashes, with its guides as general
rule pretending to ignore what tourists did in their free time, as long as they avoided
arguments and made a show of attending sightseeing tours, recalled one frequent Zionist
traveler.993 Even in the early 1980s, when Intourist attempted to clamp down on evasive
tourists, all they needed to do was “invent some stomach illness or headache. Intourist
990
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guides knew what was going on, but they were understanding.”994 During the 1980s, as
assaults on refuseniks and emissaries intensified, Soviet Jewry movement organizers
were applying behind-the-scenes pressure on Intourist’s foreign partners to complain
about the negative effects such attacks were having on travel to the Soviet Union. In June
1986, NCSJ filed suit against Intourist’s American affiliate arguing consumer fraud,
alleging that Intourist made false claims in its advertisement by promising that its clients
would not be harassed in the Soviet Union.995
And here lay the rub: Zionist travelers could leverage not only nebulous concepts
like global public opinion but could harm specific Soviet interests in ways that required
Soviet elites to find ways to live with their presence on Soviet soil. For instance, while
direct evidence for such a contention is lacking, it doesn’t take much imagination to
realize that youth exchanges like the one Levitt went on would have run aground if
Soviet authorities attempted to screen them for Jewish travelers- and thus deny many a
Komsomol official and/or KGB asset an American junket.996 Inna Rubin-Akselrod,
widow of the sinologist Vitalii Rubin, a leading refusenik activist, recalls that Western
sinologists working on behalf of her husband convinced the World Congress of Oriental
Studies to choose Mexico City over Moscow as a location for its 1976 meeting. This
choice of venue gravely embarrassed Bobojon Ghafurov, the functionary in charge of
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Soviet oriental studies. Ghafurov, as Masha Kirasirova shows,997 was a figure of some
influence in Soviet foreign policy circles, and a hit to his prestige could plausibly have
played a part in Rubin receiving permission to emigrate shortly afterwards.998
While these personalized issues must remain a matter of speculation, we are on
more solid ground when examining the use Western activists made of international
exchange systems to get inside Soviet borders. For instance, as the Soviet Union was
lobbying the International Olympic Committee to host the Olympics, it could not deny
Israeli athletes access to competitions in the Soviet Union, and the latter could use the
opportunity to “distribute propaganda magazines, religious literature and religious
artifacts.”999 On a far grander scale, when in 1977, four years after the Soviet Union
joined the International Copyright Convention, and two years after the Helsinki accords,
Soviet officials were negotiating with American publishers in an attempt to get them to
join the inaugural Moscow Book Fair, the Americans, under pressure from American
Jewish organizations, agreed to join only on the condition that Israeli publishers were
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invited too.1000 In the Fair itself, The Israelis, in collaboration with friendly Westerners,
staged a massive operation that distributed vast amounts of “Zionist propaganda” to
hundreds of local Jews who swarmed their exhibits.1001
Professional exchanges were perhaps the most important forum in which Western
activists could demonstrate their strength. Lawyers were one key group in this regard.
Like Cotler, many Jewish North American lawyers were passionately committed to the
refusenik cause, perhaps because it allowed them to resolve the tension between their
universalistic commitment to human rights and their attachment to the Jewish nation.1002
Soviet Jewry movement lawyers offered their services to defend refuseniks, publicized
their plight in the West, and incessantly badgered Soviet officials about the Jewish
emigration problem.1003 And if the Soviets had in mind to use visa regulations or other
procedures to cut off the stream of such visitors, movement lawyers had powerful
counter-measures in their disposal. When in the early 1980s, Soviet legal authorities,
seeking to integrate their practices into international commercial law, negotiated with the
American Bar Association the establishment of a formal exchange agreement, a
considerable faction of the latter body vowed to resist any such agreement unless all
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American legal delegations to the Soviet Union contained a strong contingent of lawyers
associated with the Soviet Jewry movement.1004
Scientific, cultural, and technological exchanges were an even more important
ingredient of networks connecting the Soviet Union to the outside world that the Soviet
Jewry movement could leverage for its purposes. Some of the actions taken by exchange
scholars were individualized. Thus, for instance, one French philosopher who repeatedly
travelled to the Soviet Union under the aegis of the French Academy of Sciences
exchange agreement with its Soviet counterpart, not only taught classes on Jewish
tradition to refuseniks but also browbeat Soviet customs officers into letting her keep
notes with information she received from the refuseniks, arguing they were part of her
research project and thus protected by the exchange agreement.1005 Collective actions
were even more powerful: In 1980, an organization devoted to the release of Anatolii
Shcharanskii and dissident physicists Andrei Sakharov and Yuri Orlov was able to get
8,000 scientists to cease visits and other forms of cooperation with the Soviet Union.1006
As was often the case, visits to the Soviet Union proved an even more powerful
tool of the Soviet Jewry movement than travel boycotts. We have already noted above the
crucial contribution of scientific networks in fostering aid to the refuseniks. At times,
scientists’ visits could be transformed into both powerful public relations coups for the
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Soviet Jewry movement, and subtle demonstrations of the price Soviet authorities would
pay if they decided to deal decisively with the problem. Thus, in April 1974, Soviet
authorities had to confront a mass international outpouring of support for the organizers
of an international session of the Moscow Scientific Seminar- the most famous of
refusenik semi-regular gatherings in the 1970s. Mark Azbel’ and Aleskandr Voronel’, the
seminar’s organizers, used a lacuna in Soviet law - the lack of any ban on independently
organizing international scientific meetings - to send invitations to hundreds of foreign
scientists, many of whom (including 8 Nobel Prize winners) gladly accepted. Faced with
the prospect of a massive Zionist gathering on Soviet soil, Soviet authorities refused visas
to foreign attendees, arrested the seminar organizers, and scattered the few foreign
scientists present in Moscow for other purposes who attempted to attend it. However,
Voronel’, Azbel’, and many other seminar attendees were allowed to emigrate in the next
2 years.1007
In an even more powerful action, the 1984 Congress Federation of European
Biochemical Societies in Moscow was a Zionist tour de force. Again, the Soviets could
not deny the Israeli delegation, headed by biochemist and ex-President Ephraim Katzir,
permission to attend the Congress. They and many other participants used the Congress
to smuggle large amounts of Zionist materials into the Soviet Union. Some scientists
included dedications to refusenik scientists on their slides, while others conducted sideseminars with Moscow refuseniks.1008 The Soviets retaliated by deporting a small number
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of participants, and briefly detaining Katzir and his wife during a visit to Leningrad– a
detention Soviet authorities were then forced to disavow when it became international
news.1009 And what better epitaph could there be for the Soviet effort to deter the “Zionist
peddlers”

Conclusion

Somewhere in the 1990s, Yasha Kazakov, now known as Ya’kov Kedmi and serving as
head of Nativ since 1992, went on an official trip to Moscow. There, he met Filipp
Bobkov, the now retired chief of the defunct Fifth Department, for a professional summit
of sorts. According to Kedmi, this was Bobkov’s message to Nativ: “you beat us, you
broke us. Using the West, you managed to keep the refusenik movement strong, and then
used that movement to make us lose the Soviet Jews.”1010
Whether one can trust this second-hand account, or whether this was an attempt at
flattery, or perhaps post-Soviet depression on Bobkov’s part, this declaration rings far too
strong. Despite the Soviet Jewry Movement’s best efforts, the Soviet Union did not open
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its gates until 1989. Prominent Zionists were as likely to be imprisoned and sent to the
Far East as released and allowed to immigrate to the Middle East until perestroika began
in earnest, and Shcharanskii remained in prison for six long years after 8,000 scientists
vowed to boycott the Soviet Union until he was released.
And still, the success the international Soviet Jewry Movement enjoyed in forcing
the Soviets to de-facto tolerate the existence of a Jewish religious-nationalist community
on Soviet soil was evidence of the extent to which growing integration with the outside
world challenged the strategic assumptions of the Soviet state and its coercive agencies.
The latter found themselves constrained by growing Soviet dependence on the economic,
reputational, and scientific-technological benefits of international exchanges- and the
serious threat to the welfare of the Soviet state that massive coercive actions against
foreign visitors would have represented. Thus, even as it continued to operate on the
basis of a deeply ingrained institutional paranoia, the Soviet state, and especially its
sword and shield, the KGB, consistently failed to fully operationalize it. This partial
withdrawal of the Soviet absolute sovereignty claims allowed a social space for the
emergence and survival of a nationalist Jewish community in the Soviet Union- and the
flourishing of the various social ecologies and non-conformist movements we covered in
the preceding 2 chapters. As long as the underpinnings of Soviet power remained intact,
these subcultures were effectively kept to the margins of Soviet life. But when the
foundations of Soviet power were knocked out under glasnost’, the full import of this
gradual withdrawal was clear for all to see.
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Conclusion

Let us imagine a visitor to Moscow, arriving somewhere around 1985 – a certain Mister
T. perhaps. If Mister T. had visited Moscow before, perhaps 10 or 20 years prior, he
would find that very little had changed. Intourist hotels, now built by Finns, French or
Americans, are better than they used to be, but paint is already peeling, faucets are
broken, toilet paper comes at a premium, and even at Intourist restaurants, food supplies
can be spotty. Service is as rude and inefficient as ever, but one gets what one wants in
the end, possibly after some money changes hands. During his sight-seeing tours, Mr.
T.’s Intourist guide, who perhaps is preparing for a competition for the best referat on the
70th Anniversary of the October Revolution,1011 is as full of facts and figures on the
momentous achievements of Soviet power as ever.
In his hotel lobby, Mr. T. might find, with some annoyance, posters warning
locals about foreigners carrying Bibles in one hand and a dagger in another.1012 And yet,
the strange men badgering him for jeans are as active as ever, as are girls offering him
adventure for a night. If Mr. T. is on a group tour he might observe guides pretending not
to notice that some members of his group are deliberately absent from most excursions –
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and maybe followed around by furtive men in dark suits. If Mr. T. is there to make
contact with dissidents or co-religionists, he will find the experience harrowing and the
besuited men menacing, but probably not so menacing as to abort his mission. Like
everything else in the late Soviet Union, the complex ecology woven around the hundreds
of thousands of “Mister T.s” who visit the USSR yearly seems to be in a state of
inefficient, but stable, equilibrium.
And then, it all dissolved into air. For Intourist, the early days of perestroika
seemed like glimpses of a golden era, as it hosted record-breaking numbers of tourists,1013
was allowed, for the first time, to form joint ventures with foreign firms,1014 and was
bombarded by ambitious, sometimes fantastic,1015 pitches for investment projects from
foreign businessmen eager to colonize the virgin Soviet market. Between 1988 and 1990,
Intourist went through a reorganization in the spirit of “full cost-accounting, selffinancing and hard currency profitability.”1016 The Joint Stock Firm Intourist yet again
emerged as a separate entity, owned by Goskominturist (the latest incarnation of the
central Intourist bureaucracy), and a number of commercial operations were set up on the
basis of functional and territorial Intourist units (for example, Intourist-Moscow,
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Intourist-Leningrad, Intourist-Transport, and Intourist-Servis). Between this
reorganization and infusion of foreign capital and knowledge, Intourist was set to
conclude its integration into global markets, as (in theory) a flexible entity, combining a
centralized infrastructure (for instance, Intourist’s IT systems) and decentralized
operations of its sub-units.1017
Unfortunately, things did not turn out this way at all. Most fundamentally,
outside large cities, Intourist hotels and departments, faced with the collapse of Soviet
supply networks, could barely feed their clients, let alone prepare for a hypothetical
tourist surge.1018 By 1989/90, in some areas of the Soviet Union, say, Northern Ossetia,
the only guests in Intourist hotels were journalists and diplomats attempting to broker
shaky cease fires.1019 Republican Foreign Tourism Administrations, long frustrated by the
center’s practice of impounding all their hard currency proceeds, rebelled against the
center in 1988/9,1020 and by 1991, had mostly exited the scene. (In Ukraine, for instance,
the question whether Intourist existed or not in 1992 was a matter of some debate).1021
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In the Russian republic (RSFSR) itself, confusion reigned. The Intourist system
became driven by a complex (and unfortunately ill-documented) struggle that, roughly
speaking, pitted the RSFR Foreign Tourism Administration (now subordinated to
Yeltsin’s Russian government) and cooperatives organized by Intourist staff against the
central all-Union apparat, now entrenched in Intourist’s commercial structures, backed
by hotel managers and local authorities. Based on documentation produced by the
RSFSR Main Administration, the only extant archival evidence of this struggle, the
former envisioned the new Intourist system as a network of worker-owned enterprises
provided with informational and transport infrastructure by a state-owned Intourist-like
entity, while the latter sought to municipalize and/or privatize (or, as the Russians say,
prikhvatat’) Intourist’s considerable assets.1022 In 1992, Intourist split into 2 bodies, each
laying claim to the brand, and holding various bits of its erstwhile empire.1023 Meanwhile,
cities seized (and often sold for pittances or transferred to cronies) Intourist’s real-estate
holdings.1024 Tourism and state proceeds from it collapsed, due to both the general
economic crisis and the dissolution of Intourist’s infrastructure, marketing, and network
of international partners.1025 Thousands of small, under-capitalized and often fraudulent
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tour firms sold a dizzying array of services to the shrinking market, often at fire-sale
prices, with some of their members calling on the government to step in and recreate
Intourist, as “wild businesses” were destroying the industry.1026 By the mid-1990s, the
former apparat faction, having won the battle for the brand name but having lost nearly
all of Intourist’s hotels and other assets in the process, found a home in the Sistema
holding company owned by billionaire Vladimir Evtushenkov.1027 In the meantime,
foreign tourism in Russia in 2015 barely exceeded its 1989 numbers.1028
The other elements of foreign experience of the Soviet Union covered in this
dissertation also either dissolved or were transformed beyond recognition.
Unsurprisingly, Intourist’s propaganda functions gave up quickly and without much
resistance. After the 1987 celebration of the 70th Anniversary of the October Revolution,
1988 saw a rapid shift, as Intourist celebrated 1,000 years of Christianity in Russia.1029 In
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the next 2 years, guide training was stripped of its ideological components, Intourist
guides became willing to speak about difficult topics, and were allowed to maintain
personal relationships with their clients - and even visit them abroad.1030 For many
Intourist guides, the crumbling of the system offered new opportunities, first by forming
cooperatives providing services to Intourist, and then as independent tour operators,
especially for the rapidly expanding Russian outgoing tourism market.1031 For many other
tour guides, however, the 1990s brought loss of job security, prestige, and blat, as well as
the pains of deprofessionalization.1032 Things were no doubt even more dire for Intourist
doormen, waiters, and dezhurnye, who lost their uniquely privileged positions vis-à-vis
foreigners and their consumer goods.
If, as I have argued, the demimonde registered a symbolic victory over Soviet
power, many of its practitioners discovered, to their misfortune, the extent to which their
business was entangled with that power. The heyday of the foreign currency speculator
ended quickly, as, starting in 1988, the Soviet state gradually loosened its exchange
regime, thus sharply constraining the arbitrage opportunities they enjoyed.1033Russian
currency markets were, of course, nowhere near “normal” even after the shock therapy of
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of the early 1990s. The Russian government still maintained multiple currency regimes
that provided immense opportunities for well-connected speculariors. Hyper-inflation,
massive counter-fitting, and the wealth and prestige that came to be associated with those
holding baksy and kapusta (U.S dollars), kept Russian atttitudes to foreign currency,
legally, economically and culturally peculiar. Still, businesss largely moved from the
streets to currency exchange stalls and hastily established banks, often connected to
emerging business, criminal and government networks.1034 Lucky (and well-connected)
currency speculators moved into this growing sector, sometimes in route to gathering
dumbfounding riches, while less lucky ones had to discover other ways to make ends
meet.1035
Fartsovshchiki also did not fare well under the new order. While an impressive
post-Soviet mythology celebrates their escapades,1036 as a group they enjoyed far less
post-Soviet success than one would have expected based on their entrepreneurial élan.
Their place as a key component of urban Russian supply chains was rapidly lost to the
vast armies of “shuttlers” [chelnoviki] - often desperately poor women who traveled back
and forth between Russia and abroad, bringing back cheap consumer goods at quantities
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fartsovshchiki could scarcely dream of.1037 In the Russian business world, access to state
assets and Party, state and Komsomol networks counted for quite a bit more than access
to Intourist doormen,1038 meaning that relatively few fartsovshchiki could use their
business acumen for enrichment. Thus, in a comprehensive study of erstwhile Leningrad
fartsovshchiki, a Russian journalist found that only a handful of people detained in St.
Petersburg in the 1980s for badgering foreigners had prominent post-Soviet careers and
about 50% had no assets whatsoever registered to their names (meaning that they were
either dead, emigrants, or totally impoverished).1039
A similar territorial transformation occurred in the sex work field. “Domestic” sex
work involving foreigners, while it never disappeared,1040 became a mere speck
compared to the vast wave of international trafficking of women from the former Soviet
space, fed by poverty and despair, but also, perhaps, by myths about the luxurious lives
of the interdevochki and Russian women’s desire for Western men rooted in late Soviet
myths.1041
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When it came to encounters between foreigners and the KGB, outcomes are
somewhat murkier. Based on materials from Lithuanian archives, the KGB kept its
surveillance system intact to the last possible moment – tracking both the foreign
businessmen who scoured the republic for business opportunities, and Lithuanian North
Americans whom the KGB (rightly) suspected were assisting nationalist forces. 1042 While
evidence on this issue is lacking, there can be very little doubt that vast elements of the
KGB’s surveillance, agent, and reserve officer networks (which now included an obscure
colonel laboring as vice-rector of international affairs at LGU) remained intact.1043
Yet, things changed. Bible smuggling became unnecessary, as the Soviet
authorities allowed American evangelicals to legally deliver millions of Bibles.1044 The
entirety of the clandestine edifice built by Nativ was rendered obsolete, as the Israeli
embassy reopened and American visitors (including Leon Uris himself) could legally
bring copies of Exodus into the Soviet Union.1045 In the next few years, nearly 2 million
Soviet Jews emigrated, and a trickle of American rabbis and Chabad emissaries traveled
in the opposite direction to establish an institutional Jewish community that to this day
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enjoys very close relations to the Russian government.1046 Finally, in a moment that
perhaps best encapsulated the surrender to global forces, by early 1992, tourists could get
a guided tour of the KGB headquarters - for $35.1047
So, one might reasonably inquire, if our story ends in the total defeat of the
ultimate guardian of the socialist order by the all-mighty dollar and the “golden hordes”
of international travelers, is this dissertation but another neo-liberal parable about the
world becoming “flat,” and humanity surrendering to the “golden fetters” of democratic,
transnational capitalism?1048 On some level, the stories told in this dissertation are
consistent with this narrative. Beginning in the late 1950s, the Soviet institutions
surveyed here - Intourist, in both its propagandistic and commercial guises, the socialdisciplinarians of the Komsomol, official media, and even the KGB – were all forced to
make a series of compromises with forces stemming from the Soviet opening up to the
outside world: increased dependence on foreign capital and technology, quiet acceptance
of the impossibility of selling the Soviet way of life to foreigners, and increasing
tolerance for unsanctioned commercial and, to a lesser extent, political, interactions with
foreigners. The new post-Stalin order these compromises shaped was contradictory,
reactive, and straddled a profound chasm between the ethos of Soviet institutions and the
illicit practices they tolerated and, at times, engaged in. Seen from this vantage point,
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such compromises, by no means limited to foriegners and their Soviet interlocutors,
hollowed out the Soviet order, and made its dissolution seem, using Yurchak’s language
“completely unsusprising” when the last barriers to the cultural and economic forces of
Westernization were inadvertently removed under Gorbachev.
However, Porous Empire tells another, more complex (and, if one is so inclined,
darker) story. Soviet institutions were no mere bystanders to the USSR’s move from
“isolation to globalization,” from late-Stalinist Soviet naïve patriotism to late Soviet
infatuation with the “True West.”1049 Rather, they actively shaped the terms under which
this shift unfolded. As this dissertation amply demonstrated, attitudes inherited from the
Stalinist period: a neo-mercantilist ethic regarding foreign trade, a deep commitment to
moral purity and social discipline, profound suspicion of the outside world, and refusal to
bow down to foreign judgments of Soviet reality, still shaped Soviet attitudes towards
engagement with the outside world well into the 1980s.
Despite the contradictions that the clash between these attitudes and the realities
of the post-Stalin period engendered, the institutional resistance of the Soviet state to the
demands of this order helped shape the course of late Soviet and post-Soviet history. In
the late Soviet period, the structures of the planned economy constrained the choices of
even the most “global” of Soviet institutions, Intourist. Soviet tour guides’ unflinching
commitment to the official line vexed and amused their Western charges but also served
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as a reminder of the seemingly unbreakable solidity of the Soviet state. The demimonde
was an irrepressible social institution that embarrassed Soviet authorities and fed Soviet
urban obsession with jeans and rock-n’roll – but it was also a marginal sub-culture
belonging to which carried significant risk and social stigmas. Foreign travel provided
force multipliers for small networks and communities of dissent, but effective repression
prevented the transnational institutional building that helped forge liberal pressure groups
that shaped transitions from authoritarianism to democracy elsewhere: the vast complex
of Catholic and civil society institutions, academic communities, trade union activists, all
able to gain easy access both to foreigners at home and to travel abroad which emerged
in, say, late socialist Poland or late Francoist Spain was quite inconceivable in the
USSR.1050
The late Soviet opening up to the outside world is therefore best understood as a
case of selective Westernization, or what anthropologist Anna Lowenhaupt Tsing
memorably termed friction: “the grip of encounter” between local cultures and global
forces that reshapes non-Western localities but also helps forge new local, and often antiWestern, communities and identities.1051 From this vantage point, the late Soviet period
saw not the erosion but the reconfiguration of Soviet identities, as Soviet elites (as well as
a significant majority of the Soviet body politic) came to embrace some elements of
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Western culture, from jeans to rock ‘n roll to European high culture, while maintaing
fidelity to a highly adversarial view of relations between the Soviet Union and the West.
This perspective on late Soviet society has the crucial benefit of allowing us to
historicize contemporary Russian political culture. Following Gorbachev’s brief attempt
to resolve the contradictions between Soviet institutional attitudes and global structures
by means of unabashed internationalism and a view of the Soviet Union as an integral
part of the West,1052 and the near dissolution of Russian institutions in the 1990s, official
late Soviet views regarding relations between Russia and the West are still woven into the
fabric of the newly reconstituted Russian state. Here, evidence from the last several years
is overwhelming that the current Russian regime is both heavily influenced by suspicions
of the outside world and is displaying an impressive measure of what political scientists
term “authoritarian learning”- applying lessons from the failures of other authoritarian
regimes- in regards to the ideological overreaches, contradictions, and inefficiencies that
made Soviet responses to the global era brittle, unsatisfying, and in the end, selfdefeating. 1053
The successful authoritarian learning of the Russian authorities is most evident in
the two fields where Soviet responses to the outside world were weakest: economics and
cultural consumption. As political scientist Anni Kangas shows, despite its recent
flirtation with autarkic rhetoric, Putin’s regime successfully combined a deep
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commitment to economic nationalism with neoliberal reform by recasting the latter as the
necessary foundation of state power in the modern age.1054 Similarly, Russian authorities
were, until very recenly1055, generally uninterested in its citizens’ cultural consumption,
reading habits, or travel patterns – thus resolutely taking such things out of the political
arena.
On the other hand, the Russian state, famously manned by many graduates of the
KGB, has maintained an ideological commitment to Soviet era state-paranoid views of
the global age, ideological commitments that are increasingly becoming the foundation of
state action. Thus, as we have seen in Chapter Four, KGB-derived Russian elites
resolutely considered the collapse of the Soviet Union via the prism of Soviet state
paranoia. As Julie Fedor demonstrates, from the very dawn of the post-Soviet era, such
readings of the past made the FSB view itself as the guardian of the purity and integrity
of the Russian nation, leading charges against “sects” and now, increasingly, queer
people, as vectors of foreign-derived ideological pollution.1056 Since the post-2012
elections, Russian elites have repeatedly connected domestic opposition with Western
plans to destabilize Russia, moved to restrict Western NGOs, brand civil society
institutions in Russia as “Foreign Agents,”1057 and unsubtly connected effeminacy and
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privilege associated with the “creative class” - all rhetorical ploys familiar (mutatis
mutandis) to readers of this dissertation.
As was the case in the Soviet Union, such rhetoric is often accompanied by
action. In recent years, a number of scholars, sometimes at the instigation of state-owned
television, conducted profilaktika by compiling “stop-lists” of enemies of Russia.1058
Anecdotal reports by tour guides indicate that in a manner unprecedented even in Soviet
times, American tourists are facing at least some level of street harassment from locals
unhappy about Russian-American relations.1059
Finally, as in the wake of the Ukrainian conflicts, terms like “political
technology,” “hybrid warfare” and “Putin’s army of trolls” became buzzwords of global
discourse on Russia and the West.1060 Russian challenges to the Western-dominated
global order and the central role of propaganda in providing backing to these challenges
have yet again moved to the forefront of global politics.1061 And here, yet again, late
Soviet practices prove rather illuminating. Seen from the early 21st century, the robotic
utterances of Soviet tour guides that so often baffled and amused contemporaries seem
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less and less like the last gasps of a dying ideology and more like a reminder of Russia’s
seemingly unlimited capacity to generate epistemological defiance of the West.
While we would be foolhardy to propose that any single manifestation of
illiberalism or hostility to the West is a product of irreducible Soviet (or even worse,
primordial Russian) xenophobia, taken together they suggest that historiographical
narratives of the late Soviet period are due for an update taking account of the realities of
Putin’s Russia. Even as the Soviet opening up to the world promoted Westernization and
undermined some of the ideological foundations of Soviet power, it also generated,
within the bowels of Soviet institutions, a profound and honestly-held commitment to
authoritarianism and social discipline as instruments of geopolitical resistance. This
ambiguous response to the Soviet opening up to the world remains an underexplored
aspect of the late Soviet experience – and the historical profession would do well to scour
the period not only for harbingers of Soviet collapse, but also for the mental and
institutional factors that helped so many Soviet institutional and mental habits to survive
for so long after 199
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Graeber, Andreas. "Monolithic Intentionality, Belonging and the Production of State
Paranoia: A View Through the Stasi Onto the Late GDR." In Off Stage/On Display:
Intimacies and Ethnographies in the Age of Public Culture, edited by Andrew
Shyrock, 244-277. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004.
Gregory, Paul and Mark Harrison. "Allocation under Dictatorship: Research in Stalin's
Archives." Journal of Economic Literature 43, no. 3 (Sep 2005, 2005): 721-761.
Grekul, Lisa. Leaving Shadows: Literature in English by Canada's Ukrainians.
Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 2005.
Guillory, Sean. "Culture Clash in the Socialist Paradise: Soviet Patronage and African
Students' Urbanity in the Soviet Union." Diplomatic History 38, no. 2 (2014, 271281.
Hagenloh, Paul. Stalin's Police: Public Order and Mass Repression in the USSR, 19261941. Washington, D.C.; Baltimore: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2009.

372

Harrison, Mark. "Accounting for Secrets." The Journal of Economic History 73, no. 04
(2013): 1017-1049.
Harrison, Mark. One Day we will Live without Fear: Everyday Lives Under the Soviet
Police State. Palo Alto, CA: Hoover Institute Press, 2016.
Harrison, Andrew. Passover Revisited: Philadelphia's Efforts to Aid Soviet Jews, 19631998. Madison NJ; Cranbury, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press; London;
Associated University Presses, 2001.
Harrison, David. Tourism and the Less Developed Countries. London; New York:
Belhaven Press, 1992.
Haslam, Jonathan. Near and Distant Neighbors: A New History of Soviet Intelligence.
First edition. ed. 2015.
Hazbun, Wale. Beaches, Ruins, Resorts: The Politics of Tourism in the Arab World.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008.
Hessler, Julie. "Death of an African Student in Moscow." Cahiers Du Monde Russe
(/01/2006, 06): 33; 33-64; 64.
Heydenmann, Steven and Reinoud Leenders, “Authoritarian Learning and Authoritarian
Resilience: Regime Responses to the ‘Arab Awakening’.” Globalizations 8, no.
5(2011): 647-653.
Hill, Kent Richmond, The Soviet Union on the Brink: An Inside Look at Christianity &
Glasnost. Portland, OR: Multnomah, 1991.
Hixson, Walter L. Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 19451961. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997.
Hoffman, David. The Billion Dollar Spy: A True Story of Cold War Espionage and
Betrayal 2015.
Hoffman, David. The Oligarchs: Power and Wealth in the New Russia. New York:
Public Affairs, 2002.
Hollander, Paul. Intellectual Pilgrims: Western Intellectuals in Search of the Good
Society. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1998.
Högselius, Per. Red Gas: Russia and the Origins of European Energy Dependence. New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.

373

Holquist, Peter. ""Information is the Alpha and Omega of our Work": Bolshevik
Surveillance in its Pan-European Context." The Journal of Modern History 69, no. 3
(1997): 415-450.
Hornsby, Rob. Protest, Reform and Repression in Khrushchev's Soviet Union.
Cambridge, U.K. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
Hutchings, Raymond. Soviet Secrecy and Non-Secrecy. Totowa, N.J.: Barnes & Noble,
1988.
Ilic, Melanie and Jeremy Smith. Khrushchev in the Kremlin: Policy and Government in
the Soviet Union, 1953-1964. London; New York, NY: Routledge, 2011.
———. Soviet State and Society under Nikita Khrushchev. London; New York:
Routledge, 2009.
Iakovlev, N. N. 1 Avgusta 1914. Moscow: Moskvitianin, 1993.
Irvin, Sam. Kay Thompson: From Funny Face to Eloise. New York: Simon & Schuster,
2010.
Jaakson, Reiner. "Tourism in Transition in Post-Soviet Estonia." Annals of Tourism
Research 23, no. 3 (7, 1996): 617-634.
Johnston, Rob. Analytic Culture in the US Intelligence Community: An Ethnographic
Study. Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2005.
Jong, Ben de, “The KGB View of the West: Conspiracies and Agents of Influence,” in
The Future a Memory: The Cold War and Intillegence Services edity by Heiner
Timmerman, 77-96, Berlin: Lit. Verlag Dr. W. Hopf, 2013.
Kangas, Anni. “Market Civilization Meets Economic Nationalism: the Discourse of
Nation in Russia's Modernization.” Nations and Nationalism 19, no. 3(2008): 572591.
Kas’ianov, H. V. Nezhodni: Ukrains’ka intelihentsiia v rusi oporu 1960-80-Kh rokiv.
Kyiv: "Lybid’", 1995.
Kelly, Catriona. St. Petersburg: Shadows of the Past. New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 2014.
Kevorkov, V. General Boiarov. Moscow: Sovershenno sekretno, 2003.
———. Viktor Lui: chelovek s legendoi. Moscow: Sem’ dnei, 2010.

374

Khanin, Vladimir (Ze’v). Shestidnevnaia Voina i Evreiskoe dvizhenie v SSSR.
Akademicheskaia Seriia; Variation: Moscow: Sefer, 2008.
Khotchenkov, Iu.M. Prostitutsiia i prestupnost’: Problemy, diskussii, predlozheniia.
Moscow: IUrid. lit-ra, 1991.
Kharkhordin, Oleg. The Collective and the Individual in Russia: A Study of Practices.
Berkeley, Calif: University of California Press, 1999.
Kirasirova, Masha. "“Sons of Muslims” in Moscow: Soviet Central Asian Mediators to
the Foreign East, 1955–1962." Ab Imperio 4, (2011): 106-132.
Koivunen, Pia. "The 1957 Moscow Youth Festival: Propagating a New, Peaceful Image
of the Soviet Union." In Soviet State and Society under Nikita Khrushchev, edited by
Mellanie Ilic and Jeremy Smith, 46-65. London: Routledge, 2009.
Kon, I. S. Seksual’naia kul’tura v Rossii: Klubnichka na Berezke. Moscow: O.G.I, 1997.
Konstantinov, Andrei and Igor’ Shusharin. Banditskii Peterburg: dokumental’nye
ocherki. Saint Petersrubg: Neva, 2004.
Kostyrchenko, G.V Plenu u krasnogo Faraona : politicheskie presledovanii︠︡ a Evreev v
SSSR v poslednee Stalinskoe desi︠︡ atiletie. Dokumental'noe issledovanie. Moscow:
"Mezhdunar. otnoshenii︠a︡", 1994.
Kostyrchenko, G.V. Tainaia Politika Khrushchëva : Vlast’, intelligentsiia, Evreiskii
vopros. Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 2012.
Korey, William. Russian Antisemitism, Pamyat, and the Demonology of Zionism. Chur,
Switzerland: Harwood Acad. Publishers, 1995.
Kornai, János. The Socialist System: The Political Economy of Communism. Oxford :
Clarendon Press ; Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press.
Kostianen, Auvo. "The Vodka Trail: Finnish Travelers’ Motivation to Visit the Former
Soviet Union." In Travel Patterns: Past and Present, edited by Timo Toivonen and
Janne Ahtola, 33-48. Savonlinna: University of Joensuu, 1999.
Kotkin, Stephen. “Russia’s Perpetual Geopolitics” Foreign Affairs 96, no.3(2016): 2-9.
———. “Mongol Commonwealth? Exchange and Governance across the Post-Mongol
Space”. Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 8, no.3 (2007): 487531.

375

——— .“Modern Times: The Soviet Union and the Interwar Conjuncture”. Kritika:
Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 2.No. 1(2001), 111-164.
Kotsonis, Yanni. States of Obligation : Taxes and Citizenship in the Russian Empire and
Early Soviet Republic. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014.
Kozovoi, Andrei. "Dissonant Voices: Soviet Youth Mobilization and the Cuban Missile
Crisis." Journal of Cold War Studies 16, no. 3 (2014): 29; 29-29; 29.
———. "The Way to a Man's Heart: How the Soviet Travel Agency Sputnik Struggled to
Feed Western Tourists." Journal of Tourism History 6, no. 1 (2014): 57-73.
Kupferberg, Herbert. The Raised Curtain: Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task
Force on Soviet-American Scholarly and Cultural Exchanges. New York: Twentieth
Century Fund, 1977.
Krylova, Anna. "The Tenacious Liberal Subject in Soviet Studies." Kritika: Explorations
in Russian and Eurasian History 1, no. 1 (2000): 119-146.
LaPierre, Brian. Hooligans in Khrushchev's Russia: Defining, Policing, and Producing
Deviance during the Thaw. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2012.
Laruelle, Marlene. "The Iuzhinskii Circle: Far-Right Metaphysics in the Soviet
Underground and its Legacy Today." The Russian Review 74, no. 4 (2015): 563-580.
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1993.

378

———. Yeḥasim meyuḥadim: Berit ha-Moʻatsot u-vaʻalot beritah ṿe-yaḥasehen ʻim haʻam ha-Yehudi, ha-ysiyonut u-Medinat Yiśraʼel 1939-1959. Sdeh Boḳer: ha-Merkaz
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